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Summary  
This thesis is a collection of three related papers examining how academics handle 
multiple demands in the UK higher education sector, as outlined in chapter one. It suggests 
why some academics progress faster through their careers than others and why gender 
imbalances may persist in academia. It uses a behavioural approach to these questions by 
examining the role of individual preferences, differing responsiveness to student expectations 
and engagement and biases in evaluations of teaching. 
Chapter two reports the effect of individual research, teaching and time preferences 
on time allocated to research. I find that devoting more time to research is associated with 
higher levels of seniority. I find that preferences for research and teaching are in conflict and 
greater preferences for research predict more time allocated to research. Further, there are 
significant gender differences in research preference that provide a lens to examine a male 
career advantage in academia. 
Chapter three reports a survey experiment testing the motivation of academics 
devoting more time to extra-curricular teaching effort, when it is in conflict with research 
time. I test whether student expectations of support and student engagement motivates extra-
curricular teaching effort, as well as examine gender differences in the responsiveness to 
expectations and engagement. I find that expectations and engagement affect extra-curricular 
teaching effort positively for both male and female academics.  
Chapter four tests for gender bias in teaching evaluations, following from findings 
that female academics may devote less time to research and more time to teaching (chapter 
two). I find evidence of gender bias and show that gender bias may be eliminated by the 
academic’s seniority but not by a high warmth teaching style. I find no evidence of less 
biased evaluations by those who anticipate gender bias. 
Chapter five summarizes the findings of this thesis and concludes.    
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Introduction  
This thesis is a collection of three related papers examining how academics handle 
multiple demands in the UK higher education sector. The handling of multiple demands in 
academia is important to individual careers, student outcomes and institutional productivity. 
The UK higher education sector generates up to £73 billion of output, accounts for 2.8% of 
GDP and for 2.7% of all UK employment, the equivalent of 757, 268 full-time jobs (Kelly, 
McNicoll, & White, 2014). A strategic review of the sector highlights the need to develop 
and retain talented academics in an increasingly demanding environment (Deloitte LLP, 
2015). Academics face the challenges of rising student expectations and a focus on value for 
money as well as rising quality standards for both research and teaching (Department for 
Business Innovation and Skills, 2016).    
The papers, which follow at chapters two, three and four, are each self-contained but 
address common central questions of why some academics progress faster through their 
careers than others and why male academics may enjoy a career advantage. A central 
conceptual theme of these papers is that academics have some degree of discretion in their 
time allocation decisions between research, teaching and administration/service with 
consequences for career outcomes. Academic choice and discretion, associated with 
academic autonomy in time allocated to research, professionalism and trust, were 
characteristics of the system of liberal governmentality prevailing in UK higher education 
until the 1980s. This has subsequently given way to a system of neoliberal governmentality 
with a marketization of public sector higher education in the UK (Canaan & Shumar, 2008; 
Olssen & Peters, 2005; Olssen, 2016). The effect has been to establish principal-agent line 
management chains leading to control through workload accountability, facilitated by 
Information and Communication Technology (ICT), and reduced academic autonomy 
(Canaan & Shumar, 2008; J. Kenny & Fluck, 2014; J. Kenny, 2017; Vardi, 2009). With 
 3 
 
widening student participation and universities largely funded on a per student basis, 
students’ choice of university, as consumers and economic beneficiaries, is central to this 
model. Student choice will depend on both teaching quality, for employment prospects, and 
research-driven prestige such that combining both high quality teaching and research is 
desirable for universities (Canaan & Shumar, 2008; Olssen & Peters, 2005). 
However, for academics, acting as agents in a principal-agent relationship, teaching, 
research and administration/service may be viewed as substitutes in their use of time (Gautier 
& Wauthy, 2007; Hattie & Marsh, 1996; Marsh & Hattie, 2002). Arguably, some residual 
academic autonomy has persisted and re-evolved in the 21st century to permit the substitution 
of activities (Fumasoli, Gornitzka, & Maassen, 2014; Nokkala & Bacevic, 2014; Zgaga, 
2012). Indeed, the incentives to devote time to research may have increased due to the 
requirements of the Research Excellence Framework, an increasing institutional focus on 
gaining research funding, and the existence of an international labour market where research 
publications are more portable than teaching (Canaan & Shumar, 2008; Gautier & Wauthy, 
2007; Murphy & Sage, 2014). More recently, the Teaching Excellence Framework has also 
incentivised teaching (Department for Business Innovation and Skills, 2016). The incentives 
facing academics, and their intrinsic motivations for each role, may influence choices 
between research and teaching subject to institutional constraints. Indeed academics have 
been shown to use the discretion that remains in their roles to produce very different 
occupational profiles with differences in the allocation of their working time (Allgood & 
Walstad, 2013; Boyd & Smith, 2016; El Ouardighi, Kogan, & Vranceanu, 2013; Gautier & 
Wauthy, 2007; Kossi, Lesueur, & Sabatier, 2015; Wilkin & Tavernier, 2002). This remaining 
element of academic choice and discretion forms the basis for chapter two, focusing on 
individual preferences, and chapter three, focusing on differing responsiveness to student 
expectations and engagement.  
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A focus on differential career outcomes by gender is in the context of a continuing 
low female representation at professor level, standing at 23% (Higher Education Statistics 
Agency, 2017). In contrast, postgraduate student numbers, from which academics will 
emerge, are weighted 56.2% to 43.8% in favour of women. Differential career outcomes have 
been attributed to systemic cultural sexism in a male-centered academic system, affecting 
hiring and evaluation, with gendered role expectations and increased gender inequalities at 
the intersectionality of gender and motherhood (Heijstra, Bjarnason, & Rafnsdóttir, 2015; 
O'Hagan, 2018; Savigny, 2014; Savigny, 2017). Certainly female academics face different 
societal expectations for care giving which may lead to gendered differences in time usage 
and power over time (Beddoes, 2015; Heijstra et al., 2015; Rafnsdóttir & Heijstra, 2013). 
Further, gender differences in volunteering for non-promotable administration/service tasks, 
as part of their time allocation, and gender differences in recognizing contributions have been 
studied extensively (Babcock, Recalde, Vesterlund, & Weingart, 2017; Sarsons, 2017; 
Vesterlund, Babcock, & Weingart, 2014). In this context, analysing gender differences in 
handling the multiple demands of academia is of great interest. Conceptually, whilst 
controlling for domestic responsibilities (number of children, young children, job mobility), I 
assume that both male and female academics have some power over their allocation of time 
and in this context the descriptive statistics in chapter two show little difference in total hours 
worked per week by gender. Chapters two and three focus on gender differences in time 
allocations and chapter four on gender differences in outcomes as a result of gender biases in 
teaching evaluations.  
In the three papers that follow, a specific conceptual position has been taken with 
regards to gender. A feminist distinction has been made between gender, as an imposed social 
construct, and sex, as biologically determined (Harrison, 2006; Mikkola, 2008). This has led 
to an extensive literature on gender differences (Croson & Gneezy, 2009; Niederle, 2016).  In 
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chapters two and three, I study gender differences but using sex as an operationalisation of 
gender, given that “biological sex is an appropriate operationalization when studying gender 
…. at the social structural level.  In this case, research examines around issues such as others' 
perceptions, attributions, attitudes, or behaviours toward a target person (e.g., stereotyping, 
sexism, and tokenism).  In such instances, sex is a more salient and overt cue than gender 
role; therefore, perceivers' judgments and actions will more likely be influenced by the sex of 
the target person (i.e., their status or their attributed gender assignment as a man or a woman) 
than by the target person's gender identity or gender-role traits or attitudes.” (Korabik, 1999, 
p 20). Chapter four features an experiment that manipulates perceived gender, as 
operationalised by sex. 
Whilst each paper tackles a separate theme, there are commonalities in the methods 
and research strategies employed, with behavioural experiments used to address specific 
research questions. Chapter two examines the daily challenge faced by academics in 
balancing the conflicting demands of career-enhancing research with teaching and 
administration/service duties. I find devoting more time to research is associated with high 
levels of academic seniority. I use individual research, teaching and time preferences to 
examine differences in allocating time to research. I find that preferences for research and 
teaching are in conflict in allocating time to career-enhancing research. Further, I find gender 
differences in research preference that may contribute to a male career advantage in 
academia.     
Chapter three provides another resolution of the conflict between devoting time to 
either research or teaching. I examine why some academics devote more time to supporting a 
student, when extra-curricular teaching effort is in conflict with a career-enhancing research 
grant application. I test whether, where academics’ have discretion over teaching effort, high 
levels of student expectations of support and student engagement lead to increased extra-
 6 
 
curricular teaching effort. I also examine gender differences in the responsiveness to 
expectations and engagement.  
I find that high student expectations of support and student engagement give rise to 
extra-curricular teaching effort. The findings are mixed with regard to the mechanism for 
these effects. On the one hand, I control for individual differences in guilt proneness (T. 
Cohen, Kim, Jordan, & Panter, 2014), and show a significant correlation of guilt proneness 
with extra-curricular teaching effort. This provides support for guilt aversion possibly being a 
mechanism for in-the-moment effects of student expectations and engagement on extra-
curricular teaching effort. On the other hand, I find that female academics are more prone to 
guilt than male academics. Yet, there are no gender differences in how female versus male 
academics respond to student expectations of support and student engagement. I discuss these 
seemingly conflicting findings and suggest promising avenues for future research. 
Chapter four examines gender biases in teaching evaluations, following from findings 
that female academics may devote less time to research and more time to teaching in chapter 
two. I test whether female academics are assessed more poorly than their male peers for equal 
performance, by manipulating the gender of the candidate being assessed, leading to unfair 
decisions during academics’ careers.  
In two controlled experiments, I examine whether gender bias is eliminated by an 
academic’s high warmth teaching style and by seniority.  I find that gender bias lowers 
recommendations to hire female academics delivering identical content as male academics, 
with the effect mediated by evaluations of the academic’s warmth and/or competence. In 
Study 1, I test competing hypotheses regarding the effect of teaching style on gender bias. I 
find that a high warmth teaching style increases women’s perceived warmth, but decreases 
their perceived competence, so gender bias in hiring recommendations remains. In Study 2, I 
find that gender bias disappears for senior academics. Finally, I find no evidence of less 
 7 
 
biased evaluations by those who anticipate gender bias. I discuss my findings in the higher 
education context and make recommendations to mitigate gender bias in teaching 
evaluations. 
As the basis for chapters two and three of this thesis, over 1,400 UK academics 
contributed to a unique dataset of preferences and experimental responses. This represents a 
point of difference to many behavioural studies using student samples in that responses were 
gathered from the same subject group who face multitasking decisions in every day real-
world settings. For chapter four, the experiments were conducted using Prolific.com, an 
academic website aimed at recruiting and screening candidates for experimental 
manipulations (Peer, Brandimarte, Samat, & Acquisti, 2017). The use of behavioural 
experiments in an applied setting enables one to gain a more fine grained understanding of 
how academics handle multiple demands and to manipulate independent variables associated 
with time allocation decisions.  
I contribute to the existing literature in each of chapters two to four. Academic’s 
preferences for research and teaching have received limited attention and my work represents 
a significant step in exploring the link between preferences and career outcomes (Callaghan 
& Coldwell, 2014; Matthews, Lodge, & Bosanquet, 2014). I add to this literature by finding 
the mediating role of a preference for research in devoting time to research activities. I also 
add to the literature on the relationship between the roles of research and teaching, by finding 
a conflict between research and teaching preferences (Hattie & Marsh, 1996; Marsh & Hattie, 
2002) and to the study of gender differences in role preferences (Gino, Wilmuth, & Brooks, 
2015).  
In finding that student expectations and engagement lead to extra-curricular teaching 
effort, my work contributes to the applications of the social exchange theory (Blau, 1964; 
Emerson, 1976). Guilt aversion has been characterised as an individual altering their 
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behaviour to avoid guilt from failing to line up to the expectations of others, in order to 
maintain and strengthen relationships (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994). In testing 
for guilt as a possible mechanism for the in-moment decision to devote extra-curricular 
teaching effort, I contribute to the literature on guilt aversion in an applied setting (Battigalli 
& Dufwenberg, 2007; Charness & Dufwenberg, 2006). 
Existing field studies of gender bias in teaching evaluations, the subject of chapter 
four, have yet to consider the role of evaluations of warmth and competence in this setting 
(MacNell, Driscoll, & Hunt, 2015; Ottoboni, Boring, & Stark, 2016). Very few studies have 
considered the role of academic seniority in teaching evaluations (Mengel, Sauermann, & 
Zölitz, 2017) or the debiasing of evaluations (Boring & Arnaud, 2017). I extend these studies, 
and derive new insights, in a controlled experimental setting.    
 To summarize, the focus of this thesis is in extending behavioural approaches into the 
applied, and economically relevant, setting of the UK higher education sector to study how 
academics handle multiple demands and the differential effects on their career outcomes. 
chapter five concludes this thesis by summarizing the results of chapters two to four, 
outlining the policy implications of these results, subject to their external (ecological) 
validity, and pointing out promising directions for further research.  
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“Understanding the research time allocations of academics and its 
association with career success.” 
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Abstract 
Academics face a daily challenge in balancing the conflicting demands of career-
enhancing research with teaching and service duties. Using a unique dataset gathered from 
UK academics across multiple departments, I find, as anticipated, that those who devote more 
time to research hold higher academic titles. I use individual research, teaching and time 
preferences to examine differences in allocating time to research and I find that preferences 
for research and teaching are in conflict. I also find that there are significant gender 
differences in preferences for research and teaching. Gender differences in research 
preference are directly associated with a greater allocation of time to research by male 
academics, which may contribute to a male career advantage in academia. I discuss my 
findings in terms of their potential to shed light on the unexplained gender difference in 
career outcomes in academia.    
 
 
 
Introduction 
In this paper, I examine how academics handle the multiple demands of their work, 
and allocate time to research as against teaching and administration/service. Academic 
discretion in the allocation of time has been eroded by increasing workload accountability, 
facilitated by Information and Communications Technology (ICT) (J. Kenny & Fluck, 2014; 
J. Kenny, 2017; Vardi, 2009). This has been a feature of the neoliberal model of marketised 
public sector higher education in the UK (Canaan & Shumar, 2008; Olssen & Peters, 2005; 
Olssen, 2016). Student choice, and the flow of funding from students, is central to this model. 
This has made both high quality teaching, to enhance student employment prospects, and 
research-driven prestige, desirable for universities (Canaan & Shumar, 2008; Olssen & 
Peters, 2005). 
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However, subject to workload accountability constraints, academics may view 
teaching, research and administration/service as substitutes with both the perceived incentives 
for each role and the intrinsic motivations of academics resulting in very different role 
profiles in practice (Allgood & Walstad, 2013; Gautier & Wauthy, 2007; Kossi et al., 2015; 
Wilkin & Tavernier, 2002). Certainly beyond minimum requirements for teaching, how much 
more time and effort spent to improve the quality and quantity of teaching activities may be 
discretionary (Boyd & Smith, 2016; El Ouardighi et al., 2013). This is reflected in my 
descriptive statistics, with gender differences in time allocated to each role despite working 
similar hours. Compared to female academics, male academics allocate more time to research 
(19.30 hours versus 16.68 hours per week) and less time to teaching (18.05 hours versus 
19.28 hours). Assessing differences in the relative amounts of time academics actually, rather 
than contractually, spend on research, teaching and administration/service is therefore of 
interest, with 60% of UK full-time academics engaged in concurrent research and teaching 
roles (Higher Education Statistics Agency, 2018). 
Whilst many socio-organisational factors can influence research productivity 
(Beerkens, 2013; Fox & Mohapatra, 2007; Kern, 2011), my interest in the decision to allocate 
time to research arises from the positive relationship between time use and research 
productivity (Chen, Gupta, & Hoshower, 2006; Hattie & Marsh, 1996; Stack, 2004; Tower, 
Plummer, & Ridgewell, 2007). The further link between research productivity and career 
progression in academia (Cadez, Dimovski, & Zaman Groff, 2017; Parker, 2008), means that 
individual time allocation decisions may affect career outcomes. 
I argue that individual decisions to allocate time to research will be influenced by 
preferences for the activities of research and teaching, together with time preferences 
(Callaghan & Coldwell, 2014; Frederick, Loewenstein, & O'Donoghue, 2002; Matthews et 
al., 2014). A preference for research may translate directly into time spent on research. A 
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preference for teaching, as the other central function of higher education, may translate into 
teaching time allocations which can conflict with research time allocations (Hattie & Marsh, 
1996). If academics are primarily motivated by extrinsic career rewards, then time 
preferences, a measure of relative preference for larger but delayed rewards over smaller 
immediate rewards, may also matter to time allocation decisions, given the different timings 
of the benefits of research (later) and teaching (sooner) (Frederick et al., 2002).  
Notably, research, teaching and time preferences may all differ by gender and 
contribute to gender differences in career decisions and outcomes. This assumes that both 
male and female academics have power over the allocation of time in a male-centered 
academic system which I discuss below (Heijstra et al., 2015; O'Hagan, 2018; Savigny, 2014; 
Savigny, 2017). There is potential for differences in preferences to help increase the 
understanding of phenomena such as the glass ceiling in UK higher education. The 
proportion of female academics at professor level was only 23% in 2014/15 despite initiatives 
to promote gender equality (Higher Education Statistics Agency, 2017). I argue that gendered 
role and social preferences (Azmat & Petrongolo, 2014; Konrad, Ritchie Jr, Lieb, & 
Corrigall, 2000), socially constructed gender differences in delay gratification (Bjorklund & 
Kipp, 1996) and a greater female weight to trade-offs arising from progression (Gino et al., 
2015) may result in gendered research, teaching and time preferences that individually and 
together favour greater male allocations of time to research.   
As anticipated, I find that academics devoting more time to research hold higher 
academic titles. A direct relationship between hours allocated to research and a senior 
academic title is found across a range of UK academic departments with different gender 
ratios, academic cultures and traditions. I am not able to establish causality in this 
relationship as my study is based on cross-sectional data. Cross-sectional data may also be 
subject to sampling bias, omitted variable bias and the potential for two way causality 
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(Hoover, 2006) but this association provides a context for the study of individual preferences 
in allocating time to research and may be a starting point for a further longitudinal study 
(Andrews, 2018; Sedgwick, 2014).  
I examine the role of research, teaching and time preferences in the decision to 
allocate time to research. In light of the importance of research time to career outcomes, I 
find that preferences for research and teaching have conflicting effects on devoting time to 
research. In testing for gendered research, teaching and time preferences, I find that a male 
preference for research does indeed mediate a male advantage in the amount of time allocated 
to research. Although I do not find strong evidence for the mediating effects of teaching and 
time preferences, I do find a female preference for teaching and higher female rates of time 
preference. In combination, these three individual preferences mediate the effect of gender on 
time allocated to research. So, I recoded my data to identify those conditions most aligned 
with my theoretical prediction of greater time allocated to research using a technique devised 
to provide a holistic view of the alignment of characteristics associated with a positive career 
outcome (Foti & Hauenstein, 2007). This verified that gender differences in the allocation of 
time to research appear to be explained by a greater likelihood of encountering individuals 
with an aligned pattern of preferences, with my theoretical prediction of preferences 
associated with greater time allocated to research, among male academics, and a greater 
likelihood of encountering individuals with a misaligned pattern of preferences among female 
academics.   
Finding a pattern of high research preference, low teaching preference and low time 
preference associated with more research time contributes to the study of academic 
preferences (Callaghan & Coldwell, 2014; Matthews et al., 2014). In finding gendered 
differences in research preferences underlying greater male research time, I contribute 
directly to work on gender differences in role preferences (Azmat & Petrongolo, 2014; 
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Konrad et al., 2000) and to the developing conversation about gender differences in 
preferences as a whole (Croson & Gneezy, 2009). My analysis also adds to the understanding 
of gendered differences in time preferences (Bjorklund & Kipp, 1996; Dittrich & Leipold, 
2014; Silverman, 2003). 
 
 
Theory Development 
The Importance of Time Allocated to Research 
A degree of academic autonomy has arguably persisted and re-evolved dynamically 
despite the marketization of higher education (Fumasoli et al., 2014; Nokkala & Bacevic, 
2014; Zgaga, 2012). Further, academics may regard teaching, research and 
administration/service as substitutes in their use of time (Gautier & Wauthy, 2007; Hattie & 
Marsh, 1996; Marsh & Hattie, 2002). Whilst the marketization of higher education has 
restricted academic autonomy and discretion, it has arguably increased the attractiveness of 
devoting time to research through the requirements of the Research Excellence Framework, 
an increasing institutional focus on gaining research funding, and the creation of an 
international labour market where research publications are more portable than teaching 
(Canaan & Shumar, 2008; Gautier & Wauthy, 2007; Murphy & Sage, 2014). Conversely, the 
recent introduction of the Teaching Excellence Framework has also incentivised teaching 
(Department for Business Innovation and Skills, 2016). With the discretion remaining to 
them, academics may seek to change their allocation of time to research (Boyd & Smith, 
2016; Kossi et al., 2015).  
Many determinants of academic research productivity have been identified including 
individual passion, research funding, institutional and collaborative networks and other socio-
organisational factors (Beerkens, 2013; Fox & Mohapatra, 2007; Kern, 2011). Within these 
frameworks of determinants, time allocated to research has been identified as having a strong, 
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positive effect on research productivity (Chen et al., 2006; Hattie & Marsh, 1996; Stack, 
2004; Tower et al., 2007). So, all other factors being equal, an academic’s discretionary time 
allocation decisions, in the shape of time allocated to research, can have a direct impact on 
their personal research productivity.  
Personal research productivity and impact are often cited as the primary drivers of 
academic progression (Morley, 2014; West, 2016). Certainly, the Research Excellence 
Framework has focused attention on both institutional and personal research productivity 
(Murphy & Sage, 2014). In an increasingly global higher education labour market, research 
outputs are recognised as a key indicator of personal quality and may be more marketable 
than teaching efforts (Gautier & Wauthy, 2007; Mägi & Beerkens, 2016). Moreover, 
recently, research productivity has been linked to better teaching (Healey, Jordan, Pell, & 
Short, 2010; Shin, 2011; Zhang & Shin, 2015). All in all, research productivity thus becomes 
increasingly linked with positive career outcomes. So, time devoted to research may be 
expected to relate positively to career outcomes in academia. 
 
Hypothesis 1: (Academic Progression) those academics who devote more time to 
research are more likely to achieve higher academic titles. 
 
There is empirical evidence that research performance may be more important than 
teaching to academic progression to senior academic levels (Cadez et al., 2017; Parker, 
2008).  
The Role of Preferences in Time Allocated to Research 
I have argued that individual preferences, together with incentives, may create 
differences in the allocation of working time and I will focus on three types of individual 
preferences that may matter for career outcomes. Research and teaching are considered to be 
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the primary functions of higher education (Gautier & Wauthy, 2007; Hattie & Marsh, 1996). 
Additionally time preferences may influence a range of personal outcomes (Frederick et al., 
2002; Urminsky & Zauberman, 2016).  I will focus on these three preferences ahead of 
administration/service which may be non-promotable and plays a secondary role within 
higher education, generating knowledge specific to an institution compared to the more 
portable knowledge arising from research and teaching (Department for Business Innovation 
and Skills, 2016; Morley, 2014; West, 2016). I will verify whether time devoted to 
administration/service affects my findings in a robustness analysis of my results. 
A preference for research may translate directly into research time allocations 
(Matthews et al., 2014). That would mean that some academics enjoy doing research more 
than others, as a matter of taste, and thus, choose to spend more time doing what they enjoy 
more. A preference for teaching, as the other central function of higher education, may 
translate into teaching time allocations which can conflict with research time allocations 
(Hattie & Marsh, 1996). Finally, time preferences, a measure of relative preference for larger 
but delayed rewards over smaller immediate rewards may also matter to research time 
allocations if academics are strongly motivated by extrinsic career rewards, given the 
different timings of the benefits of research (later) and teaching (sooner) (Frederick et al., 
2002). I will develop the arguments for how each of these three preferences will affect time 
allocated to research in turn.  
As explained above, a preference for research will, subject to incentives and 
institutional constraints, result in greater time being allocated to research. Positive incentives, 
in the form of the research excellence framework, personal recognition and marketability, and 
academic cultural norms should aid the translation of the research preference into action 
(Fishbein, 1979; Fishbein & Ajzen, 2011). Further, studies have found a clear correlation 
between allocating time to research and research productivity (Chen et al., 2006; Hattie & 
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Marsh, 1996; Stack, 2004; Tower et al., 2007). So, allocating time to research should develop 
self-efficacy in research skills, reinforcing a preference for research and the desire to turn that 
preference into action (Bandura, 1986). Thus I would expect a stronger preference for 
research to result in greater time allocated to research. 
 
Hypothesis 2: (Research Preference) those academics who have a stronger 
preference for research will allocate more hours to research. 
 
A stronger preference for teaching will, subject to incentives, similarly result in 
greater time being allocated to teaching. Developing self-efficacy in teaching is also likely to 
reinforce a preference for teaching (Tschannen-Moran, Hoy, & Hoy, 1998). Given that 
teaching and research represent the two central functions of higher education they represent 
alternatives in allocating working time (Hattie & Marsh, 1996). The scarcity model posits 
that limited time, energy and commitment will lead to a conflict between research and 
teaching and allocating time to teaching will certainly reduce time allocated to research, all 
else remaining equal (Moore, 1963). Hence I would expect a preference for teaching to 
negatively impact time allocated to research.  
 
Hypothesis 3: (Teaching Preference) those academics who have a stronger 
preference for teaching will allocate fewer hours to research. 
 
If academics are motivated by extrinsic career rewards, then time preferences may 
impact time allocated to research given the trade-off between the costs and benefits of 
research and teaching activities occurring at different times. The costs, in allocating time to 
research and teaching, occur each academic year. The economic benefits of teaching, in the 
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form of module evaluations and their impact on performance appraisals, will arise within the 
appraisal period. However, the benefits of research may be deferred far into the future. The 
rigorous demands of publishing in highly ranked journals, lengthy gestation periods to 
publication and the cumulative nature of accruing citations all take time and career benefits 
will only accrue subsequently. Arguably, time preferences will be reflected in the rate at 
which academic benefits are discounted over time. A higher rate of time discounting will be 
consistent with a preference for the smaller but more immediate rewards of teaching, and a 
lower rate of time discounting will be consistent with a willingness to defer the larger reward 
of progression through research.   
 
Hypothesis 4: (Time Preference) those academics with a lower rate of time 
discounting will allocate more hours to research. 
 
Gender Differences in Research and Teaching Preferences.  
It is notable that all three preferences discussed above may be gender-specific. If this 
is the case, gendered preferences may be an important lens for understanding potential gender 
differences in research time allocations which, arguably, produce well-defined gender 
differences in the career outcomes of academics. In this context, lower research productivity 
has long been associated with lesser career outcomes for female academics (Larivière, 
Vignola-Gagné, Villeneuve, Gélinas, & Gingras, 2011; Leahey, 2006; Shauman & Xie, 
2003).  
A key argument in studying gender differences in preferences is that both male and 
female academics have power over their allocation of time (Fumasoli et al., 2014; Nokkala & 
Bacevic, 2014; Zgaga, 2012). Systemic cultural sexism in a male-centered academic system 
may produce gendered role expectations with increased gender inequalities at the 
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intersectionality of gender and motherhood limiting discretion (Heijstra et al., 2015; 
O'Hagan, 2018; Savigny, 2014; Savigny, 2017). Female academics face different societal 
expectations for care-giving which may lead to gendered differences in time usage and power 
over time (Beddoes, 2015; Heijstra et al., 2015; Rafnsdóttir & Heijstra, 2013). Further, 
gender differences in volunteering for non-promotable administration/service tasks may 
curtail the effect of research and teaching preferences on female academics’ time allocations 
(Babcock et al., 2017; Vesterlund et al., 2014). I develop these and other broader 
qualifications in the Sociological Considerations section of the General Discussion. Subject 
to these considerations, I will build on hypotheses 2 to 4, to formulate hypotheses for the 
mediating role of gender-specific research, teaching and time preferences on time allocated to 
research in turn.  
I anticipate a greater male preference for research, and a greater female preference for 
teaching. Publishing research in high ranking journals is a competitive process (Brembs, 
Button, & Munafò, 2013; Fanelli, 2010; Fanelli, 2012; Van Dalen & Henkens, 2012). Studies 
have found that men are more willing to engage in competitive interactions and self-select 
into competitive environments (Gneezy, Niederle, & Rustichini, 2003; Niederle & 
Vesterlund, 2007). Male role preferences for challenge, autonomy and influence, in line with 
gender stereotypes, may be an additional contributory factor to a male preference for research 
(Konrad et al., 2000). Further, neoliberalised academia has been associated with 
individualism and an increasingly international job market in higher education (Canaan & 
Shumar, 2008). Male academics, constrained by fewer domestic responsibilities relative to 
female academics, may be better placed to leverage the career advantages afforded by greater 
research productivity (Ivancheva, Lynch, & Keating, 2019; Loveday, 2018; Rafnsdóttir & 
Heijstra, 2013), also shaping a male preference for research.  
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At the same time, fewer constraints on male academics meeting the demands of 
increasing workload accountability may reinforce traditional academic stereotypes of the 
male researcher and the female teacher (MacNell et al., 2015; Powell, Ah‐King, & Hussénius, 
2018). Gendered preferences, again fashioned at the social structural level, may also 
encourage a female preference for teaching and care-giving in higher education (Ashencaen 
Crabtree & Shiel, 2018). A range of studies suggest greater female other-regarding 
preferences, and more socially oriented role preferences (Azmat & Petrongolo, 2014; Croson 
& Gneezy, 2009; Konrad et al., 2000; Tonin & Vlassopoulos, 2010). A female preference for 
affiliation and social interaction may work against a more autonomous research role in favour 
of a preference for a more socially oriented teaching role (Barbezat, 2006; Callaghan & 
Coldwell, 2014; Diener & Fujita, 1995). Whilst it can be argued that collaborative research 
roles can provide social interaction, at least part of the time is engaged on solitary activities 
such as data analysis and writing. Conversely, teaching involves both one-to-many and one-
to-one experiences, providing oneself with more episodes of social interaction. The 
preferences discussed here may be reinforced by the findings that “women have a higher 
number of life goals, .., associate more negative outcomes with high-power positions, 
perceive power as less desirable though equally attainable, and are less likely to take 
advantage of opportunities for professional advancement” (Gino et al., 2015, p. 12358). So, 
female academics may recognise the importance of research productivity to progression but 
place a lower value on academic progression, and thus on research as a means to progression, 
compared to male academics.  
Given scarce personal resources, I expect a conflict between allocating time to 
research versus teaching, all else remaining equal. Hence I would expect a male preference 
for research to both positively impact time allocated to research and negatively impact time 
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allocated to teaching and a female preference for teaching to both positively impact time 
allocated to teaching and negatively impact time allocated to research. To summarize, 
 
Hypothesis 5: (Mediation by (greater male) preference for research) the effect of 
gender on hours allocated to research will be positively mediated by 
gender differences in the preference for research. In particular, the 
positive effect of male gender on time allocated to research will be 
mediated by a greater male preference for research. 
 Hypothesis 6: (Mediation by a (greater female) preference for teaching under a 
research and teaching conflict): the effect of gender on hours 
allocated to research will be negatively mediated by gender differences 
in the preference for teaching. In particular, the positive effect of male 
gender on time allocated to research will be mediated by a lower male 
preference for teaching. 
 
There is some empirical evidence for less time being devoted to research and more to 
teaching and service by female academics (Bellas, 1999; Toutkoushian & Bellas, 1999).  
Without changing total working hours, time devoted to research, teaching and service 
are conflicting alternatives. Indeed, this view of activities as alternatives is consistent with 
evidence that many academics have stronger preferences for either research or teaching such 
that these preferences are likely to be in conflict (Callaghan & Coldwell, 2014). However, it 
is important to note that the view of research as an activity conflicting with teaching, as taken 
above, is contested by some researchers. Theoretical models have been built that assume the 
relationship between the two activities to be conflicting, complementary or for the two to be 
unrelated academic activities (Hattie & Marsh, 1996; Marsh & Hattie, 2002). Thus, I would 
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have to test empirically how preferences for research and teaching/service relate to each 
other. To date, a meta-analysis of empirical studies could not find evidence to support 
research and teaching being complementary activities (Hattie & Marsh, 1996).  
Gender Differences in Time Preferences 
I anticipate higher male time discounting rates. A greater female ability to delay 
gratification has been theorised based on the social pressures applied to women in child-
rearing (Bjorklund & Kipp, 1996). Greater delay gratification is consistent with lower female 
time discounting rates. Conversely, lower male delay gratification will lead to higher male 
time discounting rates which may lead to lower research time allocations. To summarize: 
   
Hypothesis 7: (Mediation by (lower female) rate of time preference) the effect of 
gender on hours allocated to research will be mediated by gender 
differences in time preferences. In particular, the negative effect of 
male gender on time allocated to research will be mediated by a higher 
male rate of time discounting. 
 
Empirical evidence for gender differences in delay gratification and time preferences 
is mixed. In the psychology literature, a greater female ability to delay gratification has been 
found (Bjorklund & Kipp, 1996; Silverman, 2003). The related field of economic time 
preferences has also provided some evidence for a greater female ability to defer 
gratification, consistent with lower female time discounting rates (Bauer & Chytilová, 2013; 
Dittrich & Leipold, 2014). Conversely, a series of studies have found higher, not lower, 
female time discounting rates (Beck & Triplett, 2009; Martorano, Handa, Halpern, Pettifor, & 
Thirumurthy, 2015; Reynolds, Ortengren, Richards, & de Wit, 2006). 
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All in all, I am unable to hypothesise the overall effect of gender on research hours 
allocated. I expect a positive effect of male gender on time allocated to research from 
hypotheses 5 and 6, but a negative effect from hypothesis 7, such that the combined effect 
could be either positive or negative. 
 
 
Study Design 
Participants and Design: 
The data was gathered as part of a survey sent to 12,272 academics at UK Universities 
in July 2016, with 1,418 respondents (11.6%). The integrity of responses was ensured by 
sending personalized email links to the Qualtrics based survey. Respondents starting but 
dropping out of the survey, and the restriction of the dataset to full-time staff only, reduced 
the number of respondents completing the detailed information required to 1,102 (Mage = 
45.00, SDage = 9.59, 36.8% female) as set out at Table 1. Restricting respondents to full-time 
staff only was to avoid gendered preferences for research or teaching being shaped by a 
respondent’s part-time employment status and domestic responsibilities (Fagan, 2001). The 
mean duration for completed surveys was 21 minutes 57 seconds. 
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
The number of academics invited to participate was determined by the requirements 
of an experiment embedded within the survey, which was used in chapter three of this thesis. 
Only academics with titles implying both research and teaching duties were invited to 
participate. The survey was sent to academics in 15 common departments at 27 pre-1992 
universities with both a research and teaching focus.   
I checked for selection bias by benchmarking responses (Montaquila & Olson, 2012; 
Pedersen, 2015). Female academics made up 38.5% of responses to the survey compared to a 
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benchmark for UK higher education of 37.3% (Higher Education Statistics Agency, 2017). 
Respondents at professor level at 27.5% exceeded a benchmark of 11.9%, but mirror over-
representation at 25.8% in a comparable study (Blackaby, Booth, & Frank, 2005).  
 
Materials: 
Full details of the invitation e-mail and all materials and measures within the survey 
follow at Appendix A.   
Pilot Study: I conducted a pilot study with 45 respondents (Mage = 42.80, SDage = 
10.45, 44.4% female) at the University of Surrey to test likely response rates, which were in 
line with similar surveys (Abreu, Grinevich, Hughes, & Kitson, 2009). The format of the 
invitation email was subsequently amended based on feedback. 
 
Procedure: 
Survey invitations were sent out in two batches on Wednesdays and Fridays at 15:00 
to maximise responses (Van Dessel, 2015). Non-responders were tracked and up to two 
reminder emails were sent, as appropriate, one week and two weeks respectively after the 
original invitation.   
 
Measures:  
Research Hours per Week. Participants were asked to provide a measure of their 
actual weekly hours worked (as opposed to contractual hours). They were also asked to 
provide their average percentage split between research, teaching and administration/service. 
Participant’s average research hours per week were then calculated by applying the 
percentage of time engaged in research to their average weekly hours.      
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Research Preferences. Participants were asked five questions about their preferences 
for research (The questions were “In order to be successful in academia, I need to focus on 
my research.”, “My first priority is research.”, “I am active (in the scholarship of) research.”, 
“I have recently participated in professional development in research.”, “I enjoy participating 
in research”). Four of these questions were drawn from a previous study questionnaire which 
did not report a Cronbach’s α (Matthews et al., 2014). The responses were on 5-point Likert-
type scales anchored by 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The responses were 
averaged together to form a single composite score, where higher scores indicated a greater 
preference for research (Cronbach’s α = .66). Given this relatively low value of Cronbach’s 
α, I performed factor analysis to check whether the questions loaded on multiple factors 
representing separate concepts (see Table 2) (Tavakol & Dennick, 2011). The two largest 
positive factors were 1.69202 and 0.05782 respectively, so under the Kaiser criterion the 
model is unidimensional loading on a single factor (Kaiser, 1960). 
Teaching Preferences. Participants were asked five questions about their preferences 
for teaching (The questions were “In order to be successful in academia, I need to focus on 
my teaching.”, “My first priority is teaching.”, “I am active (in the scholarship of) teaching.”, 
“I have recently participated in professional development in teaching.”, “I enjoy participating 
in teaching”). Four of these questions were drawn from a previous study questionnaire which 
did not report a Cronbach’s α (Matthews et al., 2014). The responses were on 5-point Likert-
type scales anchored by 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The responses were 
averaged together to form a single composite score, where higher scores indicated a greater 
preference for teaching (Cronbach’s α = .56). Given this low value for Cronbach’s α, I again 
performed factor analysis (see Table 2). The two largest positive factors were 1.00293 and 
0.08081 respectively, so under the Kaiser criterion the model is also unidimensional loading 
on a single factor (Kaiser, 1960).  
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Time Preferences. Participants were presented with choice pairs of either a declining 
amount paid in two days’ time or £80 at a later date. They completed seven payment choices 
in each of four tables derived from a previous study of inter-temporal discount rates (Burks, 
Carpenter, Götte, & Rustichini, 2012). Choice patterns implying negative or inconsistent 
interest rates were excluded from the analysis. A value for time preference was derived for 
each participant based on a regression over their choices. A value of 1 indicated perfect future 
focus with the larger future amount of £80 being chosen every time. Descending values from 
1 indicated progressively increasing present focus with more choices of smaller financial 
amounts in two days’ time.              
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
Control variables. I controlled for gender and also for experience, in the form of 
years since completion of a PhD. A control for research quality was based on a weighted 
index of published articles in the previous three years. A control for teaching quality was 
based on the achievement of teaching evaluation scores in excess of 4 out of 5 in the last 
academic year. Controls for domestic responsibilities measured by number of children, either 
one child under 5 years old or two children under 5 years old and mobility were also 
included.     
Incentives and checks 
Lotteries were used to incentivise the completion of the survey (Göritz, 2006). A prize 
of £300 was awarded to the respondent most accurately predicting the behavioural norms of 
other academics towards teaching duties. This was calculated as the response that minimises 
the sum of absolute deviations from the mean of each response within each academic 
discipline. A prize of up to £80 was awarded randomly, with a 1 in 300 chance of winning, as 
part of the end-of-survey questionnaire to elicit the time preferences of responders. In 
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addition to incentivising the completion of the survey, these specific awards were designed to 
make the questions they referred to more salient.  
To test for selection bias arising from the use of incentives, I used two formats of 
survey invitation email. In one format I described the incentives whilst in the other format, I 
omitted this information. There were no significant differences in the characteristics of 
respondents between the two formats.  
  
 
Results 
Descriptive statistics for study variables are shown in Table 3. Although male and 
female academics report similar working hours (50.99 hours and 50.26 hours per week 
respectively), their allocation of time between roles differs. Overall, male academic 
respondents allocate 19.30 hours per week on average to research, female academics 16.68 
hours per week. The effect size of the gender difference, measured by Cohen’s D is .27. Male 
academics allocate 18.05 hours per week on average to teaching, female academics 19.28 
hours per week. The effect size of the gender difference, measured by Cohen’s D is -.16.  
Within this dataset there is little gender difference in the burden of administration/ 
service. Male academic respondents allocate 13.64 hours per week on average and female 
academics 14.30 hours per week. The effect size of the gender difference, measured by 
Cohen’s D is -.08. At academic levels below professor, the gender difference is very small 
(Male respondents 13.10 hours per week, female respondents 12.94 hours per week and 
Cohen’s D is .02). At professor level, the gender difference is large (Male respondents 15.19 
hours per week, female respondents 19.12 hours per week and Cohen’s D is -.40).   
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
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Correlations between research and teaching variables are shown in Table 4. Hours 
allocated to research are positively correlated with a preference for research and negatively 
correlated with a preference for teaching. The relationship between research and teaching 
variables is always negative with a preference for research negatively correlated with a 
preference for teaching. 
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
To test Hypothesis 1 (Academic Progression), I conducted a probit regression with 
Professor as the dependent variable, shown in Table 5. Consistent with my hypothesis I found 
that hours allocated to research per week are correlated with the academic title of professor (β 
= .02, p < .01). However, given this result is obtained with cross-sectional data this may be 
better described as an association between variables with no implications for causality, as 
discussed later.   
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
To test hypotheses 2 to 4 (Preferences), I regressed hours allocated to research on 
research, teaching and time preferences, as shown in Table 6. Consistent with hypothesis 2, a 
research preference is positively correlated with hours allocated to research (β = 5.08, p < 
.01). Consistent with hypothesis 3, a teaching preference is negatively correlated with hours 
allocated to research (β = -3.07, p < .01). However, the rate of time discounting is not 
correlated with hours allocated to research, so I do not find support for hypothesis 4 (β = -
175.93, ns). 
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
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To test hypotheses 5 to 7 (mediation), I analysed whether research preferences, 
teaching preferences and time preferences acted as mediators between the gender of the 
academic and the time allocation to research, as shown at Table 7 (D. Kenny, 2016). For the 
individual regressions, there is a significant gender difference for research preferences (β = -
.08, p < .05) but only weakly significant gender differences for teaching preferences (β = .08, 
p < .10) and for time preferences (β = .00, p < .10).  
For hypothesis 5 (Mediation by (greater male) preference for research) the indirect 
effect of a preference for research was correctly signed and significant (standardized path 
coefficient = -.02, p < .05). The indirect effect of gender mediated by a preference for 
research on time allocated to research remained significant when bootstrapping standard 
errors to allow for kurtosis (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). Thus I have support for hypothesis 5. 
For hypothesis 6 (Mediation by a (greater female) preference for teaching under a 
research and teaching conflict) the indirect effect of a preference for teaching was correctly 
signed but just outside of significance at p=.10 (standardized path coefficient = -.01, ns). For 
hypothesis 7 (Mediation by rate of time preference) the indirect effect of time preferences 
was not significant (standardized path coefficient = .00, ns). Thus I do not find support for 
either hypothesis 6 or hypothesis 7. 
However, the overall (negative) indirect effect of the three mediators; research 
preferences, teaching preferences and time preferences; is significant (standardized path 
coefficient = -.03, p < .05). The direct effect of gender on time allocated to research remains 
significant indicating only partial mediation (standardized path coefficient = -.09, p < .01). 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
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To further analyse the combined indirect effect of the three mediators; research 
preferences, teaching preferences and time preferences, I recoded the data. The recoding 
sought to identify those conditions most aligned with my theoretical prediction of greater 
time allocated to research using a technique devised to provide a holistic view of the 
alignment of characteristics associated with a positive career outcome (Foti & Hauenstein, 
2007). I grouped individuals by whether they scored higher than average research 
preferences, lower than average teaching preferences and lower than average time discount 
rates as a pattern most aligned, theoretically, with greater time allocated to research. I also 
grouped them according to a misaligned pattern (being the opposite pattern) and partially 
aligned pattern (i.e. some preferences aligned only).  As shown in Table 8, there is an overall 
(negative) indirect effect of the aligned pattern together with the misaligned pattern 
(standardized path coefficient = -.02, p < .05). This verified that gender differences in the 
allocation of time to research appear to be explained by a greater likelihood of encountering 
individuals with an aligned pattern of preferences, with my theoretical prediction of 
preferences associated with greater time allocated to research, among male academics, and a 
greater likelihood of encountering individuals with a misaligned pattern of preferences 
among female academics.  
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 8 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
Robustness Analysis  
I conducted a number of tests of key assumptions and findings. Firstly, I verified 
whether the allocation of time to administration/service represents an omitted variable in the 
regressions of time allocated to research (Clarke, 2005; Wooldridge, 2009). Including 
administration/service hours in the probit regression for the professor dummy variable does 
not change the sign or the statistical significance for any of the measures, as shown in Table 
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9. Including administration hours in the regression for research hours per week on 
preferences and gender does not change the sign or the statistical significance for any of the 
measures, as shown in Table 10.  
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 9 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 10 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
Secondly, I tested an alternative specification of the model, treating gender as a 
moderator, to determine whether it simplified and clarified the proposed conceptual 
framework. The interaction between female academics, research preferences and teaching 
preferences does not show significant effects, as shown in Table 11. Hence this formulation 
does not offer any additional insights as preferences do not lead to different time allocations 
for male and female academics.  
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 11 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
 
General Discussion 
With a unique dataset, based on a survey of UK academics actual time allocations, I 
determined the role of individual preferences in allocating time to research and the 
association of research time with seniority. As hypothesised, I found that a preference for 
research was positively correlated with, and a preference for teaching negatively correlated 
with, time allocated to career-enhancing research activities. Also as hypothesised, I found 
that gender differences in the preference for research produce gender differences in time 
allocated to research. These new findings may help explain the career advantage enjoyed by 
male academics.  
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I highlight the theoretical and practical implications of my results below, together 
with sociological considerations, the limitations of, and future directions for my research.    
Theoretical Implications 
I found that a preference for research was positively correlated with, and a preference 
for teaching negatively correlated with, time allocated to research. These findings provide a 
better understanding of the motivations of academics and contribute directly to the literature 
on teaching and research preferences in higher education (Callaghan & Coldwell, 2014; 
Matthews et al., 2014).  
Theoretical models have been built that assume the relationship between the roles of 
research and teaching to be conflicting, complementary or for the two to be unrelated 
academic activities. To date, a meta-analysis could not find evidence to support research and 
teaching being complementary activities (Hattie & Marsh, 1996). Indeed, in my sample, a 
preference for teaching is negatively correlated with hours allocated to research. However, 
recently, research productivity has been linked to better teaching (Healey et al., 2010; Shin, 
2011; Zhang & Shin, 2015). Hence, if there is a complementarity between the two roles, 
those academics who prefer teaching over research are likely to devote more hours to 
teaching and fewer hours to research so that their teaching may be under-informed by an 
active research agenda. In the light of the ongoing debate about the relationship between 
research and teaching, this is an area that merits further analysis.     
Developing my analysis, I used gender differences in research, teaching and time 
preferences as a lens to examine gender differences in career outcomes. I found a male 
preference for research, a female preference for teaching and, contrary to my hypothesis, 
higher female rates of time discounting. I found that a strong male preference for research 
mediates time allocated to research, providing one explanation for why men allocate more 
time to research. Given studies linking time spent on research to research productivity, and 
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the importance of research productivity to career outcomes, this finding is important and adds 
to the literature on the impact of gender differences in preferences (Croson & Gneezy, 2009; 
Gino et al., 2015). Having argued that rather than differ in the extent that either research or 
teaching is preferred, female academics have to respond more or less strongly to a given level 
of preference for research or teaching, I tested an alternative specification of the model in the 
robustness analysis. Treating gender as a moderator did not show significant effects. 
I also find that the combined effect of gender differences in research, teaching and 
time preferences mediates time allocated to research. This gender difference was confirmed 
by grouping individuals according to their alignment or misalignment with the pattern of 
higher than average research preferences but lower than average teaching and time 
preferences associated with allocating most hours to research. A particular pattern of 
preferences in combination across roles may give rise to the additional time allocation to 
research (Foti & Hauenstein, 2007) and this finding contributes to the study of academic 
preferences. My findings contribute directly to work on gender differences in role preferences 
(Azmat & Petrongolo, 2014; Konrad et al., 2000).  
My findings, in a higher education context, also add to the understanding of gender 
differences in time preferences. I hypothesised higher time discounting rates for men but 
found higher rates of time discounting for women. However, my result is consistent with 
other studies based on hypothetical money choices at different times (Beck & Triplett, 2009; 
Martorano et al., 2015) and a laboratory study of impulsive behaviour (Reynolds et al., 2006). 
The study of time preferences is complicated by the likelihood that time discounting rates are 
domain specific, such that preferences expressed in my study for hypothetical money choices 
may differ from preferences relevant to time allocated to research and career outcomes 
(Ubfal, 2016; Urminsky & Zauberman, 2016; Winer, 1997).    
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I also contribute to studies of progression in higher education, by finding that holding 
a senior academic title is more likely for those devoting more time to research. This 
association was found across a range of academic departments with different gender ratios, 
academic cultures and traditions. The links between allocating time to research and research 
productivity (Chen et al., 2006; Hattie & Marsh, 1996; Stack, 2004; Tower et al., 2007) and 
research productivity and career outcomes (Cadez et al., 2017; Parker, 2008) are established 
in existing literature. My finding is a first step in directly linking time allocated to research to 
career outcomes. I discuss below the limitations of my approach and future directions in 
research to provide insight into causal relationships.    
Practical Implications 
The practical implications of my findings depend on how individual preferences, and 
gender differences in preferences, are formed. Preferences are based on direct experiences 
with more abstract preferences developed and refined with age from interactions between 
individuals and their environment (Druckman & Lupia, 2000; Sameroff, 2010). The 
polarization of preferences that I found for either research or teaching roles will also reflect 
the culture and norms of higher education institutions in the UK and the incentives provided 
for each role. Academics may be encouraged by institutions to consider research and teaching 
as conflicting activities as teaching becomes more focused on employability concerns in the 
neoliberal academy (Canaan & Shumar, 2008). The introduction of the Teaching Excellence 
Framework (Bhardwa, 2017; Wild & Berger, 2016) and findings for research-driven teaching 
(Healey et al., 2010; Shin, 2011; Zhang & Shin, 2015), changing the incentives for each role, 
may modify preferences going forwards.  
Gender differences in preferences have been widely studied (Croson & Gneezy, 
2009). Social experiences, education and parental gender-role attitudes are likely to affect the 
early development of gender-role attitudes leading to gender differences in preferences 
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(Thornton, Alwin, & Camburn, 1983). Much research confirms the gender stereotypes of 
women being more communal and men more competent (Biernat & Fuegen, 2001; Diekman 
& Eagly, 2000; Eagly & Johannesen‐Schmidt, 2001; Lockheed, Harris, & Nemceff, 1983) 
and there is evidence of gender differences in role preferences broadly following these 
stereotypes (Corrigall & Konrad, 2007; Konrad et al., 2000).  
Gender differences in role preferences may be reinforced by the finding that women 
have more and wider life goals, and place more weight on the negative effects of time 
constraints and trade-offs, than men (Gino et al., 2015). Female academics may prefer more 
flexible, less research-intensive departments to accommodate the demands of childbirth and 
family (Rothausen-Vange, Marler, & Wright, 2005). However, changing societal gender 
stereotypes and institutional cultures will influence the preferences of future female 
academics (Carli, 2001). This may be crucial in equalising career outcomes derived from 
research in higher education (Eagly & Carli, 2007).   
Sociological Considerations 
My focus is confined to gender differences in research, teaching and time preferences 
as shaping the time allocated to research and gender differences in academic outcomes. 
Gender differences in preferences may be shaped, in turn, by social expectations. However 
whether those preferences are reflected in time allocations will depend on whether both male 
and female academics have power over their allocation of time. Female academics, especially 
when combining a career and motherhood, face different societal expectations for care-giving 
which may lead to gendered differences in time usage and power over time (Amsler & Motta, 
2017; Beddoes, 2015; Heijstra et al., 2015; Rafnsdóttir & Heijstra, 2013). Further, gender 
differences in volunteering for non-promotable administration/service tasks, may reduce the 
effect of research and teaching preferences on female academics’ time allocations, hence I 
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control for administration/service in the robustness analysis (Babcock et al., 2017; Vesterlund 
et al., 2014).  
In my study, the mediating effect of gender differences in preferences on time 
allocated to research is relatively small (the direct effect of gender is three times as large in 
Table 6). This may reflect both time usage and wider sociological constraints on female 
academics in allocating time to research. Whilst I do not find strongly significant effects 
controlling for domestic responsibilities (number of children, young children), my sample 
was restricted to full-time academics with both research and teaching responsibilities who 
may have fewer domestic constraints. Male academics are likely to be more flexible with 
fewer constraints in allocating time to research (Ivancheva et al., 2019; Rafnsdóttir & 
Heijstra, 2013). Further, cultural sexism in a male-centered academic system may lead to 
gendered expectations of the roles performed and how performance in these roles is evaluated 
and supported (Heijstra et al., 2015; Savigny, 2014; Savigny, 2017).  
Limitations and Future Directions 
In terms of methodological limitations, my study, like other studies of research and 
teaching preferences, is based on cross-sectional data (Callaghan & Coldwell, 2014; 
Matthews et al., 2014). From my cross-sectional data, I am not able to establish causality in 
relationships, only associations between variables, although in each case the hypothesised 
relationships are supported by theory. The issue is most pertinent in associating time 
allocated to research with seniority, where it is difficult to rule out rival hypotheses. Further 
cross-sectional data issues include omitted variable bias, recall bias and the potential for two 
way causality also apply both to this relationship and to the study of preferences for research 
and teaching where additional time devoted to either research or teaching may build self-
efficacy which reinforce preferences (Andrews, 2018; Sedgwick, 2014). The direction of 
causality in a mediation model cannot be assessed by statistical methods (D. Kenny, 2016). I 
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outline the steps taken to ensure the robustness of my survey data in more detail in chapter 
three and make proposals for further analysis using a longitudinal study below.   
In conducting my survey, I collected a large sample with 1,102 viable responses. 
Unlike a comparable survey based cross-sectional study, I tracked responses and sent 
multiple reminders to maximise uptake (Blackaby et al., 2005). In line with best practice, I 
conducted benchmarking to ensure that a representative sample, in terms of gender and 
seniority, was obtained (Montaquila & Olson, 2012; Pedersen, 2015). I also compared signs 
and coefficients of control variables, where comparable, with similar studies. My study 
benefitted from a wealth of additional data with which I conducted a large number of internal 
consistency checks as detailed in footnote 4 of chapter three.       
In addressing reverse causality between time allocated to research and seniority, two 
considerations may support the direction of the relationship. Firstly, I would expect senior 
academics to have some flexibility to reduce both research and teaching effort. Hence, the 
risk of examining cross-sectional data would be in finding a negative relationship where a 
positive one would hold longitudinally. Instead, I see a positive relationship that is unlikely to 
be the artefact of analysing cross-sectional data. Secondly, I find that time discount rates are 
negatively correlated with seniority. There is both theoretical and empirical support for 
patience being greatest in middle age and declining into old age, such that I might expect to 
see higher discount rates for older, more senior academics (Martorano et al., 2015; Read & 
Read, 2004; Sozou & Seymour, 2003). Here, the risk of examining cross-sectional data 
would be in finding a positive relationship, and mistaking its importance, where a negative 
relationship would hold longitudinally. Instead, I see a negative relationship that is again 
unlikely to be the artefact of analysing cross-sectional data. I also find that time allocated to 
teaching affects the likelihood of holding a senior academic title negatively but this finding 
 39 
 
could be the artefact of cross-sectional data, with senior academics being shielded from 
teaching duties.  
My findings for time preferences are based on the argument that rates of time 
preference may act as a mediator for time allocated to research, given the deferred benefits of 
research productivity to academic careers. However, it can be questioned whether academics 
consider the extrinsic rewards from research outputs as a primary motivation to engage in 
research. Some activities have been argued to provide their own intrinsic reward (Deci, 1971; 
Kahneman & Thaler, 2006). So, the intrinsic reward from performing research may 
undermine the relationship which I argue may exist between time preferences and research 
hours. Indeed, I did not find a significant relationship between these variables. However, this 
caveat does not affect my finding of higher rates of time discounting for female academics.      
Preferences for administration/service were not captured as part of the research design 
but may yield interesting results as a subject for further research. From the robustness 
analysis, including hours allocated to administration/service in regressions did not affect 
either the sign or significance of any of the key variables. So, the findings in respect of 
research, teaching and time preferences on time allocated to research appear unaffected. In 
contrast to literature on gender differences in accepting administration/service tasks with low 
promotability, I do not find gender differences for time allocated to service below professor 
level (Babcock et al., 2017; Pyke, 2011; Vesterlund et al., 2014). However, I do find a large 
gender effect at professor level, consistent with previous research on the disproportionate 
burden of administration and service activities falling on underrepresented senior female 
academics (Grove, 2016; Guarino & Borden, 2017).  
My findings, especially those relating to individual research and teaching preferences, 
represent a springboard for further research. Conducting a longitudinal study would enable 
researchers to track time allocation to research and individual research, teaching and time 
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preferences over a period of time. This would provide some insight into the stability of 
individual preferences over time and whether these preferences change with age, experience 
and academic progression. It would also enable the testing of proposed cause and effect 
relationships over time compared to merely identifying associations within a snapshot of 
cross-sectional data. Associating individual preferences, and gender differences in those 
preferences with career outcomes, merits further investigation using such advanced data-
analytic methods.   
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Tables and Figures 
TABLE1 
Deductions from the survey sample in the study 
Original survey sample                                                 1,418 100.00% 
Part time staff excluded                                        75   
  1,343 94.71% 
Other deductions    
Inconsistent time prefs              15   
Incomplete data                              226   
Net Sample    1,102 77.72% 
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TABLE 2 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis for Preference Scales 
 
(a) Factor Analysis for Research Preference scale 
Factor  Eigenvalue Proportion 
Factor 1 1.69202 1.2531 
Factor 2 0.05782 0.0428 
Factor 3 -0.05130 -0.0380 
Factor 4 -0.14094 -0.1044 
Factor 5 -0.20734 -0.1536 
Notes. Method: principal factors, rotation method: unrotated. 
 
(b) Factor Loadings for Research Preference scale 
Item Factor 1 Factor 2 
In order to succeed in academia, I need to focus on my teaching.  .57 -.07 
My first priority is teaching. .60 .02 
I am active in (the scholarship of) teaching. .72 .12 
I have recently participated in professional development in teaching. .28 .22 
I enjoy participating in teaching. .62 .03 
Notes. Method: principal factors, rotation method: orthogonal varimax (Kaiser off). Loadings 
larger than .40 are in bold. 
 
(c) Factor Analysis for Teaching Preference scale 
Factor  Eigenvalue Proportion 
Factor 1 1.00293 1.5019 
Factor 2 0.08081 0.1210 
Factor 3 -0.03994 -0.0598 
Factor 4 -0.16059 -0.2405 
Factor 5 -0.21543 -0.3226 
Notes. Method: principal factors, rotation method: unrotated. 
 
(d) Factor Loadings for Teaching Preference scale 
Item Factor 1 Factor 2 
In order to succeed in academia, I need to focus on my teaching.  .26 .16 
My first priority is teaching. .35 .36 
I am active in (the scholarship of) teaching. .53 .22 
I have recently participated in professional development in teaching. .49 .11 
I enjoy participating in teaching. .22 .34 
Notes. Method: principal factors, rotation method: orthogonal varimax (Kaiser off). Loadings 
larger than .40 are in bold. 
  
 43 
 
TABLE 3 
Means (and standard deviations in brackets) for study variables  
  Total Professors Others 
  Female Male Female Male Female Male 
Total Hours per week 50.26 50.99 53.63 52.29 49.43 50.41 
 (8.79) (9.50) (9.30) (9.34) (8.47) (9.52) 
Research Hours per week 16.68 19.30 18.64 22.07 16.19 18.06 
 (8.54) (10.29) (9.57) (11.04) (8.20) (9.70) 
Teaching Hours per week 19.28 18.05 15.87 15.02 20.13 19.41 
 (8.16) (7.73) (9.50) (7.28) (7.57) (7.55) 
Admin/Service Hours per week 14.30 13.64 19.12 15.19 13.10 12.94 
 (8.93) (8.53) (10.37) (9.76) (8.12) (7.82) 
Research Preference Index 3.04 3.07 3.07 3.13 3.03 3.05 
 (0.71) (0.61) (0.58) (0.59) (0.73) (0.62) 
Teaching Preference Index 2.29 2.19 2.06 2.06 2.35 2.25 
 (0.70) (0.67) (0.73) (0.65) (0.68) (0.68) 
High Research Quality (Note 1) 0.50 0.55 0.68 0.68 0.46 0.49 
 (0.50) (0.50) (0.47) (0.47) (0.50) (0.50) 
High Teaching Quality (Note 2) 0.39 0.38 0.31 0.34 0.41 0.40 
 (0.49) (0.49) (0.47) (0.48) (0.49) (0.49) 
Years Post PHD 13.12 17.80 22.39 26.11 10.82 14.06 
 (8.73) (10.59) (7.67) (8.52) (7.35) (9.22) 
       
Observations     498     828      99     256     399     572 
Standard deviations in brackets. Note 1 – a control for research quality was based on a 
weighted index of published articles in the past 3 years. Note 2 – a control for teaching 
quality was based on the achievement of teaching evaluation scores in excess of 4 out of 5 in 
the last academic year.  
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TABLE 4  
Correlation Matrix showing Pearson's r for Research and Teaching variables 
 
Research 
Hours 
per 
Week 
Research 
Preference 
Index 
High 
Research 
Quality 
Teaching 
Hours 
per week 
Teaching 
Preference 
Index 
High 
Teaching 
Quality 
Research Hours per 
Week 
 1.00 
     
Research Preference 
Index 
 0.38  1.00 
    
High Research 
Quality 
 0.15  0.05  1.00 
   
Teaching Hours per 
week 
-0.36 -0.18 -0.07 1.00 
  
Teaching Preference 
Index 
-0.31 -0.13 -0.04 0.25 1.00 
 
High Teaching 
Quality 
-0.09 -0.01 -0.23 0.10 0.07 1.00 
Note: N= 1,339, values in bold = significant at p<0.05.  
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TABLE 5  
Probit regression for Professor dummy variable  
Dependent Variable  Professor 
                 
Research Hours Per Week 0.02***  
 (0.01)    
Teaching Hours Per Week -0.04*** 
 (0.01)    
Research Quality 0.47*** 
 (0.12)    
Teaching Quality 0.15    
 (0.12)    
Female Academic -0.08    
 (0.13)    
Years Post PHD 0.11*** 
 (0.01)    
Children Number 0.09    
 (0.05)    
One Under 5 (Note 1) 0.20    
 (0.17)    
Two Under 5s (Note 1) -0.29    
 (0.30)    
Research Preference Index 0.21**   
 (0.09)    
Teaching Preference Index -0.04    
 (0.09)    
Time Preference 117.15**   
 (45.51)    
Mobility 0.27**   
 (0.11)    
Bath  -0.51    
 (0.45)    
Birmingham -0.83*   
 (0.42)    
Bristol 0.06    
 (0.41)    
Cambridge -0.24    
 (0.42)    
Cardiff 0.28    
 (0.36)    
Edinburgh -0.10    
 (0.38)    
Essex 0.41    
 (0.41)    
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Imperial College London -0.07    
 (0.69)    
Kent 0.06    
 (0.43)    
Leeds -0.21    
 (0.40)    
Leicester 0.08    
 (0.39)    
LSE 0.11    
 (0.42)    
Loughborough -0.05    
 (0.42)    
Manchester -0.15    
 (0.37)    
Nottingham -0.20    
 (0.39)    
Oxford -0.47    
 (0.41)    
Queens Belfast -0.07    
 (0.42)    
Reading 0.16    
 (0.43)    
Royal Holloway College 0.27    
 (0.45)    
Southampton 0.26    
 (0.44)    
St Andrews -0.50    
 (0.46)    
Surrey 0.00    
 (0.42)    
UCL 0.24    
 (0.38)    
UEA 0.20    
 (0.41)    
Warwick 0.30    
 (0.37)    
York -0.50    
 (0.42)    
English 0.81*   
 (0.36)    
Business/Management 1.53*** 
 (0.26)    
Chemistry 0.61*   
 (0.29)    
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Computer Science 0.53    
 (0.29)    
Economics 1.21*** 
 (0.29)    
Geography 0.98**  
 (0.30)    
History 1.13*** 
 (0.29)    
Law 1.75*** 
 (0.28)    
Mathematics 0.95*** 
 (0.27)    
Physics 0.75**  
 (0.26)    
Politics/International relations 0.91**  
 (0.32)    
Psychology 1.08*** 
 (0.28)    
Sociology 1.02**  
 (0.36)    
Other 1.19*** 
 (0.30)    
Constant -121.37***  
 (45.51)    
  
Observations   1,102 
Pseudo r-squared 0.44 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note 1:  the control variables for children under 5 are mutually exclusive   
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TABLE 6  
Regression for research hours per week on preferences and gender. 
Dependent Variable Research Hours Per Week 
  
Professor Level 2.94*** 
 (0.71)    
Female Academic -1.79***  
 (0.56)    
Years Post PHD -0.12*** 
 (0.04)    
Research Quality 2.54*** 
 (0.53)    
Teaching Quality -1.44***  
 (0.55)    
Children Number -0.27    
 (0.26)    
One Under 5 -1.27*    
 (0.75)    
Two Under 5s -0.51    
 (1.20)    
Research Preference Index 5.08*** 
 (0.41)    
Teaching Preference Index -3.07*** 
 (0.38)    
Time Preference -175.93    
 (197.26)    
Mobility -0.90*    
 (0.51)    
Bath  -0.95    
 (2.10)    
Birmingham 1.48    
 (1.96)    
Bristol 1.18    
 (1.97)    
Cambridge 2.72    
 (2.01)    
Cardiff -1.17    
 (1.71)    
Edinburgh -1.80    
 (1.86)    
Essex -2.01    
 (1.95)    
Imperial College London -0.40    
 (3.12)    
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Kent 0.92    
 (1.98)    
Leeds -1.52    
 (1.87)    
Leicester -1.41    
 (1.90)    
LSE -1.50    
 (2.23)    
Loughborough -2.01    
 (2.05)    
Manchester -0.54    
 (1.87)    
Nottingham -1.22    
 (1.81)    
Oxford 2.65    
 (2.02)    
Queens Belfast -0.27    
 (1.88)    
Reading -0.43    
 (2.09)    
Royal Holloway College -1.59    
 (2.11)    
Southampton 3.82    
 (2.03)    
St Andrews 1.39    
 (2.06)    
Surrey -0.28    
 (1.94)    
UCL 0.73    
 (1.91)    
UEA -1.20    
 (1.97)    
Warwick 1.07    
 (1.87)    
York -0.48    
 (1.91)    
English -5.78*** 
 (1.54)    
Business/Management -1.95    
 (1.13)    
Chemistry 0.95    
 (1.29)    
Computer Science -0.15    
 (1.33)    
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Economics -0.78    
 (1.26)    
Geography -2.21    
 (1.35)    
History -5.95*** 
 (1.31)    
Law -3.75**  
 (1.29)    
Mathematics -1.95    
 (1.20)    
Physics -1.68    
 (1.24)    
Politics/International relations -3.63**  
 (1.31)    
Psychology -3.33**  
 (1.20)    
Sociology -3.38*   
 (1.49)    
Other -1.02    
 (1.38)    
Constant 189.78    
 (197.05)    
  
Observations   1,102 
R-squared    0.32 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note 1:  the control variables for children under 5 are mutually exclusive 
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TABLE 7 
Standardized Mediation Effects between gender and research hours per week. 
      
    Indirect effect of IV on DV  
  
Direct 
Effect 
of IV 
on DV 
Via 
Research 
Preferences 
Via 
Teaching 
Preferences 
Via Delta 
(Time 
Preference) 
Total 
Total 
Effect 
IV on 
DV 
     
 
  
Gender  -0.09 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.13 
       
Note: N= 1,102, DV = dependent variable, IV = independent variable (Gender), 
Values in bold = significant at p < .05. 
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TABLE 8 
Standardized Mediation Effects between gender and research hours per week 
using pattern analysis. 
  
Direct 
Effect of 
IV on 
DV 
Via 
Aligned 
Pattern 
Via 
Misaligned 
Pattern 
 
Total Indirect 
Effect IV on 
DV  
Total 
Effect IV 
on DV 
     
 
  
Gender  -0.09 -0.01 -0.01  -0.02 -0.11 
       
Note: N= 1,102, DV = dependent variable, IV = independent variable (Gender), 
Values in bold = significant at p < .05. 
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TABLE 9 
Probit regression for Professor dummy variable (including administration hours)  
Dependent Variable  Professor 
  
Research Hours Per Week 0.03*** 
 (0.01)    
Teaching Hours Per Week -0.03***  
 (0.01)    
Administration Hours Per Week 0.03*** 
 (0.01)    
Research Quality 0.41*** 
 (0.12)    
Teaching Quality 0.17    
 (0.12)    
Female Academic -0.10    
 (0.13)    
Years Post PHD 0.11*** 
 (0.01)    
Children Number 0.11*   
 (0.05)    
One Under 5 (Note 1) 0.22    
 (0.17)    
Two Under 5s (Note 1) -0.30    
 (0.31)    
Research Preference Index 0.24**   
 (0.10)    
Teaching Preference Index -0.06    
 (0.09)    
Time Preference 115.39**   
 (46.10)    
Mobility 0.26**   
 (0.11)    
Bath  -0.54    
 (0.46)    
Birmingham -0.88*   
 (0.43)    
Bristol 0.02    
 (0.41)    
Cambridge -0.30    
 (0.43)    
Cardiff 0.30    
 (0.36)    
Edinburgh -0.14    
 (0.39)    
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Essex 0.47    
 (0.42)    
Imperial College London 0.11    
 (0.65)    
Kent 0.07    
 (0.43)    
Leeds -0.28    
 (0.40)    
Leicester 0.05    
 (0.40)    
LSE 0.13    
 (0.43)    
Loughborough -0.11    
 (0.43)    
Manchester -0.13    
 (0.38)    
Nottingham -0.17    
 (0.39)    
Oxford -0.48    
 (0.42)    
Queens Belfast -0.02    
 (0.42)    
Reading 0.15    
 (0.44)    
Royal Holloway College 0.28    
 (0.45)    
Southampton 0.24    
 (0.44)    
St Andrews -0.60    
 (0.46)    
Surrey -0.01    
 (0.42)    
UCL 0.25    
 (0.39)    
UEA 0.12    
 (0.42)    
Warwick 0.33    
 (0.37)    
York -0.55    
 (0.43)    
English 0.72    
 (0.37)    
Business/Management 1.52*** 
 (0.26)    
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Chemistry 0.54    
 (0.29)    
Computer Science 0.47    
 (0.29)    
Economics 1.24*** 
 (0.29)    
Geography 0.94**  
 (0.31)    
History 1.14*** 
 (0.29)    
Law 1.79*** 
 (0.29)    
Mathematics 1.00*** 
 (0.27)    
Physics 0.78**  
 (0.27)    
Politics/International relations 0.84**  
 (0.32)    
Psychology 1.12*** 
 (0.28)    
Sociology 0.98**  
 (0.37)    
Other 1.14*** 
 (0.30)    
Constant -120.54***  
 (46.10)    
  
Observations     1,102 
Pseudo R-squared 0.45 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note 1:  the control variables for children under 5 are mutually exclusive.  
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TABLE 10  
Regression for research hours per week (including administration hours). 
Dependent Variable  
Research Hours Per 
Week 
  
Professor Level 3.79*** 
 (0.67)    
Female Academic -1.33**   
 (0.52)    
Administration Hours Per Week -0.38*** 
 (0.03)    
Years Post PHD -0.06    
 (0.03)    
Research Quality 2.84*** 
 (0.49)    
Teaching Quality -1.37***  
 (0.51)    
Children Number -0.43    
 (0.24)    
One Under 5 (Note 1) -0.97*    
 (0.70)    
Two Under 5s (Note 1) -0.23    
 (1.11)    
Research Preference Index 4.28*** 
 (0.39)    
Teaching Preference Index -2.78*** 
 (0.35)    
Time Preference -61.32    
 (183.12)    
Mobility -0.61*    
 (0.47)    
Bath  -0.54    
 (1.95)    
Birmingham 2.55    
 (1.82)    
Bristol 1.82    
 (1.83)    
Cambridge 3.36    
 (1.86)    
Cardiff -0.75    
 (1.59)    
Edinburgh -0.25    
 (1.73)    
Essex -1.82    
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 (1.80)    
Imperial College London -0.42    
 (2.89)    
Kent 1.24    
 (1.84)    
Leeds -0.35    
 (1.73)    
Leicester -0.36    
 (1.76)    
LSE -0.49    
 (2.07)    
Loughborough -0.80    
 (1.90)    
Manchester -0.37    
 (1.74)    
Nottingham -0.56    
 (1.68)    
Oxford 2.12    
 (1.87)    
Queens Belfast -0.85    
 (1.74)    
Reading 1.09    
 (1.94)    
Royal Holloway College -1.14    
 (1.96)    
Southampton 3.58    
 (1.89)    
St Andrews 2.06    
 (1.92)    
Surrey 0.49    
 (1.80)    
UCL 0.97    
 (1.77)    
UEA 0.13    
 (1.83)    
Warwick 1.15    
 (1.73)    
York 0.75    
 (1.78)    
English -3.99**  
 (1.43)    
Business/Management -1.44    
 (1.05)    
Chemistry 1.47    
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 (1.20)    
Computer Science 1.08    
 (1.24)    
Economics -0.43    
 (1.17)    
Geography -1.87    
 (1.25)    
History -5.28*** 
 (1.21)    
Law -3.44**  
 (1.19)    
Mathematics -2.19*   
 (1.11)    
Physics -1.72    
 (1.15)    
Politics/International relations -2.27 
 (1.22) 
Psychology -3.10**  
 (1.11) 
Sociology -2.36 
 (1.39) 
Other -0.68 
 (1.28) 
Constant 79.82 
 (182.91) 
  
Observations   1,102 
R-squared 0.42 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note 1:  the control variables for children under 5 are mutually exclusive.  
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TABLE 11  
Regression of Research Hours per week: gender as a moderator 
Dependent Variable Hours Allocated to Research 
  
Professor Level 2.82*** 
 (0.72)    
Female Academic 4.93    
 (7.93)    
Research Preference Index 6.67*** 
 (1.58)    
Female x Research Pref. -3.51    
 (2.48)    
Teaching Preference Index -2.77    
 (2.05)    
Female x Teaching Preference -0.27    
 (3.03)    
Research Preference x Teaching Preference -0.32    
 (0.65)    
Female x Research Preference x Teaching Preference 0.67    
 (0.97)    
Years Post PHD -0.12***  
 (0.04)    
Research Quality 2.43*** 
 (0.53)    
Teaching Quality -1.50***  
 (0.55)    
Children Number -0.27    
 (0.26)    
One Under 5 (Note 1) -1.44*    
 (0.75)    
Two Under 5s (Note 1) -0.53    
 (1.20)    
Time Preference -123.06    
 (197.20)    
Mobility -0.90*    
 (0.50)    
Bath  -0.48    
 (2.10)    
Birmingham 1.76    
 (1.95)    
Bristol 1.23    
 (1.97)    
Cambridge 3.17    
 (2.00)    
Cardiff -0.92    
 (1.71)    
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Edinburgh -1.63    
 (1.85)    
Essex -1.69    
 (1.94)    
Imperial College London -0.18    
 (3.11)    
Kent 1.05    
 (1.98)    
Leeds -1.49    
 (1.86)    
Leicester -0.96    
 (1.89)    
LSE -1.41    
 (2.22)    
Loughborough -1.83    
 (2.05)    
Manchester -0.35    
 (1.87)    
Nottingham -1.08    
 (1.80)    
Oxford 2.90    
 (2.01)    
Queens Belfast 0.10    
 (1.87)    
Reading -0.75    
 (2.09)    
Royal Holloway College -1.25    
 (2.10)    
Southampton 3.85    
 (2.03)    
St Andrews 1.41    
 (2.06)    
Surrey 0.15    
 (1.93)    
UCL 0.93    
 (1.90)    
UEA -1.08    
 (1.97)    
Warwick 1.27    
 (1.86)    
York -0.18    
 (1.91)    
English -5.61*** 
 (1.53)    
Business/Management -1.68    
 (1.12)    
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Chemistry 1.36    
 (1.29)    
Computer Science 0.02    
 (1.33)    
Economics -0.44    
 (1.26)    
Geography -1.60    
 (1.35)    
History -5.67*** 
 (1.30)    
Law -3.49**  
 (1.29)    
Mathematics -1.48    
 (1.20)    
Physics -1.69    
 (1.23)    
Politics/International relations -3.44**  
 (1.31)    
Psychology -2.98*   
 (1.20)    
Sociology -3.14*   
 (1.49)    
Other -1.10    
 (1.38)    
  
Constant  133.19    
 (197.06)    
Observations    1,102 
R-squared 0.33 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Note 1:  the control variables for children under 5 are mutually exclusive.  
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Appendix A 
 
Materials: Higher Education Survey. 
Original (Reminder) Cover unincentivised {incentivised} Email 
 
Date: (Today’s Date) 
  
Dear (First Name), 
 
(Reminder) Higher Education Survey  
 
We would like to invite you to take part today in a short survey relating to incentives and 
motivation in the Higher Education Sector. (You should have already received an invitation 
to take part in the national Higher Education Survey. We have noticed that you have yet to 
participate in this survey.) This survey is a part of a major national research project. 
The benefit from completing this survey will come from studying how academics approach 
multi-tasking conflicts in the context of increasing demands on academics for both research 
productivity and teaching quality. 
 
The deadline for completion, after which the personalized link below will expire, is 21 (14) 
days from receipt of this invitation. Completing this survey should take 15 minutes {, and 
you will be eligible for two prizes as follows:  
 Prize of £500 for the best prediction of your colleagues' views. 
 Multiple prizes of up to £80 drawn at random for every 300 submissions received.} 
If you have any queries, please feel free to contact our survey team at 
deliveringbetter@surrey.ac.uk 
 
To participate please click on the personalised link below. 
Follow this link to the Survey:  
$l://SurveyLink?d=Take the Survey 
Or copy and paste the URL below into your internet browser: 
$l://SurveyURL 
This link will be valid for 21 (14) days from the date of receipt. 
 
Thank You 
Professor Graham Cookson, 
Surrey Business School, 
University of Surrey. 
Graham Cookson Profile 
Delivering Better For Less Website  
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The study has been reviewed and received a Favourable Ethical Opinion (FEO) from the 
University of Surrey Ethics Committee.  
 
Data protection notice: 
We obtained your contact details from publically available data from your academic 
institution's website. Please see the Participant Information Sheet for details of our ethics 
policy.  
If you do not wish to be contacted again, please click here to unsubscribe. 
 
[Introductory Screen] 
Welcome to the Higher Education Survey. Please press I CONSENT and NEXT if you agree 
with the terms below to continue to the survey. 
  
Informed Consent - Higher Education Survey 
  
 I have read and understood the Participant Information Sheet provided (version 1.0, dated 
08/02/2016).   
 I agree for my anonymised data to be used for this study. 
 I understand that data will be collected using Qualtrics software. This software is used by 
academic institutions worldwide and Qualtrics give assurances that data collected in the EU 
will remain in the EU. I understand that all the data collected from my responses will be 
anonymised and the collected data points will not be linked to my identity.    
 I understand that all project data will be held for at least 6 years and all research data for at 
least 10 years in accordance with University policy and that my personal data is held and 
processed in the strictest confidence, and in accordance with the Data Protection Act (1998). 
 I understand that I can request for my data to be withdrawn up to one month after completing 
the survey and that following my request all data already collected from me will be deleted.  
 I confirm that I have read and understood the above and freely consent to participating in this 
study.  I have been given adequate time to consider my participation. 
 
I CONSENT and wish to complete the survey. 
I DO NOT CONSENT and wish to exit the survey now. 
 
[Initial question Block] 
Please tell us about yourself under the following headings: 
 
Personal Information 
 64 
 
 
Are you Male or Female? 
 
What is your age? 
 
Academic Information 
  
Which University do you work at? 
 
Are you a full-time or part-time member of staff?  
 
How many hours per week on average do you work in reality (rather than contracted)? 
 
Which School or Department do you associate yourself most with at your University? 
 
Over a full year what percentage of your time do you spend on the following? 
 
Research (%) 
Teaching (%) 
Administration and other (%) 
 
How many years is it since you completed your PhD or other Highest Degree? 
 
How many different universities have you been employed by? 
 
What best describes your Academic Title? 
 
 
[Own Norms Screens] 
 
On a scale of 0% to 100%, what percentage of YOUR OWN working time over a full year 
do you spend on each of the following activities? 
 
% of working time on preparation for lectures. 
% of working time on additional assessment of learning, e.g. essays and quizzes 
% of working time with your door open to indicate availability for interruption. 
% of working time with your door locked whilst in your office to avoid interruptions. 
% of working time focusing on low achieving or disadvantaged students. 
 
[Peer Norms Screen] 
 
Prize draw for most accurate guess of other academics' responses 
  
There will be a prize of a £500 for the academic who most accurately guesses the mean of 
responses to the following questions. In the event of a tie, the winner will be selected at 
random. If you win, you will be able to select whether you would like payment to be credited 
directly to your bank account or to be in the form of gift cards to the value of £500 from any 
major online retailer. * 
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On a scale of 0% to 100%, what percentage of THEIR WORKING TIME DO OTHER 
ACADEMICS in your discipline and in comparable institutions CONSIDER 
PROFESSIONALLY APPROPRIATE to spend on each of the following activities over a 
full year? 
  
If you would like to know the means of actual and guessed answers of other academics in 
your discipline, please choose this option in the box below, and the information will be sent 
to you after the completion of the study.  
 
% of working time on preparation for lectures. 
% of working time on additional assessment of learning, e.g. essays and quizzes 
% of working time with your door open to indicate availability for interruption. 
% of working time with your door locked whilst in your office to avoid interruptions. 
% of working time focusing on low achieving or disadvantaged students. 
 
* The accuracy of your guesses will be judged by the lowest sum of absolute deviations from the mean of each 
response within your discipline. 
 
Research Preferences 
 
On a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), please indicate your views on 
each statement below. 
 
In order to be successful in academia, I need to focus on my research. 
My first priority is research 
I am active (in the scholarship of) research 
I have recently participated in professional development in research 
I enjoy participating in research 
Teaching Preferences 
On a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), please indicate your views on 
each statement below. 
 
In order to be successful in academia, I need to focus on my teaching 
My first priority is teaching 
I am active (in the scholarship of) teaching 
I have recently participated in professional development in teaching 
I enjoy participating in teaching 
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[Trait Guilt Questions] 
 
In this short questionnaire you will read about situations that people are likely to encounter in 
day-to-day life, followed by common reactions to those situations. As you read each scenario, 
try to imagine yourself in that situation. Then indicate the likelihood that you would react in 
the way described. 
 
Scale of 1 (very unlikely) to 5 (very likely) 
 
After realizing you have received too much change at a shop, you decide to keep it because 
the sales assistant does not notice. What is the likelihood that you would feel uncomfortable 
about keeping the money? 
 
You secretly commit a crime. What is the likelihood that you would feel remorse about 
breaking the law? 
 
At a co-worker’s housewarming party, you spill red wine on their new cream-coloured 
carpet. You cover the stain with a chair so that nobody notices your mess. What is the 
likelihood that you would feel that the way you acted was pathetic? 
 
You lie to people but they never find out about it. What is the likelihood that you would feel 
terrible about the lies you told? 
 
Out of frustration, you break the photocopier at work. Nobody is around and you leave 
without telling anyone. What is the likelihood you would feel bad about the way you acted? 
 
[Measure of Time Preference] 
 
Scale of 1 (very unwilling) to 5 (very willing) 
 
In comparison to others, are you a person who is willing to give up something today in order 
to benefit in the future? 
 
 
[Time Preference Tables] 
 
In this page you are asked to complete 6 tables. Each row of each table has two choice 
options, and you have to pick one option for each row. You have a 1 in 300 chance of being 
paid according to your choices below in one randomly chosen row from one randomly chosen 
table. 
  
Table 1 
For each of the following seven choice pairs, would you prefer to receive the amount in the left 
hand column in 2 days' time or the fixed amount of £80 in the right hand column in 9 days' 
time? Make your selections for each row by choosing either the amount payable in 2 days' 
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time or the fixed amount of £80 payable in 9 days' time. YOU MAY SWITCH BETWEEN 
COLUMNS ONLY ONCE in making your choices.  
 2 days’ time 9 days’ time  
£75 in 2 days’ time ο ο £80 in 9 days’ time 
£70 in 2 days’ time ο ο £80 in 9 days’ time 
£65 in 2 days’ time ο ο £80 in 9 days’ time 
£60 in 2 days’ time ο ο £80 in 9 days’ time 
£55 in 2 days’ time ο ο £80 in 9 days’ time 
£50 in 2 days’ time ο ο £80 in 9 days’ time 
£45 in 2 days’ time ο ο £80 in 9 days’ time 
Table 2 
For each of the following seven choice pairs, would you prefer to receive the amount in the left 
hand column in 2 days' time or the fixed amount of £80 in the right hand column in 30 days' 
time? Make your selections for each row by choosing either the amount payable in 2 days' 
time or the fixed amount of £80 payable in 30 days' time. YOU MAY SWITCH BETWEEN 
COLUMNS ONLY ONCE in making your choices.  
 2 days’ time 30 days’ time  
£75 in 2 days’ time ο ο £80 in 30 days’ time 
£70 in 2 days’ time ο ο £80 in 30 days’ time 
£65 in 2 days’ time ο ο £80 in 30 days’ time 
£60 in 2 days’ time ο ο £80 in 30 days’ time 
£55 in 2 days’ time ο ο £80 in 30 days’ time 
£50 in 2 days’ time ο ο £80 in 30 days’ time 
£45 in 2 days’ time ο ο £80 in 30 days’ time 
Table 3 
For each of the following seven choice pairs, would you prefer to receive the amount in the left 
hand column in 2 days' time or the fixed amount of £80 in the right hand column in 90 days' 
time? Make your selections for each row by choosing either the amount payable in 2 days' 
time or the fixed amount of £80 payable in 90 days' time. YOU MAY SWITCH BETWEEN 
COLUMNS ONLY ONCE in making your choices. 
 2 days’ time 90 days’ time  
£75 in 2 days’ time ο ο £80 in 90 days’ time 
£70 in 2 days’ time ο ο £80 in 90 days’ time 
£65 in 2 days’ time ο ο £80 in 90 days’ time 
£60 in 2 days’ time ο ο £80 in 90 days’ time 
£55 in 2 days’ time ο ο £80 in 90 days’ time 
£50 in 2 days’ time ο ο £80 in 90 days’ time 
£45 in 2 days’ time ο ο £80 in 90 days’ time 
 
Table 4 
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For each of the following seven choice pairs, would you prefer to receive the amount in the left 
hand column in 2 days' time or the fixed amount of £80 in the right hand column in 180 days' 
time? Make your selections for each row by choosing either the amount payable in 2 days' 
time or the fixed amount of £80 payable in 180 days' time. YOU MAY SWITCH BETWEEN 
COLUMNS ONLY ONCE in making your choices. 
 2 days’ time 180 days’ time  
£75 in 2 days’ time ο ο £80 in 180 days’ time 
£70 in 2 days’ time ο ο £80 in 180 days’ time 
£65 in 2 days’ time ο ο £80 in 180 days’ time 
£60 in 2 days’ time ο ο £80 in 180 days’ time 
£55 in 2 days’ time ο ο £80 in 180 days’ time 
£50 in 2 days’ time ο ο £80 in 180 days’ time 
£45 in 2 days’ time ο ο £80 in 180 days’ time 
 
Table 5 
For each of the following 10 choice pairs, would you prefer to receive the lottery on the 
left or the lottery on the right? The lottery on the left will pay a combination of £50 and £35, 
each with the varying probabilities (PR) shown. The lottery on the right will pay a 
combination of £80 and £10, each with the probabilities (PR) shown. Make your selections 
for each row by choosing either the lottery on the left or the lottery on the right. YOU MAY 
SWITCH BETWEEN COLUMNS ONLY ONCE in making your choices. 
 Lottery on the left Lottery on the right  
£50 (PR 10%) or £35 (PR 90%) ο ο £80 (PR 10%) or £10 (PR 90%) 
£50 (PR 20%) or £35 (PR 80%) ο ο £80 (PR 20%) or £10 (PR 80%) 
£50 (PR 30%) or £35 (PR 70%) ο ο £80 (PR 30%) or £10 (PR 70%) 
£50 (PR 40%) or £35 (PR 60%) ο ο £80 (PR 40%) or £10 (PR 60%) 
£50 (PR 50%) or £35 (PR 50%) ο ο £80 (PR 50%) or £10 (PR 50%) 
£50 (PR 60%) or £35 (PR 40%) ο ο £80 (PR 60%) or £10 (PR 40%) 
£50 (PR 70%) or £35 (PR 30%) ο ο £80 (PR 70%) or £10 (PR 30%) 
£50 (PR 80%) or £35 (PR 20%) ο ο £80 (PR 80%) or £10 (PR 20%) 
£50 (PR 90%) or £35 (PR 10%) ο ο £80 (PR 90%) or £10 (PR 10%) 
£50 (PR 100%) or £35 (PR 0%) ο ο £80 (PR 100%) or £10 (PR 0%) 
 
Table 6 
For each of the following 10 choice pairs, would you prefer to receive the lottery on the left 
or the lottery on the right? The lottery on the left will pay a combination of £60 and £30, 
each with the varying probabilities (PR) shown. The lottery on the right will pay a 
combination of £100 and £20, each with the probabilities (PR) shown. Make your selections 
for each row by choosing either the lottery on the left or the lottery on the right. YOU MAY 
SWITCH BETWEEN COLUMNS ONLY ONCE in making your choices. 
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 Lottery on the left Lottery on the right  
£60 (PR 10%) or £30 (PR 90%) ο ο £100 (PR 10%) or £20 (PR 90%) 
£60 (PR 20%) or £30 (PR 80%) ο ο £100 (PR 20%) or £20 (PR 80%) 
£60 (PR 30%) or £30 (PR 70%) ο ο £100 (PR 30%) or £20 (PR 70%) 
£60 (PR 40%) or £30 (PR 60%) ο ο £100 (PR 40%) or £20 (PR 60%) 
£60 (PR 50%) or £30 (PR 50%) ο ο £100 (PR 50%) or £20 (PR 50%) 
£60 (PR 60%) or £30 (PR 40%) ο ο £100 (PR 60%) or £20 (PR 40%) 
£60 (PR 70%) or £30 (PR 30%) ο ο £100 (PR 70%) or £20 (PR 30%) 
£60 (PR 80%) or £30 (PR 20%) ο ο £100 (PR 80%) or £20 (PR 20%) 
£60 (PR 90%) or £30 (PR 10%) ο ο £100 (PR 90%) or £20 (PR 10%) 
£60 (PR 100%) or £30 (PR 0%) ο ο £100 (PR 100%) or £20 (PR 0%) 
 
Remaining Academic Information 
Please provide some final academic and personal information before finding out if you 
have won a prize 
For the last 3 years 
Using metrics appropriate to your subject area, how many peer reviewed articles of 2*, 3* 
and 4* quality have you had published? 
For the last 3 years 
 How many books have you had published? 
For the last 3 years 
How many unpublished discussion papers, or the equivalent for your subject area, have you 
produced? 
How many scientific works in progress, or the equivalent in your subject area, do you 
currently have? 
For the last 3 years 
How many research grants have you obtained and what was their value? 
For the last academic year 
How many hours have you spent teaching in the classroom?  
For the last academic year 
How many students have you taught or assessed?  
For the previous academic year 
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For how many teaching modules did you receive an average module evaluation score 
submitted by your students? Answer zero if your university does not operate a teaching 
module evaluation system with 5 as the highest score.    
 
Remaining Personal Information  
Where have you spent most of your life? 
What is your Marital Status? 
In which band is your total household income? 
Up to £40,000 
£40,001 to £70,000 
£70,001 to £100,000 
£100,001 to £150,000 
£150,001 and above 
How Many Children do you have? 
[Prize Preamble] 
Thank you for filling out the survey.  
A number will now be randomly generated between 1 and 300. If the number is equal to 300, 
you will win a prize: the amount you could win will depend on your choice in {Randomised 
Table/Row}. You chose to receive £ {Corresponding Amount}. This entry has been randomly 
selected.  
Press "Next" to generate a number between 1 and 300. 
BAD LUCK - YOU HAVE NOT WON A PRIZE. Your number was {Random number 
between 1 & 300}. You still have a chance to win a prize of £500 for most accurately 
guessing the mean of other academics' responses in the "Prize draw for most accurate guess 
of other academics'  
[CONGRATULATIONS - YOU HAVE WON A PRIZE. Your number was ${Random 
number between 1 & 300}.  
You will be paid according to your choice in {Randomised Table/Row} which was £ 
{Corresponding Amount}. This entry was randomly selected.   
You also have a chance to win a prize of £500 for most accurately guessing the mean of other 
academics' responses in the "Prize draw for most accurate guess of other academics 
responses".] 
If you would like to be considered for [receive] a payment, please enter your email address 
below: 
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Please also choose whether you would like to be paid by direct credit to your bank account or 
by gift cards. You do not need to provide your bank details at this stage. We will contact you 
with further details. 
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Chapter 3 
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“Why give more? The role of student expectations and engagement in 
extra-curricular teaching effort.” 
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Abstract  
Academics in higher education in the UK face increasing and conflicting demands for both 
research and teaching excellence. Career payoffs are higher for research excellence leading to 
the question of what motivates extra-curricular teaching effort. I test whether student 
expectations of support and student engagement motivates extra-curricular teaching effort, as 
well as examine gender differences in the responsiveness to expectations and engagement. I 
find that expectations and engagement affect extra-curricular teaching effort positively for 
both male and female academics.  
 
 
Introduction 
UK universities now compete in global markets for students who are likely to pay 
close attention to how different institutions perform. The publication of the latest national and 
international league tables often makes headlines and influences students’ choice of 
universities (Chevalier & Jia, 2015; Gibbons, Neumayer, & Perkins, 2015). The removal of 
caps on student numbers has exacerbated competition (Fazackerley, 2017). Teaching quality 
is under intense public scrutiny with a steep increase in tuition fees driving student value for 
money concerns, and the introduction of the Teaching Excellence Framework adding to the 
focus on teaching quality (Department for Business Innovation and Skills, 2016). An 
increasing focus on teaching to enhance employment prospects may have added to the 
conflict between time spent on research versus teaching (Canaan & Shumar, 2008; Gautier & 
Wauthy, 2007; Hattie & Marsh, 1996).  
As discussed in chapter two, despite reduced academic autonomy associated with the 
marketization of higher education (J. Kenny & Fluck, 2014; J. Kenny, 2017; Olssen & Peters, 
2005; Olssen, 2016; Vardi, 2009), the remaining discretion in time allocation may lead to a 
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difference in focus between research and teaching (Allgood & Walstad, 2013; Boyd & Smith, 
2016; Gautier & Wauthy, 2007; Kossi et al., 2015; Wilkin & Tavernier, 2002). The value of 
research activities to career progression in the higher education sector is frequently 
highlighted (Barbezat, 2006; Hattie & Marsh, 1996; Rey, 2001). However, the lack of career 
incentives to devote extra-curricular teaching effort to students raises the question of what 
motivates academics in going the extra mile in practice.  
This paper examines the multi-tasking conflict academics face between research and 
teaching from a behavioural point of view, given the importance of research activities to 
career progression. With a randomised experiment, embedded in an online survey, I test 
academics’ responses to varying levels of student expectations of teaching support and 
student engagement. I use the social exchange theory (Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1976) and the 
theory of guilt aversion (Battigalli & Dufwenberg, 2007) to predict positive effects of these 
variables on the academics’ willingness to support students when academics experience a 
conflict between research and teaching responsibilities. I also test whether female academics 
are more responsive to student expectations and engagement. This follows from previous 
research suggesting that women may be more other-regarding than men, including a greater 
sensitivity to social cues (Croson & Gneezy, 2009; Kahn, Hottes, & Davis, 1971) and a 
greater disposition to experience guilt (Else-Quest, Higgins, Allison, & Morton, 2012). 
Whilst gender differences have not previously been identified in guilt-driven behaviour in 
one-off economic games, the ongoing relationship between academic and student is a setting 
in which gender differences could manifest. 
My paper is the first to apply the behavioural economic concept of guilt aversion, in 
response to the effects of student expectations of support and student engagement, as a 
motivation for the discretionary allocation of time between research and teaching in the 
higher education sector. I find that high student expectations of support and student 
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engagement give rise to extra-curricular teaching effort. The findings are mixed with regard 
to the mechanism for these effects. On the one hand, I control for individual differences in 
guilt proneness (T. Cohen et al., 2014) , and show a significant correlation of guilt proneness 
with extra-curricular teaching effort. This provides support for guilt aversion possibly being a 
mechanism for in-the-moment effects of student expectations and engagement on extra-
curricular teaching effort. On the other hand, I find that female academics are more prone to 
guilt than male academics. Yet, there are no gender differences in how female versus male 
academics respond to student expectations of support and student engagement. I discuss these 
seemingly conflicting findings and suggest promising avenues for future research. My work 
contributes to the literature on social exchange theory (Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1976) and guilt 
aversion (Battigalli & Dufwenberg, 2007; Charness & Dufwenberg, 2006).  
In what follows, I set out the theoretical framework for my research hypotheses. I 
describe next my experimental design, data analysis, experimental validity checks, and 
conclude with the discussions of all findings.  
 
 
Theory Development 
In what follows, I provide the rationale for why academics may engage in extra-
curricular teaching effort and what is the role of student expectations of support and student 
engagement. I formulate predictions that differ for male and female academics. Central to my 
hypotheses will be the social exchange theory (Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1976) and the concept 
of guilt aversion (Battigalli & Dufwenberg, 2007; Charness & Dufwenberg, 2006), topics 
which I discuss below. 
Social Exchange Theory  
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According to social exchange theory, parties to a relationship remain satisfied and 
committed as long as the benefits of the relationship outweigh its costs (Blau, 1964; Emerson, 
1976). In the higher education context, part of the academic’s job is to engage with students 
for the purpose of forming and maintaining positive and mutually satisfying relationships 
(DeShields Jr, Kara, & Kaynak, 2005; Voss, Gruber, & Szmigin, 2007). In this respect, it is 
important then to ensure that the relationship between the academic and the student yields 
equitable outcomes whereby what one party takes from the relationship and what they give to 
it is comparable to what the other party takes from the relationship and what they, in turn, 
give to it (Adams, 1963; Rawls, 2009).  
The expectations of students and the engagement of students may underpin the 
academic-student relationship as independent constructs. Promises that induce expectations in 
the other party need to be fulfilled both as an indicator of valued social status for the other 
party and because such consistency may signal a commitment to equity as a norm for the 
relationship (Cropanzano, Byrne, Bobocel, & Rupp, 2001; Tyler & Blader, 2001). 
Independently of expectations induced through promises, an academic’s decision to devote 
extra-curricular teaching effort may depend on a student’s level of engagement as a more 
engaged student may be presumed to give more to the relationship with the academic than a 
less engaged student. In this alternative case, student expectations are also likely to be higher, 
the higher their level of engagement (Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1976). I develop these ideas 
below with reference to the phenomenon of guilt aversion. In the model, I discuss the effects 
of higher expectations on the part of the student (due to promises versus student engagement) 
only when the distinction is relevant to discuss possible interaction effects. I then manipulate 
expectations both ways to empirically test my theoretical predictions.  
Guilt Aversion  
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Guilt aversion can be defined in the following terms: “if people feel guilt for hurting 
their partners…..and for failing to live up to their expectations, they will alter their behaviour 
(to avoid guilt) in ways that seem likely to maintain and strengthen the relationship 
(Baumeister et al., 1994). So, empathic (interpersonal) guilt can be seen as one mechanism 
for the interdependent exchanges described in social exchange theory. In making a promise, 
one party has intentionally induced the other party to rely on that behaviour. By breaking a 
promise the promisor disappoints the entitled expectation of the promisee to receive what is 
deserved, which is harmful to the relationship. Similarly, guilt may arise as a result of 
violating the principle of equity in the relationship when, for example, someone who gives 
more and someone who gives less to the relationship receives from it the same amount of the 
corresponding reward. In this sense, either student expectations or student engagement are 
likely to affect the behaviour of the academic independently of each other through the 
mechanism of guilt aversion (Battigalli & Dufwenberg, 2007; Charness & Dufwenberg, 
2006).  The application of guilt aversion to the academic-student relationship is a novel 
development. Increasing student expectations of extra-curricular teaching support in the 
neoliberal academy and the relationship that may exist between the two parties provide a 
setting that could give rise to guilt aversion. I define extra-curricular teaching effort as both 
the likelihood that an academic will respond to a student and how much time they will 
allocate if they respond (DellaVigna, List, & Malmendier, 2012).  
The Model and Research Hypotheses 
I adapt a formalisation of guilt aversion, which applies to theoretic games with 
financial payoffs (Battigalli & Dufwenberg, 2007). I modify the dictator game to represent 
the relationship between an academic and a student, with the academic deriving utility from 
having more time to finalize a research grant application. There is no retribution from the 
student affecting the academic’s payoff as the timeframe is set subsequent to the student 
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completing the teaching evaluation. In total, she has a time resource of x units which she can 
allocate between working on her research grant application and helping a student who asks 
for support before his upcoming final exam.1 Both tasks have the same deadline creating a 
conflict. The basic idea of a guilt averse academic is that she will suffer from guilt to the 
extent that she believes the student receives less support than he expects to get. Thus she will 
increase her teaching effort to avert these feelings of guilt. A psychological utility function 
for the academic µA can be defined as:   
µA (z, αS) = πA (z) – θ1 max {0, Eαs [πS] – πS (z)} – θ2 max {0, πS (z) - Eαs [πS]}  (1) 
 
 
Where z is the eventual time allocation of the academic to her research grant, πA (z) is 
the payoff (from the research grant application) to the academic at z, αS is the student’s 
expectation of receiving help from the academic and Eαs [πS] is the student’s expected payoff 
(in this case the student’s final grade) given his beliefs of receiving help from the academic 
and θ1 and θ2 are exogenously given constants. The academic then maximises her utility 
subject to the constraint that z ≤ x, where x is the academic’s time resource. 
 
Further discussions regarding the mathematical details of the model follow in the 
formalization of guilt aversion (Battigalli & Dufwenberg, 2007). Here I concentrate on the 
interpretation of (1) in the higher education context. Equation (1) says that in a conflict of 
interests, as in dictator games, the increase in the academic’s payoff from spending more time 
on the grant application [πA (z2) -  πA (z1)] > 0 may be offset by the cost of her guilt due to the 
failure to meet the expectations of the student caused by his lower grade. 
 
Max {0, Eαs [πS] – πS (z2)} - max {0, Eαs [πs] – πs (z1)} ≥ 0  (2) 
 
 
                                                 
1 In this subsection I will refer to the academic as “she” and the student as “he”. 
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Where inequality (2) is strict if the student initially expects to get more help than πS 
(z2). The extent of the psychological cost is given by θ1 and θ2 which measure the academic’s 
sensitivity to guilt by not meeting the student’s high or low expectations of support, 
respectively. 
Note that student expectations may be high either due to explicit promises by the 
academic (direct induction of expectations) or because the student gives more (versus less) to 
the relationship in terms of his/her engagement (a prediction derived from social exchange 
theory (Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1976)). Thus, the model illustrates the effects on extra-
curricular teaching effort that are possible as a function of either promise-induced 
expectations or student engagement. I summarize these as my first two hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1: (Student Expectations) There will be a positive association between 
student expectations and higher extra-curricular teaching efforts by 
academics. 
 
 
Hypothesis 2: (Student Engagement) There will be a positive association between 
student engagement and higher extra-curricular teaching efforts by 
academics. 
 
I further note that there may be interactive effects between student expectations and 
student engagement. That is academics may be more responsive to expectations when 
students are more engaged. This type of interaction has previously been theorized between a 
guilt averse response to another party’s expectations and the engagement of the other party in 
the relationship, measured by their effort exerted in response to differing incentives (Adams, 
1963; Ghidoni & Ploner, 2014). Also, as previously discussed, high levels of engagement 
may reduce the social distance between the academic and the student, which has also been 
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shown to more likely give rise to guilt aversion when expectations are not met (Balafoutas & 
Sutter, 2016; Morell, 2016). 
Thus, 
 
Hypothesis 3: (Student Expectation and Engagement). The positive relationship 
between student expectations induced through promises and extra-
curricular teaching effort will be stronger when student engagement is 
high. 
 
The Role of Gender 
In this section, I discuss the role of the academic’s gender in changing the effects 
predicted in Hypotheses 1 to 3. As discussed in sociological research studies, female 
academics face different societal expectations for care-giving which may affect the roles 
female academics are expected to adopt (Beddoes, 2015; Heijstra et al., 2015; Rafnsdóttir & 
Heijstra, 2013). The neoliberalism of academia may reinforce traditional academic 
stereotypes of the male researcher, who is freer to meet workflow accountability constraints, 
and the caring female teacher (Lu, 2018; MacNell et al., 2015; Powell et al., 2018).  
Gendered preferences associated with teaching effort may also be fashioned by social 
expectations. First, female academics, like other women, may be more other-regarding than 
men with a greater sensitivity to social cues (Croson & Gneezy, 2009; Kahn et al., 1971). 
Second, men may be more responsive to financial incentives and invest in types of activities 
that lead to valued financial rewards from their career, compared to women who may respond 
to social incentives more (Murad, Stavropoulou, & Cookson, 2016; Tonin & Vlassopoulos, 
2014). Third, there may be female self-selection into roles and sectors with greater social 
motivation and affiliation (Konrad et al., 2000; Tonin & Vlassopoulos, 2010).  
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Women have long been gender stereotyped as more emotional, and more prone to 
feelings of guilt, than men (Barrett & Bliss-Moreau, 2009; Plant, Hyde, Keltner, & Devine, 
2000). A meta-analysis of studies of self-reported guilt proneness found that women are more 
prone to feelings of guilt than men (Else-Quest et al., 2012). The gender difference was small 
but statistically significant. I also test for gender differences in guilt-proneness for academics: 
 
Hypothesis 4: (Gender and Guilt) Female academics will tend to be more guilt-prone 
than male academics.  
 
Following from hypothesis 4, if female academics are more prone to guilt than male 
academics I would expect this to change how Hypotheses 1 to 3 above apply to female versus 
male academics. In particular, I expect all hypothesized relationships to be stronger for 
female academics (as they are more prone to the key trigger of the effects I predict). This 
leads to the following hypothesis:    
 
Hypothesis 5: (Gender, Expectations and Engagement) The positive relationship 
between extra-curricular teaching effort and student expectations of 
support, student engagement and the interaction of student 
expectations and engagement, will be stronger for female versus male 
academics.  
 
 
 
Study Design 
Participants and Design: 
The data was gathered from an experiment embedded in a survey sent to 12,272 
academics at UK Universities in July 2016, with 1,418 respondents (M age = 45.61, SD age = 
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9.83, 38.5% female, 44.3% at senior academic levels (associate or full professor or 
equivalent), 790 mainly lived in the UK). The survey experiment approach has an extensive 
history and was dictated by the impossibility of observing student expectations in a natural 
setting (Cruces, Perez-Truglia, & Tetaz, 2013; Di Tella, Galiani, & Schargrodsky, 2012; 
Finseraas & Jakobsson, 2014; Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2010; Jakobsson, Kotsadam, Syse, & 
Øien, 2015).  
The study consisted of a 3 (expectations: high vs. low vs. unknown) x 3 (student 
engagement: high vs. low vs. unknown) between-subjects design, with participants randomly 
assigned to one of 9 vignettes representing each combination of treatments. By manipulating 
the student’s expectation and engagement conditions in my vignettes, I hoped to observe the 
hypothesized differences between the academics time allocations, i.e. both the likelihood of 
responding and the time allocated to the student. Full details of the 9 vignettes, together with 
a table showing the link between vignettes and hypotheses, follows at Appendix A. 
Student Expectations. Participants were randomly allocated to one of three student 
expectation conditions: high, low or unknown. For high expectations of support, the wording 
was: “In your lectures, you have made a point of telling your students that you would be 
prepared to provide support for them during the exam period. As a result, your students' 
expectations of gaining support from you are high.” For low expectations of support, the 
wording was: “In your lectures, you have made a point that you might be involved in a bid 
process in the same period as the exam takes place. As a result, this specific student's 
expectation of receiving support from you before the exam is low.” For unknown student 
expectations, no statement describing student expectations was provided.  
Student Engagement. Participants were randomly allocated to one of three student 
engagement conditions: high, low or unknown. For high/ (low) student engagement, the 
wording was: “The scenarios that follow relate to a specific student of yours who is very 
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engaged/ (not very engaged) with your module.” For unknown student engagement, no 
statement describing student engagement was provided.  
To conceal the purpose of the survey experiment, it was embedded within a wide-
ranging survey of academics preferences, productivity measures and other control measures, 
which have already been detailed in chapter two. 
The number of academics polled for the study was determined based on an estimated 
response rate of 10% and on a-priori power analysis with anticipated small effect sizes (i.e., 
Cohen’s f  = .15; (J. Cohen, 1992)) requiring a minimum sample size of 1,100 to be powered 
at 95%. All power calculations were conducted using G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & 
Buchner, 2007).  
 
Materials 
In my experiment, formulated as a dictator game, the academic (the dictator) has to 
decide whether to allocate time and, if so, how much time to devote to a student (the 
recipient). Each vignette describes a multi-tasking conflict between a research grant 
application and supporting the student for an exam. Both the research grant application and 
the exam have identical deadlines, in one week’s time. It is made clear to the academic that 
helping the student will benefit the student’s exam result but may diminish the quality of the 
grant application, which is critical to the academic’s next review and that there is no penalty 
for withholding assistance to the student2.  
 
Procedure  
                                                 
2 To ensure a true dictator game, a key assumption is that there can be no retribution by the student in the form of a poor 
teaching evaluation. I contacted all 27 universities, whose staff constituted the polling sample, to verify this assertion. Where 
no university wide policy applied, I contacted 3 departments within the university to determine their policies. Based on the 
replies received, in 92.3% of cases teaching evaluations were conducted more than one week before the end of teaching and 
3-4 weeks before the exam. Thus my assertion that no retribution is possible is supported in the vast majority of cases.   
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Participants were randomly assigned to one of the nine experimental conditions, and 
read the corresponding vignette (see Appendix A). They proceeded to record their likelihood 
of responding to a student and the minutes they would devote to the student during the 
meeting, based on the vignette. 
 The survey experiment was conducted using the Qualtrics online survey tool. 
Invitations were sent to academics’ university e-mail accounts with access to the survey by 
unique individualised URL. The software enabled full response tracking and prevented the 
duplication of responses. For all questions that involved sensitive personal information 
respondents were able to either answer the question, in full or in part, or leave it blank if they 
do not want to submit these details. Ethical approval of the proposals and data security 
arrangements was granted by the University of Surrey Ethics Committee.  
Twenty-seven of the top fifty UK universities, from the Times 2015 UK higher 
education ranking (Bothwell, 2015), were selected as having similar research and teaching 
characteristics. Common departments were chosen across these universities to allow further 
analysis of the data at a departmental level. The selection of academics was by title with the 
aim of identifying those with both research and teaching responsibilities.3 Responses were 
screened to verify these dual responsibilities. Further data was sought, with completion 
optional, to provide controls and additional insights into academics’ willingness to provide 
additional support to students.  
 
Measures 
Extra-Curricular Teaching Effort. Participants were asked to provide two measures 
of extra-curricular teaching effort. These were their likelihood of responding to a student, and 
                                                 
3 In the UK Education system the titles Assistant Professor, which is equivalent to a Lecturer or Senior Lecturer, and 
Associate Professor, which is equivalent to a Reader can be used.  
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if they responded, how many minutes they would devote to a student. Where the likelihood of 
responding to a student was entered as zero, any entries for minutes devoted to a student were 
removed from subsequent regressions. These measures are summarised below and detailed at 
Appendix A.    
(a) Likelihood of Responding to a Student. Participants were asked to provide a 
percentage likelihood, on a scale of 0% to 100%, of responding to a student using 
two items. One item measured the likelihood of responding to a student email and 
the other item measured the likelihood of responding to a knock on the door 
(Spearman-Brown =. 66).     
(b) Minutes Devoted to a Student. Participants were asked how many minutes they 
would devote to responding to a student, on a scale of 0 minutes to 100 minutes, 
using 4 items for both an email approach and a knock on the door approach. A 
sample item was “This specific student of yours emails you (knocks on your door 
outside your office hours) with a significant number of questions. If you respond 
without any information that it will substantially affect the student’s grade (If, 
according to your student, your meeting could improve their overall grade from a 
2.2 to a 2.1/ If, according to your student, your meeting could improve their overall 
grade from a 2.1 to a 1st/ If, according to your student, your meeting could avoid the 
student failing their degree), how many minutes would you dedicate to responding 
to your student?”. These items probed 4 impacts of the intervention on the student’s 
overall grade for exploratory purposes, as I speculated that they may influence 
extra-curricular teaching effort. However, given a Cronbach’s α = .90 across the 8 
measures (4 impacts x 2 approaches), they were consolidated to a single measure. 
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Control Variables. I controlled for the academic’s guilt proneness, gender, seniority, 
type of department, research preference, teaching preference, time preference, years post PhD, 
risk aversion and altruism.  
Since I hypothesised that extra-curricular teaching effort would be motivated by guilt 
aversion, I investigated the effect of guilt proneness, using a psychometric index of guilt 
proneness (T. Cohen et al., 2014). The justification for controlling for gender, seniority and 
type of department was that each variable may make a difference to extra-curricular teaching 
effort, so reducing the residual variance of the regression and improving the precision of the 
estimates. I also elicited, and controlled for, academic’s validated teaching and research 
preferences (Callaghan & Coldwell, 2014; Matthews et al., 2014). A measure of time 
preference was also elicited and controlled for, given that allocating time to extra-curricular 
teaching effort may reflect a desire for short-term benefits over the long-term career benefits 
accruing from the research grant application (Burks et al., 2012). I controlled for years post 
PhD as a measure of experience. I controlled for the respondent’s degree of risk aversion 
which may influence decision-making. I also controlled for altruism, the principle of concern 
for other human beings which may be linked to helpfulness to students, by asking how much 
of a £500 win from a prize draw the respondent would donate to charity (Falk, Becker, 
Dohmen, Huffman, & Sunde, 2016). I ensured the integrity of controls by conducting a series 
of internal data validity checks.4  
 
Incentives  
                                                 
4 Internal validity checks included the following regressions: (a) Household income on age and years post PhD (b) Years 
post PhD to seniority (c) Teaching hours on teaching percentage of academic’s time (d) Aggregated publications on research 
percentage of academic’s time (e) Teaching preference on teaching percentage (f) teaching preference on teaching 
productivity index (g) research preference on research percentage (h) Research preference on research productivity index. 
All regressions produced the anticipated positive coefficients significant at 1%. 
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To improve survey response rates a prize of £300 was awarded to the respondent most 
accurately predicting the behavioural norms of other academics towards teaching duties. This 
was calculated as the response that minimises the sum of absolute deviations from the mean 
of each response within each academic discipline. A prize of up to £80 was also awarded 
randomly, with a 1 in 300 chance of winning, as part of the end-of-survey questionnaire to 
elicit the time preferences of responders. The latter was aimed at studying an unrelated 
research question, which is the subject of chapter two. In addition to incentivising the 
completion of the survey, these awards were designed to make the questions they referred to 
more salient. 
 
Experimental Validity Checks 
Randomized economic experiments are commonly referred to as a benchmark, in 
terms of their empirical credibility, against which non-experimental studies can be evaluated 
(Angrist & Pischke, 2010). My use of a survey experiment to determine economic treatment 
effects follows established methodology (Cruces et al., 2013; Di Tella et al., 2012; Finseraas 
& Jakobsson, 2014; Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2010; Jakobsson et al., 2015). The survey was 
completed by academics actively engaged in both research and teaching in higher education 
lending weight to the effects obtained compared with results from a non-representative 
population (Mullinix, Leeper, Druckman, & Freese, 2015). Given the typically low response 
rates obtained, selection bias may have altered the magnitude of treatment effects (Jakobsson 
et al., 2015). However, non-response does not necessarily predict selection bias (Groves, 
2006).  
I followed a comparable higher education survey and recommended techniques to 
determine the robustness of my results (Abreu et al., 2009; Montaquila & Olson, 2012; 
Pedersen, 2015). Benchmarking to industry data (Higher Education Statistics Agency, 2017), 
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female academics made up 38.5% of responses to the survey compared to the HESA 
benchmark 37.3%. Respondents at professor level at 27.5% exceeded the HESA benchmark 
of 11.9%, mirroring a typical over-representation of senior academic levels in surveys (Abreu 
et al., 2009; Blackaby et al., 2005).  
In my regressions, a teaching preference (positive), a research preference (negative) 
and guilt proneness (positive) are all correlated with extra-curricular teaching efforts. So, if 
the average values of these three controls varied between experimental conditions it could 
distort my results. However, I found only insignificant differences in the average value of 
these controls across the three experimental conditions, as shown at Table 1 (A). Repeating 
this comparison for different waves of respondents (to the initial email, and to the first and 
second reminders), did not show significant differences either, as shown at Table 1 (B). 
 I also compared respondents receiving incentivised emails, describing the incentives 
to complete the survey, or unincentivised emails which omitted this information. Again, if the 
average value of any variable correlated with time allocations varied between the incentivised 
and unincentivised emails it could distort my results. Those receiving the incentivised email 
had significantly higher research preferences, compared to those receiving the unincentivised 
email, as shown at Table 1 (C). If this difference was due to self-selection, based on the 
incentives offered, this would have increased the average research preference scores in my 
sample and reduced time allocated to students, due to the negative correlation between these 
variables. If the reduction was proportional to time allocated, then in line with hypothesis 
one, which proposed higher time allocations to students with high expectations of support, 
the reduction would be greater for the high expectations condition. Hence the treatment 
effects, the difference between high and unknown expectations, would be reduced but the 
findings would not be undermined.  
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-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
Many studies have found no difference between responses in laboratory experiments 
compared to real-life due to self-selection or experimenter demand effects (Abeler & 
Nosenzo, 2015; Anderson et al., 2013; Cleave, Nikiforakis, & Slonim, 2013; Exadaktylos, 
Espin, & Branas-Garza, 2013; Falk, Meier, & Zehnder, 2013). However I employed a 
number of measures to guard against possible experimenter demand effects, responses 
prompted by cues about what constitutes acceptable behaviour (Zizzo, 2010) Firstly, the 
experiment was embedded within a lengthy series of survey questions to mitigate possible 
cues. Secondly, financial incentives in the survey did not relate to the experimental vignettes. 
The ordering of vignettes was also randomized to avoid spill-over effects. Thirdly, the online 
format avoided cues from the invigilator or other subjects in a laboratory setting. Finally, it 
can be argued that the social cues in the vignettes have real-world validity by mirroring the 
social cues experienced by the academics balancing the demands of research and teaching. 
  
 
Results 
Summary Statistics 
A summary of the lecturer’s extra-curricular teaching effort, being the likelihood of 
responding (as a percentage) and time devoted (minutes and seconds), follows at Table 2, 
with effect sizes at Table 3. The results can be seen graphically at figure 1.   
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
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-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
The mean likelihood of the lecturer responding to a student is 67.88% and the mean 
amount of time devoted is 20 minutes 53 seconds. Comparing high to low expectations, the 
average likelihood of responding to a student increases by 3.02 percentage points, an effect 
size of .11, and the amount of time devoted increases by 2 minutes 29 seconds, an increase of 
12.6% and an effect size of .20. Comparing high to low engagement, the average likelihood 
of responding to a student increases by 2.07 percentage points, an effect size of .08, and the 
amount of time devoted reduces by 11 seconds, an effect size of -.01. The relatively small 
effect sizes are typical of vignette experiments (Alexander & Becker, 1978; Atzmüller & 
Steiner, 2010). However, in real-world terms, the difference for high compared to low 
expectations of roughly 2 ½ minutes per student for 20 students, a larger tutorial group, 
equates to almost an hour of time devoted to students arising from one conflict, an 
economically significant figure (Gibbs, Lucas, & Simonite, 1996; Kingsbury & Lymn, 2008).   
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
Turning to gender differences in time allocations, the average likelihood of 
responding to, and the minutes allocated to, the student for male and female academics 
individually can be seen graphically in Figure 2.  
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
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In the next section I analyse extra-curricular teaching effort motivated by student 
expectations and student engagement, covering the first three hypotheses, and gender 
differences in guilt-proneness and extra-curricular teaching effort, covering the final two 
hypotheses. 
 
Time Allocations motivated by Student Expectations and Student Engagement 
I used Tobit regressions to investigate the hypotheses, dictated by the likelihood of 
response and time donations being clumped at specific values and censored both at zero and 
at 100% and 100 minutes respectively. I show the results of the regression of the likelihood 
of response and time donations to students, with and without controls, in Table 4. Angrist and 
Pischke (2008) raise concerns over the approach used by the Tobit model. Recognising these 
concerns, I test for the robustness of the results that follow using an OLS model, in Table 5. 
There are no differences in the significance of high (compared to unknown) student 
expectations and high (compared to unknown) student engagement compared to Table 4.  
Turning to Hypothesis 1 (Student Expectations), when students have high (compared 
to unknown) expectations of support from their lecturer, the lecturer is significantly more 
likely both to respond (β = 4.98, p < .05) and to devote additional time (β = 2.04, p < .01). I 
also performed post-estimation Wald tests to compare positive extra-curricular teaching effort 
between the high and low expectations of support. For the likelihood of response, the Wald 
test was significant at 10% and for the minutes devoted it was significant at 1%.  
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
 93 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
The regressions for extra-curricular teaching effort included controls for research 
preference, teaching preference and a measure of guilt proneness (T. Cohen et al., 2014), all 
which are significant (p < .01). The significance for the measure of guilt proneness is 
consistent with the proposed transmission effect for high student expectations through the 
desire to avert guilt. In summary, the Tobit regressions and Wald tests in Table 4 provide 
support for Hypothesis 1 (Student Expectations) for both the likelihood of responding and for 
minutes devoted.  
Turning to Hypothesis 2 (Student Engagement), a high level of student engagement 
(compared to unknown student engagement) increases the likelihood of responding (β = 5.50, 
p < .05). However, the donation of additional time was not significant (β = 0.43, ns). The 
Wald tests in Table 4, comparing high engagement to low engagement, were not significant. 
Thus I have limited support for Hypothesis 2, with academics being more likely to respond to 
a student with high (compared to unknown) engagement.  
Turning to hypothesis 3 (Student expectation and engagement), I hypothesised that 
the positive relationship between student expectations and extra-curricular teaching effort 
will be stronger when student engagement is high. However, the interaction between high 
student expectations and high student engagement was not significant for either the likelihood 
of responding (β = -2.15, ns) or for minutes devoted (β = 0, ns), as shown in model 3 in Table 
4. I recoded the experimental conditions to further investigate these findings and for 
illustrative purposes. The recoding sought to identify those conditions most aligned with the 
theoretical prediction of high extra-curricular teaching effort using a technique devised to 
provide a holistic view of the alignment of characteristics associated with a positive career 
outcome (Foti & Hauenstein, 2007). The conditions were coded as aligned, where high 
student expectations were aligned to high student engagement; partially aligned, where either 
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student expectations or engagement was high but the other variable was low; and unaligned, 
where both student expectations and engagement were low. All other combinations of student 
expectations and engagement were recoded as ambiguous. Following this recoding, I show 
the Tobit regressions in Table 6.  
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
Only the aligned high expectations-high engagement condition is significant for both 
the likelihood of responding to the student (β = 7.54, p < .01), and the minutes devoted to the 
student (β = 2.17, p < .05). Other combinations of expectations and engagement were not 
significant for either the likelihood of responding to a student or for minutes devoted to the 
student. So, in summary I do not find support for hypothesis 3, that the relationship between 
high expectations and extra-curricular teaching effort will be stronger with high engagement 
but find that only the combination of high expectations and high engagement gives rise to 
extra-curricular teaching effort.   
 
Gender Differences in Guilt and Time Allocations  
To test hypothesis 4 (Gender and Guilt), whether guilt proneness differs by gender in 
the respondents, I performed a t-test. This showed that female academics were more guilt 
prone than male academics (t = 3.56, p < .01, Cohen’s D =-.19). This result provides support 
for hypothesis 4. 
To test hypothesis 5 (Gender, Expectations and Engagement), I performed difference 
in differences tests for each of hypothesis 1 to 3 by gender, which follow in Table 7.  
 
-------------------------------------------- 
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Insert Table 7 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
The interaction between high expectations and gender was not significant (see Table 
7, Model 1). The interaction between high engagement and gender for minutes devoted was 
negative and significant (see Table 7, Model 2, β = -3.96, p<0.05). To ease the interpretation 
of gender differences, I examined the significance of the interaction terms between gender 
and aligned/partially aligned/unaligned coding of the experimental conditions. The 
interaction between aligned high expectations/high engagement and gender for minutes 
devoted was negative and weakly significant (see Table 7, Model 3, β = -3.25, p<0.10). Thus, 
I do not have support for hypothesis 5. 
 
 
General Discussion 
In this paper, I have subjected a large sample of academics in UK higher education to 
a multi-tasking vignette experiment. Over 60% of UK academics face both research and 
teaching demands on a regular basis so that studying a conflict between these demands is of 
interest (Higher Education Statistics Agency, 2018). In line with my hypothesis, I found that 
a high level of student expectations of support led to higher extra-curricular teaching effort. 
Also in line with my hypothesis, I found that academics were more likely to engage in extra-
curricular teaching efforts, in terms of being more likely to respond but not to devote extra 
minutes, to help students whose engagement is high. Contrary to my hypothesis, I did not 
find the positive relationship between high expectations and extra-curricular teaching effort 
to be stronger with high student engagement. However, to analyse the interaction of student 
expectations and engagement, I recoded data for illustrative purposes and found that 
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academics will be more responsive when both student expectations of support and student 
engagement are high. 
Whilst I found that female academics were more guilt prone than male academics, this 
was not reflected in greater extra-curricular teaching effort by female academics compared to 
male academics in response to student expectations and engagement. I discuss the theoretical 
implications of my findings below, together with the limitations of, and the future directions 
for, my research. 
 
Theoretical Implications 
My findings that high student expectations and high student engagement lead to extra-
curricular teaching effort were in accordance with social exchange theory and the 
phenomenon of guilt aversion (Battigalli & Dufwenberg, 2007; Blau, 1964; Charness & 
Dufwenberg, 2006; Emerson, 1976).  
I theorised that both student expectations and student engagement were likely to affect 
the behaviour of the academic through the mechanism of guilt aversion (Battigalli & 
Dufwenberg, 2007; Charness & Dufwenberg, 2006). A correlation between the size of 
monetary donations to another player and the perceived expectations of the amount to be 
received by the other player has been found in economic experiments and attributed to guilt 
aversion. In my model, guilt could have resulted from the academic anticipating breaking a 
promise or from violating the principle of equity in the academic student relationship.  
In my model, I controlled for motivations of extra-curricular teaching effort other than 
guilt aversion, including preferences for research and teaching. By manipulating and 
conveying student expectations of support directly to academics in the vignette descriptions, 
the design addressed concerns of a false consensus of expectations (Ellingsen, Johannesson, 
Tjøtta, & Torsvik, 2010). My results were obtained across many universities and 
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departments, adding to the robustness of findings. However, the findings are mixed with 
regard to the mechanism for the extra-curricular teaching effort recorded. On the one hand, I 
control for individual differences in guilt proneness (T. Cohen et al., 2014), and show a 
significant correlation of guilt proneness with extra-curricular teaching effort. This provides 
support to the idea that guilt aversion may be the mechanism for the effects of student 
expectations and engagement on extra-curricular teaching effort. On the other hand, I find 
that female academics are more prone to guilt than male academics. Yet, there are no gender 
differences in how female versus male academics respond to student expectations of support 
and student engagement. This raises questions as to whether high student expectations and 
engagement generated feelings of guilt for the academics when they contemplated not 
engaging in the extra-curricular teaching effort. Perhaps, the mechanism for the effect of 
expectations and engagement did not involve the anticipation of, and aversion to, such 
potential feelings of guilt. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
I have actively sought to address potential limitations to this study. Firstly, there is a 
risk of self-selection into the survey and observer effects increasing the extra-curricular 
teaching effort recorded. To counter this risk, I adopted design and experimental validity 
checks, as previously detailed, to check for these biases. Secondly, the model assumes that 
academics will not respond to a conflict between research and teaching by simply working 
longer hours. The scenarios were carefully constructed to mirror that assumption and create a 
genuine conflict. To the extent that not all conflict may be resolved by working longer hours, 
my study is instructive regarding the trade-offs academics are willing to make and the role of 
student expectations in those trade-offs. 
The model using Tobit regressions, for both the likelihood of responding to a student 
and the amount of time to be allocated, can be criticised, since a non-zero likelihood of 
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response is a pre-requisite for allocating time to a student. An alternative approach could be 
Heckman’s selection model with a two stage approach, firstly to responding, then to time 
allocated, since the regressions for time allocated were conducted only for those academics 
who responded (Heckman, 1979).  
I did not plan to test for guilt as a mediating variable with a measure of state guilt, 
although my final theory development does build on guilt aversion as a mediating 
mechanism. It is a point of learning that a measure of state guilt could be used to test the 
mechanism more directly than a measure of guilt proneness as a trait. Employing a measure 
of state guilt and testing for a mediating role in extra-curricular teaching effort would be the 
subject of further research to clarify the effects found. 
In chapter two, I noted that gender differences may exist in time usage and power 
over time and in volunteering for non-promotable administration and service tasks (Babcock 
et al., 2017; Rafnsdóttir & Heijstra, 2013). These gender differences may also affect the 
allocation of extra-curricular teaching effort. So, even if female academics feel more guilt 
than male academics in a specific situation, it may limit their practical ability to supply extra-
curricular teaching effort (O'Hagan, 2018; Toffoletti & Starr, 2016).  
At a more detailed level, the email sent out to academics, inviting them to take part in 
the survey, had several references to the “Delivering Better For Less” website. A number of 
recipients submitted complaints, having associated the name with punitive measures to 
increase productivity in higher education. Although the email was subsequently amended, 
with hindsight, this issue could have been anticipated, benefitting overall response rates. 
Further, the survey sent out to UK academics was too long, requiring a minimum of 15 to 20 
minutes to complete. In retrospect, separate surveys could have been used, each closely 
aligned with the design of the corresponding study rather than trying to capture additional 
data possibly required in one long questionnaire that some of the respondents did not answer 
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in full. In mitigation, as in chapter two, data from partially completed surveys was used 
where appropriate.   
An extension of the model within the higher education setting could be to study 
responsiveness to student expectations of support and student engagement specifically within 
hard science departments (compared to other departments). I define hard science departments 
as including the biological sciences, chemistry and physics. This is motivated by hard science 
departments tending to work in larger teams producing multi-authored papers (Jones, 
Wuchty, & Uzzi, 2008; Wuchty, Jones, & Uzzi, 2007). This, in turn, is likely to provide a 
greater incentive to work on site compared to other departments, more contact with students 
in laboratories and, potentially, a greater aversion to guilt should students be let down in 
terms of their expectations.  
Finally, in response to the overall question posed by this thesis of whether gender 
plays a role in the handling of multiple demands in academia, I find that both male and 
female academics respond positively to student expectations of support and student 
engagement. However, unlike in chapter two, I do not find a significant difference in 
responses by gender.  
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Tables and Figures 
TABLE 1 
Experimental Validity Checks. 
(A) Differences in key variables across control and treatment groups 
    <--- Mann-Whitney p values -->  
High 
Expectations 
Low 
Expectations 
Unknown 
Expectations 
High v 
Unknown 
High v 
Low 
Low v 
Unknown 
Teaching Preference Index 2.2386 2.2486 2.2133 0.64 0.67 0.37 
  (0.6981) (0.6781) (0.6940)       
Research Preference Index 3.0398 3.0399 3.0454 0.71 0.95 0.78 
  (0.6859) (0.6685) (0.6246)       
Guilt Index 3.9215 3.8938 3.8951 0.18 0.57 0.53 
  (0.6589) (0.6655) (0.6022)       
Standard deviations in parentheses 
(B) Differences in key variables across waves of responders 
    <--- Mann-Whitney p values --> 
 
Initial 
Email 
R1 (1st 
Reminder) 
R2 (2nd 
Reminder) 
R1 v 
 Initial 
 R2 v  
Initial 
R2 v 
 R1 
Teaching Preference Index 2.1351 2.2486 2.2613 0.07 0.03 0.65 
  (0.6996) (0.6913) (0.6831)       
Research Preference Index 3.0498 2.9827 3.0852 0.60 0.38 0.09 
  (0.6060) (0.7474) (0.6021)       
Guilt Index 3.8767 3.8673 3.9444 0.90 0.38 0.20 
  (0.6657) (0.7001) (0.5797)       
Standard deviations in parentheses 
 
(C) Differences in key variables by email incentive/no incentive  
 
 
Incentivised 
Email 
Unincentivised 
Email 
Mann Whitney p value 
Teaching Preference Index 2.1750 2.2140 0.47 
  (0.6755) (0.6845)   
Research Preference Index 3.0970 2.9330 0.01 
  0.65555 0.72105   
Guilt Index 3.9125 3.8295 0.25 
  (0.6092) (0.6958)   
Standard deviations in parentheses 
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TABLE 2 
Summary of academics’ likelihood of response and time donations to students 
  
Likelihood of 
Response % 
Time 
Devoted:  
  
 
  
Overall 67.88% 20m 53s 
  (26.67) (12.72) 
By Expectations    
High 70.22% 22m 12s 
  (25.02) (13.46) 
Low 67.20% 19m 43s 
  (28.60) (11.56) 
Unknown 66.08% 20m 34s 
  (26.35) (12.81) 
By Engagement    
High 69.15% 20m 53s 
  (26.01) (12.51) 
Low 67.08% 21m 4s 
  (27.62) (13.24) 
Unknown 67.38% 20m 43s 
  (26.39) (12.43) 
By Gender    
Female 67.28% 20m 41s 
  (26.85) (12.46) 
Male 68.30% 21m 6s 
  (26.46) (12.92) 
Note: Each row shows the average percentage likelihood of responding to 
 a student and the average time devoted. Standard deviations appear in brackets. 
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TABLE 3 
Effect sizes (Cohen’s D) for academics’ likelihood of response and time donations  
Effect Size - Cohen's D 
Likelihood of 
Response  
Time Devoted 
High Expectations : Low Expectations  .11  .20 
High Engagement: Low Engagement  .08 -.01 
Male Academic : Female Academic  .04  .03 
Note: Each row shows Cohen’s d, a measure of effect size in standard deviations between two 
data samples. Negative signs indicate that the second term in the comparison is greater than the 
first term.  
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TABLE 4  
Tobit Regressions of responses to Students by Academics 
 Model 1 Model 1 Model 2 Model 2 Model 3 Model 3 
 Likelihood Minutes Likelihood Minutes Likelihood Minutes 
Low Expectations  2.25 -0.80 0.94 -1.04 8.23* -1.38    
 (2.16) (0.71) (2.33) (0.78) (4.02) (1.34)    
High Expectations  6.70*** 1.78*** 4.98** 2.04*** 4.44 2.09*    
 (2.08) (0.69) (2.24) (0.74) (3.75) (1.26)    
Low Engagement  1.13 0.23 1.44 0.06 2.68 -0.09    
 (2.14) (0.70) (2.31) (0.77) (3.87) (1.30)    
High Engagement  2.98 0.04 5.50** 0.43 9.92*** 0.33    
 (2.10) (0.69) (2.26) (0.75) (3.78) (1.26)    
Female -0.26 -0.42 -0.68 -0.85 -0.40 -0.86    
 (1.79) (0.59) (2.12) (0.70) (2.12) (0.70)    
Low Expect x Low Engage     -8.77 0.66    
     (5.75) (1.92)    
Low Expect x High Engage     -12.74** 0.36    
     (5.69) (1.89)    
High Expect x Low Engage     3.83 -0.14    
     (5.58) (1.86)    
High Expect x High Engage     -2.15 0.00    
     (5.35) (1.79)    
Research Preference   -6.47*** -2.12*** -6.57*** -2.11*** 
   (1.55) (0.51) (1.55) (0.51)    
Teaching Preference   7.50*** 1.11* 7.44*** 1.11*   
   (1.44) (0.48) (1.44) (0.48)    
Time Preference   1210.72 -411.76 1136.17 -408.33    
   (744.30) (247.35) (748.14) (249.15)    
Guilt Proneness   5.33** 2.00*** 5.39*** 2.00*** 
   (1.62) (0.54) (1.62) (0.54)    
Years Post PHD   0.14 0.02 0.14 0.02    
   (0.14) (0.04) (0.14) (0.05)    
Risk Aversion   -0.05 0.26 0.09 0.25    
   (1.00) (0.33) (1.00) (0.33)    
Altruism   -0.70 -0.05 -0.69 -0.05    
   (0.42) (0.14) (0.42) (0.14)    
Bath    9.07 -2.68 10.04 -2.69    
   (7.87) (2.64) (7.88) (2.65)    
Birmingham   9.23 -3.88 9.81 -3.88    
   (7.32) (2.45) (7.32) (2.45)    
Bristol   -0.11 -3.82 1.53 -3.87    
   (7.40) (2.49) (7.41) (2.50)    
Cambridge   8.41 -1.48 8.97 -1.47    
   (7.80) (2.58) (7.80) (2.59)    
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Cardiff   3.55 -3.26 4.15 -3.26    
   (6.42) (2.15) (6.42) (2.16)    
Edinburgh   9.04 -3.45 10.22 -3.49    
   (6.92) (2.32) (6.93) (2.32)    
Essex   0.50 -4.07 1.83 -4.11    
   (7.29) (2.45) (7.30) (2.46)    
Imperial College London   9.29 5.59 11.42 5.56    
   (11.49) (3.85) (11.53) (3.86)    
Kent   6.29 -4.77 7.36 -4.83    
   (7.45) (2.50) (7.45) (2.50)    
Leeds   10.08 -4.34 11.66 -4.40    
   (7.12) (2.37) (7.14) (2.38)    
Leicester   12.79 1.68 13.75 1.61    
   (7.20) (2.40) (7.20) (2.41)    
LSE   4.80 -6.09* 6.11 -6.11*   
   (8.46) (2.82) (8.47) (2.83)    
Loughborough   17.87* 0.29 18.92* 0.25    
   (7.65) (2.55) (7.65) (2.56)    
Manchester   11.55 -5.94* 12.74 -5.99*   
   (7.08) (2.37) (7.08) (2.37)    
Nottingham   5.29 -2.27 5.73 -2.30    
   (7.17) (2.40) (7.16) (2.40)    
Oxford   10.08 0.40 11.38 0.34    
   (7.83) (2.62) (7.83) (2.63)    
Queens Belfast   12.01 -4.93* 12.94 -4.96*   
   (7.12) (2.38) (7.12) (2.38)    
Reading   14.29 2.34 15.83* 2.27    
   (8.06) (2.66) (8.07) (2.67)    
Royal Holloway College   5.07 -6.63* 6.63 -6.70*   
   (7.87) (2.63) (7.88) (2.64)    
Southampton   4.12 -2.68 4.33 -2.71    
   (7.75) (2.61) (7.74) (2.61)    
St Andrews   16.04* -5.89* 17.07* -5.92*   
   (7.97) (2.64) (7.97) (2.64)    
Surrey   25.38*** -0.97 26.39*** -1.01  
   (7.35) (2.44) (7.36) (2.44)    
UCL   11.95 -3.84 13.22 -3.89    
   (7.24) (2.42) (7.25) (2.42)    
UEA   20.66** -1.44 21.34** -1.44    
   (7.33) (2.42) (7.33) (2.43)    
Warwick   2.35 -5.41* 2.43 -5.41*   
   (7.29) (2.44) (7.28) (2.44)    
York   15.28* -4.01 16.44* -4.04    
   (7.27) (2.42) (7.28) (2.43)    
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English   8.48 -0.57 7.54 -0.52    
   (5.77) (1.90) (5.77) (1.90)    
Business/Management   2.71 0.17 2.54 0.17    
   (4.14) (1.38) (4.14) (1.38)    
Chemistry   -4.98 1.87 -5.02 1.87    
   (4.92) (1.63) (4.91) (1.63)    
Computer Science   -2.05 0.05 -2.86 0.08    
   (5.02) (1.67) (5.02) (1.68)    
Economics   -7.32 -1.07 -7.61 -1.07    
   (4.74) (1.59) (4.75) (1.59)    
Geography   6.32 -1.19 6.39 -1.20    
   (5.09) (1.68) (5.10) (1.69)    
History   15.49** -1.97 15.74** -1.98    
   (4.90) (1.60) (4.90) (1.60)    
Law   2.91 0.42 3.19 0.38    
   (4.81) (1.60) (4.83) (1.61)    
Mathematics   1.10 1.00 1.27 1.00    
   (4.46) (1.49) (4.46) (1.49)    
Physics   2.92 1.29 2.92 1.30    
   (4.57) (1.52) (4.57) (1.52)    
Politics/Int. relations   -4.12 -3.32* -4.40 -3.34*   
   (4.86) (1.63) (4.86) (1.63)    
Psychology   -2.20 -0.50 -2.06 -0.52    
   (4.45) (1.49) (4.44) (1.49)    
Sociology   -2.01 -0.56 -1.74 -0.56    
   (5.53) (1.86) (5.52) (1.86)    
Other   3.83 3.13 4.08 3.11    
   (5.15) (1.72) (5.15) (1.72)    
Associate Professor   -3.85 -1.58 -4.02 -1.56    
   (4.48) (1.49) (4.48) (1.49)    
Reader   5.92 0.49 5.49 0.50    
   (3.86) (1.27) (3.85) (1.27)    
Assistant professor   -0.29 -1.16 -0.19 -1.15    
   (5.83) (1.95) (5.82) (1.95)    
Senior Lecturer   -3.75 -0.07 -3.90 -0.06    
   (3.23) (1.07) (3.23) (1.07)    
Lecturer   -2.79 1.29 -3.14 1.31    
   (3.42) (1.13) (3.42) (1.14)    
Other   -4.87 -2.55 -5.31 -2.54    
   (10.65) (3.53) (10.63) (3.53)    
Continental Europe   -1.60 0.35 -1.48 0.34    
   (2.50) (0.83) (2.50) (0.83)    
Asia   13.76* 3.11 14.21* 3.11    
   (6.67) (2.18) (6.67) (2.18)    
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Africa   -9.40 5.17 -9.75 5.22    
   (12.06) (4.06) (12.06) (4.06)    
North America   2.94 -0.66 3.02 -0.65    
   (3.99) (1.33) (4.00) (1.34)    
South America   -8.30 -0.91 -8.42 -0.91    
   (10.11) (3.45) (10.10) (3.45)    
Australasia   -1.58 1.91 -1.86 1.95    
   (6.67) (2.20) (6.67) (2.20)    
       
Constant 70.39*** 20.45*** -1165.29 429.56 -1093.67 426.23    
  (1.99) (0.66) (743.72) (247.16) (747.61) (248.98)    
Controls N N Y Y Y Y 
Observations     2,802     2,802     2,350     2,350    2,350    2,350 
Pseudo R-squared 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Wald Test       
(Hi – Lo expectations) 0.04 0.00 0.09   0.00   
(Hi – Lo engagement) 0.39   0.79 0.80   0.63   
Note: Model 1 = without controls, Model 2 = with controls, Model 3 = with controls and interaction effects. The 
Tobit regressions shown are for the percentage likelihood of responding to a student and the time devoted in 
minutes. The coefficients for high and low expectations are relative to the control treatment where student 
expectations are unknown to the academic. Robust standard errors are shown in in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 5  
OLS Regression of responses to Students by Academics  
 Model 1 Model 1 Model 2 Model 2 
Dependent Variable Likelihood Minutes Likelihood Minutes 
     
Low Expectations 2.25 -0.80 -0.03 -0.99    
 (2.16) (0.71) (1.68) (0.76)    
High Expectations 6.70*** 1.78*** 3.72** 2.04***  
 (2.08) (0.69) (1.62) (0.73)    
Low Engagement 1.13 0.23 0.05 0.15    
 (2.14) (0.70) (1.67) (0.76)    
High Engagement 2.98 0.04 3.89** 0.53    
 (2.10) (0.69) (1.63) (0.74)    
Female -0.26 -0.42 -1.61 -0.93    
 (1.79) (0.59) (1.52) (0.69)    
Research Preference   -4.70*** -2.08*** 
   (1.11) (0.50)    
Teaching Preference   5.40*** 0.93**   
   (1.03) (0.47)    
Time Preference   722.53 -415.52    
   (536.69) (243.78)    
Guilt Proneness   3.93*** 2.07*** 
   (1.17) (0.53)    
Years Post PHD   0.11 0.02    
   (0.10) (0.04)    
Risk Aversion   -0.39 0.26    
   (0.72) (0.33)    
Altruism   -0.31 -0.05    
   (0.31) (0.14)    
Bath    7.20 -2.77    
   (5.73) (2.60)    
Birmingham   7.72 -3.71    
   (5.30) (2.41)    
Bristol   2.55 -3.79    
   (5.40) (2.45)    
Cambridge   5.97 -1.20    
   (5.60) (2.54)    
Cardiff   3.13 -3.23    
   (4.67) (2.12)    
Edinburgh   7.18 -3.49    
   (5.03) (2.28)    
Essex   0.37 -4.15    
   (5.32) (2.42)    
Imperial College London  7.34 5.45  
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   (8.36) (3.80)    
Kent   4.76 -4.81    
   (5.42) (2.46)    
Leeds   7.04 -4.31    
   (5.14) (2.34)    
Leicester   9.24 1.68    
   (5.21) (2.37)    
LSE   2.79 -5.76*   
   (6.10) (2.77)    
Loughborough   15.02** 0.11    
   (5.54) (2.52)    
Manchester   9.60 -5.47*   
   (5.13) (2.33)    
Nottingham   4.67 -2.50    
   (5.20) (2.36)    
Oxford   9.18 0.14    
   (5.68) (2.58)    
Queens Belfast   9.66 -4.90*   
   (5.16) (2.34)    
Reading   9.92 2.14    
   (5.78) (2.62)    
Royal Holloway College  3.15 -6.52*  
   (5.70) (2.59)    
Southampton   5.69 -2.65    
   (5.66) (2.57)    
St Andrews   10.97 -5.86*   
   (5.72) (2.60)    
Surrey                          18.35*** -0.97  
   (5.28) (2.40)    
UCL   8.13 -3.70    
   (5.24) (2.38)    
UEA   13.75** -1.53    
   (5.26) (2.39)    
Warwick   1.87 -5.17*   
   (5.28) (2.40)    
York   11.09* -4.18    
   (5.25) (2.38)    
English   6.42 -0.55    
   (4.13) (1.87)    
Business/Management  2.26 0.15  
   (2.99) (1.36)    
Chemistry   -4.27 1.93    
   (3.54) (1.61)    
Computer Science   -2.64 0.08    
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   (3.63) (1.65)    
Economics   -7.07* -0.82    
   (3.43) (1.56)    
Geography   3.79 -1.07    
   (3.65) (1.66)    
History   9.40** -1.87    
   (3.47) (1.58)    
Law   1.12 0.58    
   (3.46) (1.57)    
Mathematics   1.26 1.06    
   (3.22) (1.46)    
Physics   2.30 1.38    
   (3.30) (1.50)    
Politics/International relations  -3.13 -2.98  
   (3.52) (1.60)    
Psychology   -0.88 -0.46    
   (3.23) (1.47)    
Sociology   -0.58 -0.36    
   (4.02) (1.83)    
Other   4.31 3.11    
   (3.73) (1.70)    
Associate Professor   -3.24 -1.38    
   (3.23) (1.47)    
Reader   3.51 0.42    
   (2.75) (1.25)    
Assistant professor   -1.08 -0.86    
   (4.21) (1.91)    
Senior Lecturer   -2.72 -0.04    
   (2.32) (1.05)    
Lecturer   -1.92 1.17    
   (2.46) (1.12)    
Other   -2.24 -2.42    
   (7.65) (3.47)    
Continental Europe   -1.24 0.30    
   (1.81) (0.82)    
Asia   8.24 2.86    
   (4.73) (2.15)    
Africa   -7.07 4.91    
   (8.82) (4.01)    
North America   2.37 -0.78    
   (2.89) (1.31)    
South America   -0.93 -0.93    
   (7.47) (3.39)    
Australasia   -3.00 2.05    
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   (4.75) (2.16)    
     
Constant 70.39*** 20.45*** -675.13 433.51*    
 (1.99) (0.64) (536.28) (243.59)    
Observations     2,802     2,802     2,350     2,350 
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.06 
The regressions shown in Table 3 have been re-estimated in this table using an OLS regression as a comparator.  
Model 1 = without controls, Model 2 = with controls, Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 6  
Tobit Regressions of response for Expectations-Engagement Conditions (Note 1) 
Dependent Variables Likelihood Minutes 
Expectations-Engagement aligned  7.54*** 2.17**   
 (2.92) (0.97)    
Expectations-Engagement partially aligned  3.36 0.32    
 (2.42) (0.80)    
Expectations-Engagement unaligned  -2.71 -1.04    
 (3.18) (1.06)    
Female -0.55 -0.81    
 (2.12) (0.70)    
Research Preference -6.42*** -2.09*** 
 (1.55) (0.51)    
Teaching Preference 7.50*** 1.15**   
 (1.44) (0.48)    
Time Preference 1231.71 -372.66    
 (747.36) (248.77)    
Guilt Proneness 5.44*** 2.06*** 
 (1.62) (0.54)    
Years Post PHD 0.15 0.02    
 (0.14) (0.05)    
Risk Aversion -0.05 0.27    
 (1.00) (0.33)    
Altruism -0.68 -0.05    
 (0.43) (0.14)    
Bath  8.88 -2.79    
 (7.89) (2.65)    
Birmingham 8.82 -3.97    
 (7.33) (2.45)    
Bristol -0.45 -4.12    
 (7.40) (2.49)    
Cambridge 7.99 -1.36    
 (7.80) (2.59)    
Cardiff 3.23 -3.26    
 (6.42) (2.16)    
Edinburgh 8.66 -3.48    
 (6.92) (2.32)    
Essex 0.73 -3.74    
 (7.28) (2.45)    
Imperial College London 8.00 4.86    
 (11.49) (3.85)    
Kent 6.20 -4.67    
 (7.45) (2.50)    
Leeds 9.56 -4.52    
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 (7.12) (2.38)    
Leicester 12.97 1.27    
 (7.20) (2.40)    
LSE 4.00 -6.43*   
 (8.46) (2.82)    
Loughborough 17.72* 0.26    
 (7.65) (2.56)    
Manchester 11.62 -5.96*   
 (7.09) (2.37)    
Nottingham 5.14 -2.41    
 (7.17) (2.40)    
Oxford 10.06 0.42    
 (7.83) (2.62)    
Queens Belfast 11.80 -5.10*   
 (7.13) (2.38)    
Reading 14.47 2.10    
 (8.06) (2.66)    
Royal Holloway College 4.89 -6.80**  
 (7.87) (2.63)    
Southampton 4.04 -2.97    
 (7.76) (2.61)    
St Andrews 16.03* -5.70*   
 (7.98) (2.64)    
Surrey 24.94*** -1.06    
 (7.36) (2.44)    
UCL 11.38 -3.78    
 (7.24) (2.42)    
UEA 20.33** -1.66    
 (7.34) (2.43)    
Warwick 1.94 -5.84*   
 (7.28) (2.44)    
York 14.72* -4.19    
 (7.27) (2.42)    
English 8.64 -0.71    
 (5.77) (1.90)    
Business/Management 2.77 0.01    
 (4.15) (1.38)    
Chemistry -4.83 1.66    
 (4.92) (1.64)    
Computer Science -1.90 -0.13    
 (5.02) (1.67)    
Economics -7.04 -1.07    
 (4.75) (1.59)    
Geography 6.14 -1.09    
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 (5.10) (1.69)    
History 15.55** -1.99    
 (4.91) (1.60)    
Law 3.04 0.16    
 (4.82) (1.61)    
Mathematics 1.10 0.98    
 (4.47) (1.49)    
Physics 2.95 1.28    
 (4.58) (1.52)    
Politics/International relations -3.73 -3.31*   
 (4.87) (1.63)    
Psychology -2.21 -0.53    
 (4.45) (1.49)    
Sociology -1.96 -0.60    
 (5.53) (1.86)    
Other 3.73 3.02    
 (3.85) (1.27)    
Assistant professor -0.07 -1.16    
 (5.82) (1.95)    
Senior Lecturer -3.95 -0.24    
 (3.23) (1.07)    
Lecturer -2.92 1.08    
 (3.42) (1.14)    
Other -4.47 -2.38    
 (10.63) (3.53)    
Continental Europe -1.73 0.38    
 (2.49) (0.83)    
Asia 14.17* 3.07    
 (6.67) (2.18)    
Africa -10.23 4.70    
 (12.06) (4.06)    
North America 2.45 -0.75    
 (4.00) (1.34)    
South America -8.53 -1.10    
 (10.11) (3.46)    
Australasia -2.00 2.09    
 (6.64) (2.19)    
Constant -1183.72 390.67    
 (746.79) (248.59)    
Observations      2,350     2,350 
Pseudo R-squared 0.01 0.01 
Note 1:  The alignment of conditions, compared to high student expectations and high student engagement, follows 
a technique devised to provide a holistic view of the alignment of characteristics associated with an outcome 
(leadership) (Foti & Hauenstein, 2007). Note 2: Tobit regressions for the percentage likelihood of responding to 
a student and the time devoted in minutes are shown.  The coefficients for high and low expectations are relative 
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to the control treatment where student expectations are unknown to the academic. Robust standard errors are 
shown in in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 7   
Tobit Regressions of response to students by Academics with gender interaction for guilt 
 Model 1 Model 1 Model 2 Model 2 Model 3 Model 3 
Dependent Variable Likelihood Minutes Likelihood Minutes Likelihood Minutes 
Low Expectations 3.05 -1.11 1.02 -0.92                  
 (2.94) (0.98) (2.34) (0.78)                  
High Expectations 6.00** 1.29 4.98** 2.03***                  
 (2.83) (0.94) (2.24) (0.74)                  
Female  1.97 -1.60 0.25 0.96 -1.02 -0.05    
 (3.36) (1.12) (3.47) (1.16) (2.75) (0.92)    
Low Expectations x Female -5.66 0.21                    
 (4.79) (1.59)                    
High Expectations x Female -2.84 1.96                    
 (4.64) (1.54)                    
Low Engagement 1.53 0.09 1.39 0.47                  
 (2.32) (0.77) (2.92) (0.97)                  
High Engagement 5.66** 0.45 6.49** 1.92**                  
 (2.26) (0.75) (2.85) (0.95)                  
Low Engagement x Female   0.04 -1.19   
   (4.78) (1.59)   
High Engagement x Female   -2.64 -3.96**   
   (4.68) (1.55)   
Aligned Expect-Engage     7.29** 3.40***  
     (3.68) (1.22)    
Aligned x Female     0.63 -3.25*    
     (5.95) (1.97)    
Partial Aligned Expect-Engage     4.08 0.53    
     (3.13) (1.04)    
Partial Aligned x Female     -1.66 -0.63    
     (4.93) (1.63)    
Unaligned Expect-Engage     -5.48 -0.40    
     (4.06) (1.36)    
Unaligned x Female     6.91 -1.65    
     (6.43) (2.15)    
Research Preference -6.42*** -2.14*** -6.45*** -2.08*** -6.44*** -2.06*** 
 (1.55) (0.51) (1.55) (0.51) (1.55) (0.51)    
Teaching Preference 7.45*** 1.08** 7.46*** 1.07** 7.46*** 1.14**   
 (1.44) (0.48) (1.44) (0.48) (1.45) (0.48)    
Time Preference 1168.08 -409.28 1213.74 -403.02 1244.86 -367.24    
 (744.96) (247.47) (744.56) (247.11) (747.27) (248.71)    
Guilt Proneness 5.35*** 2.01*** 5.29** 1.94*** 5.45*** 2.04*** 
 (1.62) (0.54) (1.62) (0.54) (1.62) (0.54)    
Years Post PHD 0.14 0.02 0.15 0.03 0.15 0.02    
 (0.14) (0.04) (0.14) (0.04) (0.14) (0.05)    
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Risk Aversion -0.10 0.29 -0.05 0.25 -0.06 0.25    
 (1.00) (0.33) (1.00) (0.33) (1.00) (0.33)    
Altruism -0.71 -0.05 -0.72 -0.08 -0.67 -0.06    
 (0.42) (0.14) (0.42) (0.14) (0.43) (0.14)    
Bath  8.92 -2.57 9.03 -2.70 8.48 -2.82    
 (7.88) (2.64) (7.87) (2.64) (7.90) (2.65)    
Birmingham 8.79 -4.01 9.21 -3.83 8.76 -3.98    
 (7.34) (2.45) (7.32) (2.44) (7.32) (2.45)    
Bristol -0.26 -3.81 -0.13 -3.88 -0.78 -4.23    
 (7.39) (2.49) (7.39) (2.49) (7.41) (2.50)    
Cambridge 7.98 -1.43 8.40 -1.47 7.98 -1.57    
 (7.81) (2.59) (7.80) (2.58) (7.81) (2.59)    
Cardiff 3.36 -3.21 3.52 -3.33 3.05 -3.36    
 (6.42) (2.15) (6.42) (2.15) (6.43) (2.16)    
Edinburgh 8.76 -3.42 9.00 -3.48 8.59 -3.52    
 (6.93) (2.32) (6.92) (2.31) (6.93) (2.32)    
Essex 0.02 -3.96 0.32 -4.25 0.36 -3.83    
 (7.30) (2.45) (7.29) (2.45) (7.30) (2.46)    
Imperial College London 8.49 5.79 8.91 5.19 7.92 4.43    
 (11.51) (3.85) (11.50) (3.85) (11.52) (3.86)    
Kent 5.63 -4.79 6.36 -4.76 6.26 -4.78    
 (7.47) (2.50) (7.45) (2.50) (7.46) (2.51)    
Leeds 9.80 -4.43 10.17 -4.16 9.58 -4.52    
 (7.13) (2.37) (7.12) (2.37) (7.12) (2.38)    
Leicester 12.23 1.60 12.72 1.60 12.91 1.17    
 (7.22) (2.41) (7.20) (2.40) (7.20) (2.40)    
LSE 4.49 -6.00* 4.75 -6.05* 4.00 -6.57*   
 (8.46) (2.82) (8.46) (2.82) (8.46) (2.82)    
Loughborough 17.51* 0.23 17.66* 0.02 17.62* 0.12    
 (7.66) (2.55) (7.66) (2.55) (7.67) (2.56)    
Manchester 11.38 -5.97* 11.40 -6.06* 11.53 -6.11*   
 (7.08) (2.37) (7.09) (2.37) (7.09) (2.37)    
Nottingham 5.12 -2.27 5.33 -2.20 5.12 -2.51    
 (7.17) (2.40) (7.17) (2.39) (7.17) (2.40)    
Oxford 9.85 0.39 10.12 0.58 9.67 0.49    
 (7.83) (2.62) (7.84) (2.62) (7.84) (2.63)    
Queens Belfast 11.67 -5.05* 11.86 -5.16* 11.47 -5.20*   
 (7.13) (2.38) (7.12) (2.38) (7.14) (2.39)    
Reading 13.72 2.41 14.27 2.31 14.46 1.81    
 (8.07) (2.66) (8.06) (2.66) (8.08) (2.67)    
Royal Holloway College 4.83 -6.57* 5.14 -6.53* 4.70 -6.88**  
 (7.87) (2.63) (7.87) (2.62) (7.87) (2.63)    
Southampton 4.04 -2.60 3.95 -2.89 3.72 -3.05    
 (7.75) (2.61) (7.75) (2.61) (7.76) (2.61)    
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St Andrews 15.91* -5.84* 16.16* -5.72* 15.57 -5.73*   
 (7.97) (2.64) (7.97) (2.63) (7.99) (2.65)    
Surrey 25.10*** -0.86 25.19*** -1.20 24.79*** -1.36    
 (7.36) (2.44) (7.36) (2.43) (7.38) (2.45)    
UCL 11.74 -3.81 12.10 -3.58 11.23 -3.84    
 (7.24) (2.42) (7.24) (2.41) (7.24) (2.42)    
UEA 20.37** -1.45 20.56** -1.51 20.15** -1.71    
 (7.33) (2.42) (7.33) (2.42) (7.34) (2.43)    
Warwick 2.20 -5.44* 2.28 -5.50* 1.89 -5.90*   
 (7.29) (2.44) (7.29) (2.44) (7.28) (2.44)    
York 14.87* -3.97 15.19* -4.12 14.42* -4.27    
 (7.27) (2.42) (7.27) (2.41) (7.29) (2.43)    
English 8.61 -0.55 8.48 -0.60 8.85 -0.75    
 (5.77) (1.90) (5.77) (1.90) (5.77) (1.90)    
Business/Management 2.75 0.23 2.70 0.12 2.73 0.04    
 (4.14) (1.38) (4.14) (1.38) (4.14) (1.38)    
Chemistry -5.21 1.89 -5.04 1.79 -4.80 1.68    
 (4.92) (1.63) (4.92) (1.63) (4.92) (1.63)    
Computer Science -2.14 0.06 -1.97 0.14 -1.79 -0.04    
 (5.02) (1.67) (5.02) (1.67) (5.02) (1.68)    
Economics -7.43 -1.01 -7.41 -1.17 -6.89 -1.15    
 (4.74) (1.59) (4.75) (1.58) (4.76) (1.59)    
Geography 6.26 -1.18 6.34 -1.12 6.26 -1.07    
 (5.09) (1.68) (5.09) (1.68) (5.10) (1.69)    
History 15.57** -2.01 15.54** -1.91 15.76** -1.97    
 (4.90) (1.60) (4.90) (1.60) (4.91) (1.61)    
Law 2.88 0.47 2.91 0.43 3.05 0.24    
 (4.81) (1.60) (4.81) (1.60) (4.82) (1.60)    
Mathematics 0.94 1.10 1.11 1.02 1.06 0.96    
 (4.47) (1.49) (4.46) (1.48) (4.46) (1.49)    
Physics 2.91 1.36 2.89 1.24 3.05 1.27    
 (4.57) (1.52) (4.57) (1.52) (4.58) (1.52)    
Politics/International relations -4.20 -3.25* -4.06 -3.26* -3.68 -3.38*   
 (4.86) (1.63) (4.86) (1.62) (4.87) (1.63)    
Psychology -2.18 -0.51 -2.33 -0.62 -2.19 -0.50    
 (4.45) (1.49) (4.45) (1.49) (4.46) (1.49)    
Sociology -1.86 -0.59 -2.14 -0.75 -1.97 -0.62    
 (5.53) (1.86) (5.53) (1.85) (5.53) (1.86)    
Other 3.93 3.13 3.72 2.94 3.79 2.96    
 (5.15) (1.72) (5.16) (1.72) (5.15) (1.72)    
Associate Professor -3.69 -1.59 -3.91 -1.75 -3.82 -1.70    
 (4.49) (1.49) (4.50) (1.49) (4.49) (1.49)    
Reader 5.97 0.43 5.92 0.48 5.86 0.48    
 (3.86) (1.27) (3.85) (1.27) (3.85) (1.27)    
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Assistant professor -0.57 -1.11 -0.37 -1.30 -0.11 -1.21    
 (5.83) (1.95) (5.83) (1.95) (5.82) (1.95)    
Senior Lecturer -3.80 -0.07 -3.71 -0.03 -3.94 -0.24    
 (3.23) (1.07) (3.23) (1.07) (3.23) (1.07)    
Lecturer -2.87 1.37 -2.69 1.41 -2.81 1.08    
 (3.43) (1.14) (3.43) (1.13) (3.42) (1.14)    
Other -5.29 -2.63 -4.86 -2.60 -3.90 -2.47    
 (10.65) (3.53) (10.65) (3.52) (10.64) (3.53)    
Continental Europe -1.54 0.25 -1.71 0.28 -1.80 0.41    
 (2.51) (0.84) (2.51) (0.84) (2.49) (0.83)    
Asia 13.50* 3.11 13.61* 2.96 14.15* 3.09    
 (6.67) (2.18) (6.68) (2.17) (6.67) (2.18)    
Africa -9.59 5.40 -9.41 5.21 -10.07 4.47    
 (12.07) (4.06) (12.07) (4.05) (12.08) (4.06)    
North America 3.17 -0.74 2.83 -0.81 2.38 -0.71    
 (4.00) (1.34) (4.00) (1.33) (4.00) (1.34)    
South America -8.08 -0.87 -8.36 -0.93 -9.57 -0.91    
 (10.11) (3.45) (10.11) (3.45) (10.14) (3.47)    
Australasia -1.58 1.83 -1.49 1.96 -2.30 2.19    
 (6.67) (2.20) (6.67) (2.19) (6.65) (2.19)    
       
Constant -1123.30 427.29* -1168.42 420.47* -1196.51 385.17    
 (744.35) (247.28) (744.00) (246.93) (746.70) (248.53)    
Observations 2,350 2,350 2,350 2,350 2,350 2,350 
Pseudo R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Note: Tobit regressions for the percentage likelihood of responding to a student and the time devoted in minutes 
are shown. Model 1 = interaction of Expectations and gender, Model 2 = interaction of engagement and gender, 
Model 3 = interaction of patterns (aligned, partly aligned, unaligned) and gender. Robust standard errors are shown 
in in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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FIGURE 1 
Likelihood of responding (%) and time devoted (in minutes) by expectation levels 
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FIGURE 2 
Likelihood and Minutes Devoted by expectation levels by gender 
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Appendix A 
Vignettes: text manipulations (see Explanatory Notes) 
 
You are about to answer questions based on a multi-tasking scenario. Please read the 
scenario carefully. 
  
As an academic you are engaged in a grant bid due in a week's time and you are under time 
pressure to complete this bid. You have also been lecturing to final year undergraduates who 
have an exam due for your course. Unfortunately the exam is on the same day as the bid 
deadline. Any interruptions by your students will benefit their exam results by extra marks but 
at a personal cost to you in terms of time lost by the interruption. This may diminish the quality 
of your bid, the success of which is critical for your next review. 
  
{{The scenarios that follow relate to a specific student of yours who is {not} very engaged 
with your module. You may wish to imagine a specific student of yours who sounds like this.}} 
[[In your lectures you have made a point of telling your students that you would be prepared to 
provide support for them during the exam period. [You might be involved in a bid process in 
the same period as the exam takes place]. As a result, this specific student’s expectations of 
gaining support from you are high [low].]] 
 
Given this scenario, what would be your response to each situation below? 
  
<Email> (Knock on the Door) 
       
This specific student of yours <emails you with> (knocks on your door outside your office 
hours and asks to discuss) a significant number of questions about the topics that they are 
having problems with before the exam and asks for an immediate response. Given the scenario 
above, on a scale of 0% to 100%, <how likely are you to spend time on replying to the 
student's questions by email?> (how likely are you to break off from what you are doing to 
meet your student straight away?) 
 
 
On a scale of 0% to 100%, how likely are you to respond to your student?   ¶¶SLIDER SCALE 
0% to 100%¶¶ 
 
In each case below how many MINUTES would you dedicate to responding to your student? 
 
If you respond (to your student’s request to meet), without any information that it will 
substantially affect the student & grade, how many MINUTES would you dedicate to 
responding to your student?   ¶¶SLIDER SCALE 0 to 100 MINUTES¶¶  
 
If, according to your student, <your email response to their questions> (your meeting) could 
improve their overall grade from a 2/2 to a 2/1, how many MINUTES would you dedicate to 
responding to your student?   ¶¶SLIDER SCALE 0 to 100 MINUTES¶¶ 
 
If, according to your student, <your email response to their questions> (your meeting) could 
improve their overall grade from a 2/1 to a first, how many MINUTES would you dedicate to 
responding to your student?   ¶¶SLIDER SCALE 0 to 100 MINUTES¶¶ 
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If, according to your student, <your email response to their questions> (your meeting) could 
avoid the student failing their degree, how many MINUTES would you dedicate to responding 
to your student?   ¶¶SLIDER SCALE 0 to 100 MINUTES¶¶ 
  
 
Explanatory Notes: 
 
The 3rd paragraph represents the 3 x 3 manipulations for student engagement and student 
expectations.  
 
The section bounded by {{ }} is the wording for high engagement whilst the section bounded 
by { } also appears for low engagement. The entire section does not appear when student 
engagement is unknown. 
 
The section bounded by [[ ]] is the wording for high expectations whilst the section bounded 
by [ ] is the alternative/additional wording for low engagement. The entire section does not 
appear when student expectations are unknown. 
 
For the questions that follow, the specific wordings for <Email> or a (Knock on the Door) are 
indicated.  
 
Where a slider scale appears in the survey this is indicated by the wording bounded by ¶¶  ¶¶. 
 
 
Linking of Vignettes to hypothesis testing 
 
The 9 vignettes (3 expectations conditions x 3 engagement conditions) are listed below. The 
vignettes are linked to hypotheses, with hypothesis 1 testing the effects of high student 
expectations on extra-curricular teaching effort, hypothesis 2 the effects of high student 
engagement and hypothesis 3 the interaction effect of high student expectations and 
engagement.   
 
Vignette Expectations Engagement Hypothesis 
1 High High 1, 2, 3  
2 High Low 1 
3 High Unknown 1 
4 Low High 2 
5 Low Low  
6 Low Unknown  
7 Unknown High 2 
8 Unknown Low  
9 Unknown Unknown  
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Survey questions relating to control variables 
   
[Measure of Altruism] 
 
Scale of 1 (very unlikely) to 5 (very likely) 
 
How do you assess your willingness to share with others without expecting anything in return 
when it comes to charity? 
 
[Measure of Risk Aversion]  
 
Scale of 1 (very unwilling) to 5 (very willing) 
 
Are you a person who is generally willing to take risks? 
 
[Further measure of altruism]  
 
Imagine that you won £500 in a prize draw. Considering your current situation, how much of 
this would you donate to charity?   
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Chapter 4 
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“Now you see it now you don’t: The effect of teaching style and seniority on 
gender bias in teaching evaluations.” 
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Abstract 
Gender bias in teaching evaluations leads to unfair decisions during academics’ careers. In 
two controlled experiments, I examine whether gender bias is eliminated by an academic’s 
high warmth teaching style and by seniority.  I find that gender bias lowers recommendations 
to hire female academics delivering identical content as male academics, with the effect 
mediated by evaluations of the academic’s warmth and/or competence. In Study 1, I test 
competing hypotheses regarding the effect of teaching style on gender bias. I find that a high 
warmth teaching style increases women’s perceived warmth, but decreases their perceived 
competence, so gender bias in hiring recommendations remains. In Study 2, I find that gender 
bias disappears for senior academics. Finally, I find no evidence of less biased evaluations by 
those who anticipate gender bias. I discuss my findings in the higher education context and 
make recommendations to mitigate gender bias in teaching evaluations. 
Keywords:  
Gender bias, teaching evaluations, teaching style, seniority, bias awareness. 
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Introduction 
Recent decades have seen a surge of evidence in higher education settings pointing to 
a gender bias in teaching evaluations (Langbein, 1994; MacNell et al., 2015; Ottoboni et al., 
2016; Pounder, 2007; Wagner, Rieger, & Voorvelt, 2016; Young, Rush, & Shaw, 2009). This 
is a problem because teaching evaluations are associated with educational outcomes and are 
used to make decisions on the careers of academics (Wild & Berger, 2016). To the extent that 
teaching evaluations assess academics in a biased way, based on their gender rather than 
specific behaviours, decisions that are key to academic careers may be unfair. For example, 
the under-representation of women in senior academic roles, especially in male-dominated 
disciplines, may be due to unfair decisions early in the careers of female academics (Dick & 
Nadin, 2006; Moss-Racusin, Dovidio, Brescoll, Graham, & Handelsman, 2012; Newsome, 
2008; Sheltzer & Smith, 2014; Way, Larremore, & Clauset, 2016).  
A recent quasi-experimental study of 19,920 teaching evaluations at Maastricht 
University in the Netherlands showed that it is female academics who tend to be evaluated 
less positively, especially if they are junior, in male-dominated disciplines, and rated by male 
students (Mengel et al., 2017). Interestingly, the gender bias in teaching evaluations mirrors a 
recent meta-analysis of gender bias in employment decision making (Koch, D’Mello, & 
Sackett, 2015). The latter typically examine decisions to hire a candidate, but have not looked 
at variables of relevance to the study of teaching evaluations, such as the teaching style or 
seniority of the candidate. What controlled experiments add to quasi-experimental or 
correlational designs is a ruling out of possible differences in such variables between female 
and male academics, and a possibility to estimate their effects in isolation and as moderators 
of the effect of gender (Arbuckle & Williams, 2003; Doubleday & Lee, 2016; MacNell et al., 
2015; Ottoboni et al., 2016; Wagner et al., 2016). 
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In what follows, I build on the literatures in management, economics, and education 
to formulate testable research hypotheses regarding the role of teaching style and seniority on 
gender bias in teaching evaluations and hiring recommendations. I consider that making a 
hiring recommendation to a recruitment committee is a stronger and more salient measure 
than an overall approval rating of a candidate in a teaching evaluation. I perform controlled 
experiments testing competing hypotheses regarding the effects of teaching style and the de-
biasing role of seniority. In addition, I survey lay intuitions of experimental participants 
regarding a possible gender bias in teaching evaluations and hiring recommendations to a 
recruitment committee, and examine whether the bias is expected, and if so, what is the effect 
of bias awareness. Overall, my work contributes to a more fine-grained understanding of the 
gender bias in teaching evaluations allowing us to identify conditions under which the bias 
disappears.  
To summarize, I find that a gender stereotypical (“warm”) teaching style improves 
perceptions of warmth for female academics but may backfire by lowering perceptions of 
their competence. Hence, hiring recommendations (overall approval ratings) are lower for 
female academics (vs. male) irrespective of their style because of a double-bind nature of 
reactions to their teaching. If their teaching style is low in warmth, lower hiring 
recommendations are driven by lower perceptions of their warmth, and if their teaching style 
is warm, lower hiring recommendations are driven by lower perceptions of their competence. 
Fortunately, gender bias is sensitive to seniority, and I find no evidence of bias against senior 
female academics in hiring recommendations or warmth evaluations even when they teach in 
a low warmth style. In conjunction with findings from previous research, these results 
suggest a need to shield junior academics from decisions that rely on teaching evaluations, 
especially in the early stages of their careers (Mengel et al., 2017). Moreover, they highlight 
possible benefits from showcasing titles and other credentials that may indicate more senior 
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standing for female academics (Bohren, Imas, & Rosenberg, 2018). An unexpected finding 
was of lower perceptions of warmth for senior (vs. junior) male academics suggesting that 
senior male academics, unlike their female colleagues, may not need to be concerned with 
showcasing seniority. Last but not least, subject to considerations of bias blind spot (Page, 
2009; Pronin, Lin, & Ross, 2002; Scopelliti et al., 2015), those aware of gender bias hurting 
female academics are no more likely to correct their evaluations, a result clarified by a recent 
field study (Boring & Arnaud, 2017). This result suggests caution in treating awareness alone 
as an effective remedy to the problem.  
 
Theory Development 
The role of teaching style 
Academics are commonly evaluated on criteria that align with the two universal 
dimensions of social cognition: warmth and competence (Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007). For 
example, recommendations of research councils suggest assessments of warmth-related 
“enthusiasm”, “consideration” and “accessibility” and competence-related “class structure”, 
“mastery of material” and “level of preparation” (Hannover Research Council, 2009). 
Experimental evidence to date has found significant bias against female academics on both 
dimensions, including criteria such as enthusiasm, praise, respect and fairness (warmth) and 
promptness and professionalism (competence) (MacNell et al., 2015).  
From a theoretical perspective, teaching evaluations are indeed ripe for gender bias. 
Teaching is a power relationship that highlights the dependence of the student on the 
goodwill, mastery and knowledge of the instructor (Schrodt, Witt, & Turman, 2007). The 
performance of the academic is highly salient to the student as the very reason why students 
enter the relationship. As a result, students are naturally inclined to judge various aspects of 
the academic’s performance in the classroom. Often, the judgment is made under time 
pressure and intuitively (Bassett, Cleveland, Acorn, Nix, & Snyder, 2017; Pinto & Mansfield, 
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2010). Moreover, higher education is a credence-based service as students lack the 
knowledge necessary to confidently judge the academic, especially concerning competence 
(Darby & Karni, 1973; Kasnakoglu, 2016). This makes the evaluation of performance 
through teaching evaluations highly uncertain (Gruber & Frugone, 2011). Gender stereotypes 
and considerations of gender-role congruity become an important source of information that 
helps address the uncertainty in the teaching relationship (Davison & Burke, 2000; Kunda & 
Spencer, 2003). Yet, the reliance on gender stereotypes and considerations of gender-role 
congruity is likely to favour male as opposed to female academics because women are 
typically believed to be less competent than men and less fit to occupy positions of power 
(Eagly & Karau, 2002). This is particularly true of more male-dominated disciplines, which 
reinforce the stereotype and established gender roles, making them more salient in judgment 
(Cejka & Eagly, 1999; Koch et al., 2015).  
However, research has also shown that one effective way of generating more positive 
and accepting evaluations of competent women, such as female academics, is for the women 
to show warmth, a stereotypically female characteristic associated with care and the pursuit 
of communal goals (Carli, 2001). Unlike men, women need to show pro-sociality in addition 
to self-confidence in order to influence others based on their higher performance (Guillén, 
Mayo, & Karelaia, 2018). 
In what follows I formulate competing hypotheses regarding a possible effect of a 
teaching style that is high on warmth and, hence, stereotypically “female”. On the one hand, I 
suggest that in the context of teaching, evaluations of female academics may be enhanced if 
the style of lecture delivery is high rather than low on warmth, and more so than for male 
academics. Male academics who, from the start, are more likely to be perceived as fulfilling a 
gender-appropriate role, are simply less likely to be scrutinized in terms of their style. This 
prediction is supported indirectly by content analysis of qualitative data, including comments 
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on Ratemyprofessor.com. Adjectives that relate to high versus low warmth in teaching style 
(bossy, nice, caring, warm, etc.) are more likely to be mentioned in relation to female rather 
than male academics such that teaching style is more important in the assessment of female 
academics (Mitchell & Martin, 2018; Shen, 2015). So, if a male and a female academic teach 
the same content, a teaching style that is high on warmth is likely to raise the warmth and, 
together with it, competence evaluations for female academics more than for male academics 
(Carli, 2001). This may happen to the point of possibly eliminating the gender bias in these 
evaluations, as well as their associated downstream consequences, such as hiring 
recommendations. I formulate the following research hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1:  (gender bias in hiring/approval) Hiring recommendations (overall 
approval ratings) will be lower for female than for male academics who 
teach the same content.  
Hypothesis 2: (mediation in hiring/approval) Gender bias in hiring recommendations 
(overall approval ratings) will be mediated by warmth and competence 
perceptions. 
Hypothesis 3: (effect of style on warmth and competence): Relative to a teaching 
style that is low on warmth, a teaching style that is high on warmth 
will raise perceptions of the academic’s warmth and competence, and 
more so for female rather than male academics. 
 
Collectively, Hypotheses 2-3 imply the possibility of a reduction in gender bias under a 
teaching style that is high on warmth. So, 
Hypothesis 4: (effect of style on gender bias in hiring/approval): Gender bias in 
hiring recommendations (overall approval ratings) will be reduced or 
eliminated under a teaching style that is high on warmth.  
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Although I predicted in Hypotheses 3-4 that a teaching style high on warmth may help 
overcome gender bias in the evaluations of female academics due to increasing perceptions of 
the female’s warmth and competence, competing hypotheses are also possible. To formulate 
competing hypotheses, I note the specificity of the teaching context in that it is relatively 
easier to assess the academics’ warmth rather than their competence. To the extent that 
competence assessments are highly uncertain, they may be affected in the direction of the 
stereotype especially when the style of teaching reinforces the stereotype. In particular, 
because women who behave warmly reinforce the gender stereotype, observers are likely to 
rely more heavily on the idea that women are less competent than men, and less fit to occupy 
positions of power. As a result, female academics may benefit from higher perceptions of 
their warmth but at the same time suffer a competence penalty associated with the alignment 
of the style and the stereotype of someone less knowledgeable. If this was the case, then I 
would predict that a teaching style that is high on warmth may not diminish or eliminate the 
gender bias, but rather affect competence perceptions differently for male versus female 
academics. For women, a warm teaching style could decrease competence perceptions 
whereas no such effect would be expected for men. Hence, a warm teaching style would 
increase gender bias in competence evaluations rather than help diminish it.  
Hypothesis 3A: (competing, effect of style on warmth and competence) Relative to a 
teaching style that is low on warmth, a teaching style that is high on 
warmth will raise perceptions of the academic’s warmth, and more so 
for female rather than male academics. However, it will diminish 
perceptions of the academic’s competence, and more so for female 
rather than male academics. 
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As a result, female academics may continue to be recommended for hiring less than 
male academics because of their lower perceived competence and fit to the role. Depending 
on the weight placed on competence versus warmth as determinants of hiring 
recommendations, the bias may change either upward or downward, and I, therefore, limit 
my theorizing to the mediating role of warmth and competence for hiring recommendations.   
 
The role of seniority   
The fact that female academics may be doubted more in terms of their fit to the role 
than their male counterparts due to gender stereotypes and considerations of gender-role 
congruity invites the question of whether seniority has the potential to eliminate the gender 
bias. If, in a given setting, students require more convincing evidence to infer competence 
from female academics compared to male academics then a double standard exists (Rubin, 
1981; Winocur, Schoen, & Sirowatka, 1989). Double standards are known to impede career 
advancement (Lyness & Thompson, 2000) but the attainment of a senior position implies, 
therefore, a higher level of skill or ability (Crocker & Major, 1989).  Thus, where individuals 
reach senior positions despite the existence of double standards this may confer a positive 
advantage. Indeed, research shows that providing information that supports without 
ambiguity the high competence of candidates, gender bias disappears (Bohren et al., 2018; 
Koch et al., 2015).    
As senior academics and especially in male-dominated disciplines, women may be 
judged unambiguously as highly competent. Moreover, it is likely that for senior female 
academics, both perceptions of warmth and competence will be high supporting their 
seniority proven fit to the role.  Indeed leadership research has argued that, where warmth is 
perceived as advantageous in a role, women in top positions can be viewed as both warm and 
competent and enjoy an advantage in evaluations compared to male peers (Byron, 2007; 
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Emmerik, Wendt, & Euwema, 2010; Rosette & Tost, 2010). There has been a lengthy 
literature on the benefits to female students of female approaches to teaching and of a role 
model effect (Bettinger & Long, 2005; Carrell, Page, & West, 2010; Lockwood & Kunda, 
1997). This could provide the basis for a female seniority advantage in academia.  
Hypothesis 5: (effect of seniority on gender bias on hiring recommendation/approval) 
Gender bias for junior academics will be reduced or eliminated for 
senior academics.  
Hypothesis 6: (effect of seniority on gender bias on warmth and competence) Relative 
to junior academics, senior academics delivering the same content will 
be perceived as more warm and more competent, and more so for female 
rather than male academics. 
Bias awareness 
A number of approaches have been suggested in the literature to overcome biases in 
decision-making including gender bias (Beshears & Gino, 2015). One important insight is 
that a more deliberate and thorough analysis of situations helps individuals control their 
tendency to rely on stereotypes or other faulty generalizations in judging an individual’s 
performance on a particular task. Bias awareness could help trigger a more deliberate analysis 
to overcome biased evaluations of male versus female academics. Even though students 
cannot “blind” themselves to the gender of the instructor, they may mentally simulate 
counterfactual scenarios. For example, they may consider evaluations they would have given 
if the same content was delivered by an academic of a different gender, examine the 
relevance of gender as a factor in their evaluations, and correct their evaluations accordingly. 
In fact, taking control over tacitly learned reactions to various stimuli in our daily 
environments, and developing skills of speculation, testing, and generalization has been 
advocated as a way to “educate” intuitive judgment and overcome biases (Hogarth, 2001; 
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Morewedge et al., 2015). Those who are aware of gender bias, may be in a better position to 
revise their judgment to more accurately reflect the quality of teaching and stray away from 
the considerations of the academic’s gender-role congruity. Consistent with this argument, a 
field experiment finds that a factual awareness of the gender bias in past evaluations of 
similar students leads to a reduction in gender bias (Boring & Arnaud, 2017). In the same 
study, there is a null effect of being merely reminded that one should not discriminate against 
female academics in teaching evaluations. Consequently, 
Hypothesis 7:  (effect of bias awareness): Those who are aware of the gender bias in 
teaching evaluations favouring male academics will be less likely to 
show gender bias in their teaching evaluations (warmth, competence, 
and hiring recommendations). 
Overview of studies 
I test the research hypotheses in two experimental studies. Study 1 tests for gender 
bias in the context of a male-dominated discipline (astronomy). I then examine evaluations of 
warmth, competence and hiring recommendations relative to male versus female academics 
who deliver the lecture in either a teaching style that is high or low on warmth.  
In Study 2, I use the “low warmth” version of the same experimental materials to test 
the de-biasing effect of seniority. As in Study 1, I examine evaluations of the academic’s 
warmth, competence, and hiring recommendations. In addition, I elicit intuitions regarding a 
possible bias, and examine how bias awareness affects teaching evaluations. 
 
Study 1 
Participants and Design 
I recruited 479 participants, aged between 18 and 30, on the Prolific.com academic 
website (Mage = 24.07, SDage = 3.17, 50.2% female, 61.2% with undergraduate or 
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postgraduate degrees) for a study that asked them to assess a lecture by a candidate in the 
academic job market, and provide a hiring recommendation to the university. Participants, 
recruited from Prolific.com were primarily from countries with female representation of 
fewer than 20% in physics departments, validating the assumption that astronomy, as a 
branch of physics, is a male-dominated discipline. They were paid £1.40 for completing a 10 
minute study (average completion time was 8 minutes 35 seconds). Data were gathered 
during September 2017.  
The study consisted of a 2 (gender: male vs. female) x 2 (warmth: high vs. low) 
between-subjects design. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions. 
The number of participants required for the study was determined based on a-priori power 
analysis with anticipated small effect sizes (i.e., Cohen’s f  = .15; (J. Cohen, 1992)) which 
would require a sample size of 460 to be powered at 90%. All power calculations were 
conducted using G*Power (Faul et al., 2007).  
Materials 
Participants read an astronomy lecture of around 900 words. The lecture was based on 
Professor Stephen Hawking’s first Reith Lecture entitled “Do Black Holes Have No Hair?” 
(Hawking, 2016). In the version of the lecture which was high on warmth, the candidate 
appeared warm and accessible as a teacher. In the version of the lecture which was low on 
warmth, the candidate appeared to be cold and patronizing.  A silhouette of either a male or 
female head, together with the academic’s name (Steve Smith versus Sue Smith), was shown 
on each of the five screens of the lecture text to reinforce the salience of the academic’s 
gender. Details of the study, including highlighted manipulations for high on warmth and low 
on warmth lectures, follow at Appendix A.   
Pilot study: I conducted a pilot study to test whether the teaching context (astronomy 
lecture) was perceived as male-dominated and whether the high warmth version of the lecture 
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was perceived as warmer than the low warmth version. Twenty-one individuals (Mage = 
24.33, SDage = 3.02, 16 males) participated in this pilot study for a payment of £1.40. For the 
first test, the academic was described in gender-neutral terms (surname only without a 
silhouette) and participants rated how likely it was that the academic was male on a 5-point 
Likert-type scale anchored by 1 (definitely male) to 5 (definitely female). The result, 
compared to the middle of the scale, confirmed that the astronomy lecture was perceived as 
male-dominated (χ2(12) = 45.75, p < .01). For the second test, participants rated the 
academic’s warmth on a 5-point Likert-type scale anchored by 1 (not at all warm) to 5 (very 
warm) and the high warmth version was rated higher (χ2(3) = 18.43, p < .01) confirming the 
manipulation of teaching style.   
Procedure  
Participants were randomly assigned to each of the four experimental conditions, and 
proceeded to read the astronomy lecture. Following the lecture, they assessed the academic 
candidate in terms of warmth and competence, and provided a hiring recommendation. The 
survey finished with socio-demographic questions about the participants.  
Measures 
Warmth. Participants were asked to assess the academic’s warmth using the items 
“warm” and “accessible” (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002), as detailed at Appendix A. 
Participants had to consider the above adjectives and indicate the extent to which they 
believed the candidate to be each of these things on a 5-point Likert-type scales anchored by 
1 (not at all) to 5 (very).  The items were averaged together to form a single composite score, 
where higher scores indicated greater warmth (Cronbach’s α = .76).  
Competence. Participants were asked to assess the academic’s competence using the 
items “professional” and “knowledgeable” (Fiske et al., 2002), as detailed at Appendix A. 
Participants had to consider the above adjectives and indicate the extent to which they 
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believed the candidate to be each of these things on a 5-point Likert-type scales anchored by 
1 (not at all) to 5 (very).  The items were averaged together to form a single composite score, 
where higher scores indicated greater competence (Cronbach’s α = .70).  
Hiring recommendation (Overall Approval Rating). Participants were asked 
whether the candidate who had given the lecture should be hired on a 5-point Likert-type 
scales anchored by 1 (definitely reject) to 5 (definitely hire).  Given that participants were 
restricted to between 18 and 30 years old, due to the teaching evaluation context of the study, 
and that students do not normally contribute to hiring decisions, the wording of the study 
made it clear that participants were making a recommendation only to a university hiring 
committee (see materials in Appendix A). I considered a hiring recommendation to be the 
strongest and most salient measure for the overall evaluation of academic candidates rather 
than an overall approval rating. 
Control variables. I controlled for age, gender, level of education, student status, and 
cross-cultural differences operationalized as the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender 
Gap Index for 2016 for the country of birth of each participant (World Economic Forum, 
2016).   
Manipulation and attention checks. At the conclusion of the study, participants 
were asked to indicate the gender of the academic that they had evaluated. They were also 
presented with an attention check question telling them to complete an answer with a Likert 
value of 1.  A further check was made on outlying survey completion time of less than one 
standard deviation from the mean (3 minutes 46 seconds) where the fixed pay out was 
claimed without paying due attention. As a result of these checks, a total of 7 participants 
(1.5%) were excluded from all subsequent analysis. Exclusion criteria were not applied to 
slow completion times as participants were still only eligible for a fixed pay out.    
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Results  
Descriptive statistics for all study variables are given in Table 1.  
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
Our manipulation of the teaching style worked as expected. The high warmth lecture 
was rated more highly on warmth than the low warmth lecture (M = 3.97, SD = 0.68 versus 
M = 3.53, SD = 0.80, t(477) = 6.51, p < .001). The manipulation of the candidate’s gender 
was also successful. 94% of participants in the male condition remembered the academic 
delivering the lecture as male χ2 (1) = 13.68, p < .01 compared to 50%), and 90% in the 
female condition remembered the academic as female χ2 (1) = 12.09, p < .01 compared to 
50%). 
To test Hypothesis 1, I conducted a multiple regression analysis with the hiring 
recommendation as the dependent variable. The independent variables were dummies for the 
gender of the candidate (gender: 1=male, 0=female), the teaching style (warmth: 1=high 
warmth, 0=low warmth), and their interaction (gender × warmth). All control variables were 
included (see Table 2, column 1). Consistent with Hypothesis 1, I found a gender bias: male 
academics were more likely to be recommended for hiring than their female peers (β = .21, p 
< .05). The bias held under both high and low warmth teaching style. The effect size for the 
gender bias was small, and it did not differ substantially across the low warmth and high 
warmth scenarios (Cohen’s D of -.27 and -.19 respectively). 
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
 140 
 
    To test Hypothesis 2 (mediation), I analysed whether warmth and competence acted 
as mediators between the gender of the academic and the hiring recommendation (D. Kenny, 
2016). Without controlling for warmth and competence, the hiring recommendation was 
correlated with gender (Table 2, column 1). For a low warmth teaching style, the indirect 
(mediated) effects of gender through warmth and competence were significant (Warmth: 
standardized path coefficient = .10, p < .05, Competence: standardized path coefficient = .00, 
ns, Total indirect effect: standardized path coefficient = .10, p < .05) whilst the direct effect 
of gender lost significance (standardized path coefficient = .04, ns) (see Table 3, row 1). For a 
high warmth teaching style, the indirect (mediated) effects of gender through warmth and 
competence were significant (Warmth: standardized path coefficient = .01, ns, Competence: 
standardized path coefficient = .07, p < .05, Total indirect effect: standardized path 
coefficient = .08, p < .05) whilst the direct effect of gender lost significance (standardized 
path coefficient = .00, ns) (see Table 3, row 2). The indirect effects of gender on the hiring 
recommendation remained significant when bootstrapping standard errors to allow for 
kurtosis (95% unstandardized bias corrected confidence interval for low warmth teaching 
style= 0.02, 0.30 & for high warmth teaching style = 0.00, 0.27, see Table 4). (Preacher & 
Hayes, 2008). Thus, I found support for Hypothesis 2 that gender bias in hiring 
recommendations was mediated by warmth and competence perceptions.   
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
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Contrary to Hypothesis 3 but consistent with the competing Hypothesis 3A (effect of 
style on warmth and competence), I found that the high warmth style had different effects on 
the evaluations of warmth and competence of academics depending on their gender.  For 
warmth, the high warmth style led to more positive evaluations of warmth for female 
academics, and the effect was larger than the same effect for male academics. I conducted the 
regression analysis with warmth as the dependent variable and the academic’s gender, 
teaching style, and the interaction between the two as independent variables (see Table 2, 
column 2). The main effect of male gender was positive and significant (β = .34, p < .01) 
qualified by a negative and significant interaction term (β = -.27, p < .05).  As for 
competence, the high warmth style led to somewhat more negative evaluations of 
competence for female versus male academics. I conducted the regression analysis with 
competence as the dependent variable and the academic’s gender, teaching style, and the 
interaction between the two as independent variables (see Table 2, column 3). The interaction 
term was correctly signed but failed to reach statistical significance (β = -.18, ns).  I further 
examined the simple slopes for the effect of teaching style on competence evaluations 
depending on gender (Aiken, West, & Reno, 1991). The results showed there was a 
statistically significant decrease in the evaluations of competence for women when they 
taught in a high warmth style (β = -.19, p < .05), but not for men (β = -.01, ns) (see Figure 1). 
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
Overall, the results show that gender bias persisted in the hiring recommendation in 
the high warmth scenario because of lower competence evaluations for female academics.  
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Discussion 
Study 1 showed that in a male-dominated discipline the delivery of the same teaching 
content led to greater hiring recommendations for male rather than female academics, 
irrespective of whether the style of delivery was low or high on warmth. Female academics 
benefited more than male academics from teaching in a style that was high on warmth (as 
opposed to low on warmth) in terms of evaluations of their warmth. However, they also 
suffered a somewhat greater penalty in terms of evaluations of their competence, which led to 
lower hiring recommendations.  
 
Study 2 
In Study 2 I tested the de-biasing role of seniority. To date, many empirical studies of 
gender bias in teaching evaluations examine junior academics (Boring, 2017; MacNell et al., 
2015), and a recent field study finds stronger effects of gender for junior as opposed to more 
senior academics (Mengel et al., 2017). In Study 2, I distinguished deliberately between 
junior (post-PhD) and senior (Professor Level) academics to test the debiasing role of 
seniority. 
Participants and Design 
I recruited a further 478 participants, aged between 18 and 30, on Prolific.com (Mage = 
24.40, SDage = 3.24, 49.9% female, 64.6% with undergraduate or postgraduate degrees) for a 
study that asked them to assess a lecture by a candidate in the academic job market, and 
provide a hiring recommendation to the university. Participants were paid £1.40 for 
completing a 10 minute study (average completion time was 9 minutes). Data were gathered 
during November 2017. 
The study consisted of a 2 (gender: male vs. female) x 2 (seniority: Professor vs. 
junior) between subjects design. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four 
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conditions. The number of participants required for the study was determined as in Study 1 to 
be powered at 90% with small effect sizes.  
Materials 
Participants read the low warmth version of the astronomy lecture used in Study 1. 
The academic was described as a post-PhD male/female candidate or as a Professor 
male/female candidate. A silhouette of either a male or a female head was shown on each of 
the five screens of text to reinforce the gender manipulation. In addition, depending on the 
experimental condition, each screen showed the post-PhD candidate’s name without the use 
of any titles, or the senior academic’s name used next to the “Professor” title (e.g., Sue Smith 
versus Professor Sue Smith). Details of the study, including highlighted manipulations for 
high on warmth and low on warmth lectures, follow at Appendix A.   
Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to each of the four experimental conditions, and 
proceeded to read the astronomy lecture. Following the lecture, they assessed the academic 
candidate in terms of warmth and competence, and provided a hiring recommendation. The 
survey finished with questions about gender bias and socio-demographic questions.  
Measures  
Warmth. Participants were asked to assess the academic’s warmth using the items 
“warm” and “accessible” on a 5-point Likert-type scale as in Study 1, as detailed at Appendix 
A. The items were averaged together to form a single composite score, where higher scores 
indicated greater warmth (Cronbach’s α = .77).  
Competence. Participants were asked to assess the academic’s competence using the 
items “professional” and “knowledgeable” on a 5-point Likert-type scale as in Study 1, as 
detailed at Appendix A. The items were averaged together to form a single composite score, 
where higher scores indicated greater competence (Cronbach’s α = .67). 
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Hiring recommendation (Overall approval rating). Participants were asked 
whether the candidate who had given the lecture should be hired on a 5-point Likert-type 
scale as in Study 1, as detailed in Appendix A. Given that participants were restricted to 
between 18 and 30 years old, due to the teaching evaluation context of the study, and that 
students do not normally contribute to hiring decisions, the wording of the study made it clear 
that participants were making a recommendation only to a university hiring committee (see 
materials in Appendix A). I considered a hiring recommendation to be the most salient 
measure for the overall evaluation of academic candidates. 
Bias awareness. Following the survey questions, participants were asked whether 
they thought there is a male, female or no bias in evaluations of warmth, competence and the 
hiring recommendation generally. The order of the questions was randomized and I coded for 
bias awareness as 1 if participants believed in a male bias and 0 if participants did not believe 
in any bias or believed in a female bias (1 = Bias Aware, 0 = Not Aware).  
Control variables. I controlled for age, gender, level of education, student status, and 
cross-cultural differences in the gender gap as in Study 1.   
Manipulation and attention checks. Participants were asked the gender of the 
academic that they had evaluated. A total of 6 participants (1.25%) failed the manipulation 
check and further checks on outlying survey completion times less than one standard 
deviation from the mean (3 minutes 30 seconds) where the fixed pay out was claimed without 
paying due attention. They were excluded from all subsequent analysis. Exclusion criteria 
were not applied to slow completion times as participants were still only eligible for a fixed 
pay out.    
Results  
Descriptive statistics for all study variables are given in Table 5.  
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-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
To test Hypothesis 5, I used multiple linear regressions of the hiring recommendation on 
dummies for the gender of the candidate (gender: 1 = male, 0 = female), the seniority of the 
candidate (seniority: 1 = Professor, 0 = Junior), and their interaction (gender × seniority) (see 
Table 6, column 1).  
 -------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
 There was no significant gender bias at Professor Level for the hiring 
recommendation (β = -.03, ns, effect size Cohen’s D = .05) supporting Hypothesis 5. Simple 
slopes analysis showed a significant improvement in the hiring recommendation at Professor 
Level, compared to junior levels, for female academics with little change for in the hiring 
recommendation for male academics (β = .23, p < .05 for female academics, versus β = 0.01, 
ns for male academics, see Figure 2). Gender bias for junior levels was comparable in size to 
the bias in Study 1 (Cohen’s D -.21) but only weakly significant (β = .19, p < .10).  To clarify 
what the findings implied for testing the existence of a gender bias at junior academic levels, 
I compared the gender bias in the hiring recommendation between the two studies. This does 
not yield a significant difference between the sizes of the effects found ((β = -.03, ns, see 
Table 7).  
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
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As in Study 1, gender bias in the evaluations of the academic’s warmth was 
statistically significant (β = .22, p < .05) (see Table 6, column 2). The regression of warmth 
evaluations on dummies for the gender of the candidate (gender: 1 = male, 0 = female), the 
seniority of the candidate (seniority: 1 = Professor, 0 = Junior), and their interaction (gender 
× seniority), included a significant interaction effect (β = -.39, p < .05). At first sight, this 
seemed to be consistent with Hypothesis 6. However, simple slopes analysis showed that 
rather than significantly improving evaluations of warmth for female academics, seniority 
diminished the evaluations of warmth for male academics (β = .15, ns for female academics, 
versus β = .-24, p < .05 for male academics, see Figure 2). This was unexpected, and contrary 
to the rationale of Hypothesis 6 which predicted higher warmth evaluations for senior female 
academics (due to the fact that they overcame double standards) without any drop in the 
warmth evaluations of male academics.  
For competence, seniority affected the evaluation of female and male academics the 
same (see Table 6, column 3).  
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
As for bias awareness, I found that it was generally low. Irrespective of whether 
respondents considered warmth, competence or hiring recommendations, roughly 70% 
believed no gender bias existed. Participants who believed in a female advantage were most 
numerous when it came to warmth evaluations (24% versus 2% when competence was 
considered, and 5% when hiring recommendation was considered).  To analyse whether 
awareness of gender bias helped participants correct their evaluations, I performed 
regressions of warmth, competence and the hiring recommendation on all independent and 
control variables from the previous analyses, adding the variable “bias aware” and the 
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interaction between “bias aware” and the dummy for the academic’s gender to the analysis 
(see Table 8). The coefficients for bias awareness and the interaction of bias awareness and 
the gender dummy were not significant in any of the regressions. Contrary to Hypothesis 7, I 
did not find that being aware of a male bias de-biases teaching evaluations.  
  -------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 8 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
Discussion 
In Study 2, I found that the gender bias against junior female academics, in warmth 
and in hiring recommendations, disappeared with seniority. The finding of a significant 
gender bias for junior academics proved wrong roughly 70% of respondents who considered 
that gender bias was not a factor in teaching evaluations and hiring.  
Moreover, there was an unexpected bias against senior male academics such that their 
warmth evaluations diminished and became inferior to those of senior female academics 
while the latter did not improve in comparison to junior female academics. This pattern of 
results suggested a mechanism for the elimination of gender bias that I did not initially 
foresee. At senior levels, male academics seem to have lost the advantage that drove their 
hiring recommendations when academics were portrayed as juniors. The mechanism for this 
effect should be tested in future research.    
Importantly, those who reported being aware of the bias did not show more accurate 
evaluations of the candidates on either warmth, competence, or hiring recommendations.  
 
General Discussion 
In two controlled experiments, I showed evidence of gender bias in teaching 
evaluations and hiring recommendations for junior academics. These results are consistent 
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with the predictions of the gender-role congruity theory (Cejka & Eagly, 1999; Eagly & 
Karau, 2002) and previous empirical findings (MacNell et al., 2015; Mengel et al., 2017; 
Ottoboni et al., 2016).My work provides a more fine-grained understanding of the workings 
of gender bias and points to the settings in which the bias disappears, representing a novel 
contribution to the existing literature. I discuss below the important practical and theoretical 
implications of my work. 
 
Practical Implications 
I submitted to an empirical test the idea that the academic’s teaching style may matter 
for the magnitude of the bias (Mitchell & Martin, 2018). In particular, the hope was that a 
female-stereotypic high warmth style may shield female academics from lower evaluations of 
the same teaching content. Yet, the results provided support to a competing hypothesis 
whereby a high warmth teaching style brought a competence penalty which led to lower 
hiring recommendations for female academics despite the fact that evaluations of their 
warmth improved to the level of the evaluations for their male peers. These results may be 
specific to the higher education setting because there are important information asymmetries 
between students and academics in understanding the subject matter and hence, evaluating 
the competence of the academic.  Because student evaluations of the academic’s competence 
are therefore uncertain, they are particularly likely to be vulnerable to bias.  Hence, whereas 
in other settings, a competent performance by a woman would be perceived more positively 
if the woman adopted a high warmth style (Carli, 2001), in an academic setting, her high 
warmth style triggered a greater reliance on the gender stereotype and considerations of 
gender-role congruity. This stereotyping exerted a downward pressure on the evaluations of 
her competence and the hiring recommendation. 
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In study 2, I showed that the gender bias is sensitive to seniority and disappears for 
professors as opposed to junior academics. This result supports recent calls in the literature to 
shield academics from decisions based on teaching evaluations, and qualifies it by the 
importance of doing so at least in the early stages of their careers. With seniority, the female 
academic’s title begins to pave the way for her to be assessed on par with her male peer for 
equal performance. Unexpectedly, seniority produced a negative effect on warmth 
evaluations of male academics. On the one hand, this suggests that male professors may stand 
nothing to gain from showcasing their senior status. On the other hand, it is important to 
understand the underlying mechanism for this effect. It may be that at junior levels, male 
academics experience an unfair advantage (rather than female academics experiencing a 
disadvantage), which is corrected at senior levels. However, it may also be that at junior 
levels, female academics are subjected to stereotype-driven unfair disadvantage (as argued in 
this paper) whereas, at senior levels, a seniority-related stereotype produces a similar 
disadvantage for male academics. Interestingly, a study of dynamic discrimination finds a 
similar reversal where biased beliefs initially led to a female disadvantage but a subsequent 
female advantage with an accumulation of favourable evaluations (Bohren et al., 2018). It 
remains to be investigated in future research which of these mechanisms applies in academia 
and whether my findings are specific to academia or generalize beyond the higher education 
context.           
Finally, I examined bias awareness among the very people who evaluated a given 
teaching content in my experiments, and tested the idea that bias awareness leads to less 
biased teaching evaluations. It was informative to find that the vast majority of the study 
participants did not believe that gender played a role in teaching evaluations. Regrettably, 
those who anticipated the gender bias failed to correct for it in their own teaching evaluations. 
Although many organizations may rely on building awareness about the gender bias as the 
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bias mitigation strategy, this result suggests caution in relying on that kind of intervention 
alone without other forms of career support to junior female academics. 
 
Theoretical Implications  
My work makes theoretical contributions and opens promising avenues for future 
research. First, I show that gender biases may benefit from a systematic study in credence 
versus non-credence settings (Darby & Karni, 1973; Gruber & Frugone, 2011; Kasnakoglu, 
2016). My prediction is that when violation of a misaligned (e.g. high warmth-low 
competence) stereotype on one of its dimensions affects overall performance evaluations, 
behaving in a stereotype-consistent manner will be beneficial if the other dimension is non 
credence-based, and may not be beneficial if the other dimension is credence-based. In the 
latter case, behaving in a stereotype-consistent manner may simply reinforce the stereotype. 
Second, most of the literature on gender bias in academia focuses on a female 
disadvantage (Carli, 2001). In contrast, I found evidence of a male disadvantage for senior 
academics in a male-dominated discipline. This finding merits further research attention. In 
fact, the field as a whole could benefit from a more thorough understanding of all the 
explanatory mechanisms behind gender biases that produce either male or female 
disadvantages.  
Finally, I focused in the experimental work on the evaluations of the academic along 
two fundamental dimensions of social cognition (warmth and competence) which impact the 
career decisions of individual academics (Fiske et al., 2007). Yet, it is also instructive to shed 
light on the role that gender biases may play in the evaluations of learning outcomes and 
taught content which impact decisions regarding academic institutions. At the level of 
academic institutions, this may help further inform the impact of initiatives that aim to reduce 
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possible gender biases and provide impetus for more active research on bias-reducing 
interventions.    
   
Limitations and Future Directions 
There are some potential limitations to the studies conducted. Firstly, a manipulation 
check for seniority was not performed in study 2 but may be performed as an out of sample 
test to ensure that the participants attended to differences in the seniority of academics as 
intended. However, manipulation checks were conducted for gender in both studies. 
Secondly, the external (ecological) validity of the assessment of warmth for participants 
reading, rather than being physically present and observing, a lecture can be questioned. 
Thirdly, the questions to participants on the bias awareness of others, eliciting judgements of 
other participant’s bias may be problematic as research has shown that people in general have 
a bias blind spot, tending to think of others as more prone to bias than themselves (Page, 
2009; Pronin et al., 2002; Scopelliti et al., 2015). Given the methodology I have used, my 
finding that mere awareness of bias is insufficient to debias teaching evaluations may be 
erroneous. In this context, a large field study has recently evaluated the effect of differing 
interventions to debias student evaluations (Boring & Arnaud, 2017). The study found that a 
normative statement that students should not discriminate in teaching evaluations, making 
students aware of the existence of bias, did not reduce gender bias. However, when the 
normative statement was supplemented by precise information on how male students, like the 
participants, had discriminated against female lecturers in the past, gender bias was reduced. 
Other research indicates that the effect of interventions is stronger for participants with a 
lower susceptibility to bias blind spot (Scopelliti et al., 2015). These results clarify my 
experimental finding, confirming that mere awareness of bias is insufficient to debias 
teaching evaluations.    
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Looking forwards, a number of studies have found that gender bias occurs in male-
dominated roles, but may not be present in gender balanced or stereotypically female roles 
(Carli, 2001; Koch et al., 2015; Mengel et al., 2017). Whether the effects I find generalize to 
non-male dominated academic disciplines will be the subject of further research.  
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Tables and Figures 
TABLE 1 
Means (and standard deviations in brackets) for Study 1 variables  
  
Low Warmth 
Scenario 
High Warmth 
Scenario 
  Female Male Female Male 
     
Warmth  3.36  3.70  3.94  4.00 
 (0.78) (0.79) (0.68) (0.69) 
Competence  4.37  4.36  4.17  4.34 
 (0.55) (0.56) (0.67) (0.59) 
Hiring  3.81  4.02  3.97  4.13 
 (0.85) (0.75) (0.85) (0.73) 
Control Variables    
     
Male Respondent  0.51  0.43  0.55  0.49 
 (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) 
Graduate Degree  0.46  0.43  0.46  0.47 
 (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) 
Postgraduate Degree  0.16  0.19  0.19  0.14 
 (0.37) (0.39) (0.39) (0.35) 
Over 24 years old  0.46  0.46  0.44  0.48 
 (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) 
Gender Index  0.54  0.57  0.52  0.59 
 (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) 
     
Observations  125  127  118  109 
Note: the control variables are for the gender of the respondent, whether the respondent has a 
graduate or post graduate degree, whether the respondent is over 24 years old, and a (global) 
gender index measuring the degree of gender inequality in the respondent’s country of origin.  
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TABLE 2 
Regressions for Hiring Recommendation, Warmth and Competence in Study 1 
Variables Hiring Warmth Competence 
        
Male Academic  0.21**  0.34*** -0.02 
 (0.10) (0.09) (0.08) 
High Warmth Scenario  0.17  0.58*** -0.19** 
 (0.10) (0.09) (0.08) 
Male Academic x High Warmth Scenario -0.06 -0.27**  0.18 
 (0.15) (0.14) (0.11) 
Male Respondent  0.03  0.06 -0.08 
 (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) 
Graduate Degree -0.02  0.00 -0.05 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) 
Postgraduate Degree  0.04  0.20*  0.02 
 (0.11) (0.10) (0.08) 
Over 24 years old  0.04 -0.06  0.04 
 (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) 
Gender Index  0.06  0.09  0.04 
 (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) 
Constant  3.74***  3.27*** 4.39*** 
 (0.11) (0.10) (0.08) 
    
Observations  479  479  479 
R-squared  0.02  0.12  0.03 
Note: standard errors in parenthesis, * = p < .10, ** = p < .05, *** = p < .01  
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TABLE 3 
Standardized Mediation Effects for Warmth and Competence on the Hiring Recommendation 
in Study 1. 
  DV = Hiring Recommendation 
  Indirect effect of IV on DV  
Teaching Style 
Direct 
Effect of 
IV on DV 
Via 
Warmth 
Via 
Competence 
Total Total Effect 
IV on DV 
      
Gender - Low Warmth .04 .10 .00 .10 .14 
Gender - High Warmth .00 .01 .07 .08 .08 
Note: Low Warmth N=252, High Warmth N=227, DV = dependent variable, IV = 
independent variable (Gender),  
 
Values in bold = significant at p < .05. 
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TABLE 4 
Unstandardized Mediation Effects for Warmth and Competence on the Hiring 
Recommendation in Study 1. Statistics for r = 5,000 Bootstrapped regressions 
 Total Indirect Effect: via Warmth & 
Competence 
Teaching Style Low Warmth High Warmth 
Average bootstrap 
estimate  
0.1587 0.1319 
Bootstrap standard error 0.0715 0.0714 
Asymptotic standard error  0.0700 0.0682 
Normal-based interval (0.0215,0.2960) (0.0046,0.2656) 
Percentile interval (0.0216,0.2992) (0.0018,0.2747) 
Adjusted percentile 
interval 
(0.0232,0.3004) (0.0018,0.2740) 
Notes: three bootstrapping confidence intervals are shown for each coefficient. Asymptotic 
standard errors are also shown for comparison. 
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TABLE 5 
Means (and standard deviations in brackets) for Study 2 variables  
  Junior Level Professor Level 
  Female Male Female Male 
     
Warmth  3.38  3.62 3.55 3.37 
 (0.78) (0.78) (0.91) (0.83) 
Competence  4.30  4.25 4.39 4.35 
 (0.59) (0.57) (0.52) (0.57) 
Hiring  3.83  4.02 4.06 4.02 
 (0.86) (0.89) (0.83) (0.76) 
Control Variables     
     
Male Respondent  0.40  0.55 0.58 0.47 
 (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) 
Graduate Degree  0.50  0.48 0.49 0.51 
 (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) 
Postgraduate Degree  0.13  0.16 0.18 0.14 
 (0.33) (0.37) (0.38) (0.35) 
Over 24 years old  0.48  0.54 0.46 0.59 
 (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) 
Gender Index  0.57  0.55 0.51 0.60 
 (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) 
     
Observations  118  126 130 104 
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TABLE 6 
Regressions for Warmth, Competence and Hiring Recommendation in Study 2 
Variables Hiring Warmth Competence 
    
Male Academic  0.19*  0.22** -0.04 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.07) 
Professor Level  0.23**  0.15  0.11 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.07) 
Male Academic x Professor Level -0.22 -0.39** -0.02 
 (0.16) (0.15) (0.10) 
Male Respondent -0.00  0.07 -0.05 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.05) 
Graduate Degree -0.12  0.00 -0.05 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.06) 
Postgraduate Degree -0.13  0.09 -0.07 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.08) 
Over 24 years old -0.05  0.02  0.03 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.05) 
Gender Index -0.04 -0.06  0.06 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.05) 
Constant  3.95***  3.36*** 4.30*** 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.08) 
    
Observations  478  478  478 
R-squared  0.02  0.02  0.02 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, * = p < .10, ** = p < .05, *** = p < .01. Low warmth 
scenario only.   
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TABLE 7 
Comparison of Male Academic Coefficients in Study 1 and Study 2  
Variables Hiring Warmth Competence 
        
Male Academic  0.22**  0.33***  0.01 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.07) 
Study 2  0.03  0.04 -0.08 
 (0.11) (0.10) (0.07) 
Male Academic x Study 2 -0.04 -0.11 -0.02 
 (0.15) (0.14) (0.10) 
Male Respondent  0.07  0.08 -0.08 
 (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) 
Graduate Degree -0.03 -0.00  0.02 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) 
Postgraduate Degree  0.02  0.15  0.04 
 (0.12) (0.11) (0.08) 
Over 24 years old -0.10 -0.11 -0.03 
 (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) 
Gender Index  0.09  0.08  0.09 
 (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) 
Constant  3.79***  3.31***  4.35*** 
 (0.11) (0.10) (0.08) 
    
Observations  494  494  494 
R-squared  0.02  0.04  0.02 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, * = p < .10, ** = p < .05, *** = p < .01. Low warmth 
scenario only.    
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TABLE 8 
Regression Analysis of the Role of Bias Awareness on Gender Bias in Study 2  
Variables Hiring Warmth Competence 
        
Male Academic  0.21*  0.20* -0.05 
 (0.12) (0.11) (0.08) 
Professor Level  0.23**  0.15  0.11 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.07) 
Male Academic x Professor Level -0.21 -0.40** -0.02 
 (0.16) (0.15) (0.10) 
Bias Aware -0.01 -0.31 -0.09 
 (0.12) (0.22) (0.08) 
Male Academic x Bias Aware -0.10  0.40  0.05 
 (0.17) (0.32) (0.12) 
Male Respondent -0.01  0.07 -0.05  
(0.08) (0.08) (0.05) 
Graduate Degree -0.12  0.00 -0.05 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.06) 
Postgraduate degree -0.13  0.09 -0.07 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.08) 
Over 24 years old -0.04  0.02  0.03 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.05) 
Gender Index -0.04 -0.07  0.05 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.05) 
Constant  3.96*** 3.38*** 4.32*** 
 (0.12) (0.11) (0.08) 
    
Observations  478  478  478 
R-squared  0.02  0.03  0.02 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, * = p < .10, ** = p < .05, *** = p < .01 
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FIGURE 1 
Study 1 –Simple Slopes Analysis for the Hiring Recommendation, Warmth and Competence.  
 
 
Note: 95% confidence interval shown as a dotted line.  
Note: * = p < .10, ** = p < .05, *** = p < .01 
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FIGURE 2 
Study 2 – Simple Slopes Analysis for the Hiring Recommendation, Warmth and Competence. 
  
 
 
Note: 95% confidence interval shown as a dotted line. 
Note: * = p < .10, ** = p < .05, *** = p < .01 
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Appendix A 
 
Materials: Studies 1 and 2 
 
Introductory Screens 
Welcome to this study. The purpose of the study is to assist in evaluating two candidates' job 
applications. Both are graduate students who are applying for lecturer positions at a 
university. You will be asked to rate the work prepared by each candidate and to recommend 
to a recruitment committee whether you think each candidate should be hired or rejected. 
Before commencing the study you will be presented with a consent form.  
When you are ready to proceed, please press NEXT PAGE    
*** 
Please select I CONSENT AND WISH TO PROCEED and NEXT PAGE if you agree 
with the terms below to continue to the survey.  
 I have read and understood the Participant Information Sheet provided (version 2.0, 
dated 24/07/2017).   
 I agree for my anonymised data to be used for this study. 
 I understand that data will be collected using Qualtrics software. This software is 
used by academic institutions worldwide and Qualtrics give assurances that data 
collected in the EU will remain in the EU. I understand that all the data collected 
from my responses will be anonymised and the collected data points will not be 
linked to my identity.    
 I understand that all project data will be held for at least 6 years and all research 
data for at least 10 years in accordance with University policy and that my personal 
data is held and processed in the strictest confidence, and in accordance with the 
Data Protection Act (1998). 
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 I understand that I can request for my data to be withdrawn up to one month after 
completing the survey and that following my request all data already collected from 
me will be deleted. I confirm that I have read and understood the above and freely 
consent to participating in this study.  I have been given adequate time to consider 
my participation. 
I CONSENT AND WISH TO PROCEED 
I DO NOT CONSENT AND WISH TO EXIT FROM THIS SURVEY 
*** 
Lecture Introduction: junior level [professor level] 
You are about to see the text of an astronomy lecture (of about 900 words) presented by a 
graduate student who is a candidate applying for a [senior] science lecturer position at a 
university. [The candidate you are about to assess is a Professor of Astronomy.] The 
candidate's [professor’s] performance in this lecture will be crucial to the recruitment 
committee's decision. Your role, once you have seen the lecture, is to rate the candidate's 
[professor’s] performance and indicate whether you would either hire or reject them.  
When you are ready to proceed, please press NEXT PAGE.   
 
*** 
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Text of Astronomy lecture for junior <professor> level for female {male} candidate with low 
[high] warmth manipulations in italics. 
 
Welcome to today’s introductory lecture. My name is <Professor> Sue {Steve} Smith and I 
am a graduate student [Professor of Astronomy]. I hope you will find my talk interesting. I 
will be very happy to discuss complex areas with individual students afterwards. [I would 
appreciate quiet throughout the lecture so please turn mobile phones off. I will take questions 
after the lecture]. 
 
  
My talk is on the history of black holes. It is said that fact is sometimes stranger than fiction, 
and nowhere is that more true than in the case of black holes.  
  
Black holes are stranger than anything dreamed up by science fiction writers, but they are 
firmly matters of science fact. The scientific community was slow to realize that massive 
stars could collapse in on themselves, under their own gravity, and how the object left behind 
would behave.  
  
In fact Albert Einstein even wrote a paper in 1939, claiming stars could not collapse under 
gravity, because matter could not be compressed beyond a certain point. Many scientists 
shared Einstein's gut feeling.  
 
The principal exception was the American scientist John Wheeler, who in many ways is the 
hero of the black hole story. In his work in the 1950s and '60s, he emphasized that many stars 
would eventually collapse, and the problems that posed for theoretical physics.  
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He also foresaw many of the properties of the objects which collapsed stars become, that is, 
black holes. The phrase ‘black hole’ is simple enough but it’s hard to imagine one out there in 
space. Think of a giant drain with water spiralling down into it. Once anything slips over the 
edge or ‘event horizon’, there is no return.  
  
NASA describes stars as rather like pressure-cookers. The explosive force of nuclear fusion 
inside them creates outward pressure which is constrained by gravity pulling everything 
inwards. Eventually, however, the star will exhaust its nuclear fuel. The star will contract. In 
some cases, it may be able to support itself as a white dwarf star. However, it was shown 
before the war, that the maximum mass of a white dwarf star exceeds that of the sun. A 
similar maximum mass was calculated by a Soviet physicist for a star made entirely of 
neutrons. [However, Subrahmanyan Chandrasekhar showed in 1930, that the maximum mass 
of a white dwarf star is about 1.4 times that of the sun. A similar maximum mass was 
calculated by a Soviet physicist, Lev Landau, for a star made entirely of neutrons.] 
  
In 1939 Robert Oppenheimer, of later atomic bomb fame, showed that when a massive star 
exhausted its nuclear fuel it could not be supported by pressure. [In 1939 Robert 
Oppenheimer, with George Volkoff and Hartland Snyder, showed that when a massive star 
exhausted its nuclear fuel it could not be supported by pressure.] And that if one neglected 
pressure, a uniform spherically systematic symmetric star would contract to a single point of 
infinite density. Such a point is called a singularity. 
 
Take my word for it. [Evidentially.] all our theories of space are formulated on the 
assumption that spacetime is smooth and nearly flat, so they break down at the singularity, 
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where the curvature of space-time is infinite. In fact, it marks the end of time itself. That is 
what Einstein found so objectionable. 
  
Then the war intervened.  
  
Most scientists, including Robert Oppenheimer, switched their attention to nuclear physics, 
and the issue of gravitational collapse was largely forgotten. Interest in the subject revived 
with the discovery of distant but bright objects, called quasars. The first of these, 3C273, was 
discovered in 1963.  
  
Nuclear processes could not account for their energy output, because they release only a 
percent fraction of their rest mass as pure energy. Of course the only alternative was 
gravitational energy, released by gravitational collapse.  
  
Gravitational collapses of stars were re-discovered. It was clear that a uniform spherical star 
would contract to a point of infinite density, a singularity.  
 
When John Wheeler introduced the term black hole in 1967, it replaced the earlier name, 
frozen star. Wheeler's coinage emphasized that the remnants of collapsed stars are of interest 
in their own right, independently of how they were formed.  
  
So, what do we need to know about black holes? [So, what can anyone tell me about the 
properties of black holes?] 
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From the outside, you can't tell what is inside a black hole. You can throw television sets, 
diamond rings, or even your worst enemies into a black hole, and all the black hole will 
remember is the total mass, and the state of rotation.  
  
A black hole has a boundary, called the event horizon. It is where gravity is just strong 
enough to drag light back, and prevent it escaping.  
  
Because nothing can travel faster than light, everything else will get dragged back also. 
Falling through the event horizon is a bit like going over Niagara Falls in a canoe. If you are 
above the falls, you can get away if you paddle fast enough, but once you are over the edge, 
you are lost. There's no way back. 
  
It appears that the number of configurations that could form a black hole of a given mass, 
although very large, may be finite. You won’t need to know the math for this. Jacob 
Bekenstein suggested that from this finite number, you could interpret what we call the 
entropy of a black hole. This would be a measure of the amount of information that was 
irretrievably lost during the collapse when a black hole was created.  
  
The apparently fatal flaw in Bekenstein's suggestion was that if information is lost, which is 
apparently what is happening in a black hole, there should be some release of energy - but 
that flies in the face of the theory that nothing comes out of black holes.  
  
This is a paradox. And it's one which I am going to return to in my next lecture, when I'll be 
exploring how black holes challenge the most basic principle about the predictability of the 
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universe, and the certainty of history, and asking what would happen if you ever got sucked 
into one.  
  
My name is <Professor> Sue {Steve} Smith and I'd like to thank you for attending today. 
  
I am available to discuss this lecture now and during office hours on the complex topics that 
we have covered today. [For anyone who was not able to follow this introductory lecture 
there is an extensive reading list on my website.] 
 
 
Evaluation Questions (Likert scale: 1 lowest, 5 highest) 
 
This is the first lecture in an optional science course at a college. From the text that the 
candidate has prepared did they appear professional? 
 
From the text that the candidate has prepared did they appear knowledgeable?  
 
From the text that the candidate has prepared, did they appear to be a warm person? 
 
From the text that the candidate has prepared, did they appear to be an accessible person? 
 
Should the university hire the candidate as a science lecturer? 
 
Gender Questions 
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What was the gender of the candidate that you assessed for the astronomy lecture? (M/F) 
 
Study 2 only   
Which of the following will be true for other people assessing the astronomy lecture? 
(Female warmer/male warmer/neither) 
(Female more competent/male more competent/neither) 
(Female more likely to be hired/Male more likely to be hired/neither) 
 
 
Demographic Questions 
 
Finally, please provide some information about yourself. What is your gender? (M/F) 
Please enter your age in years (Numeric) 
 
For how many years have you spoken English? (Numeric) 
 
What level is your highest qualification? (High School/Degree/Postgraduate degree)  
 
Where were you born? (Table) 
 
Where do you currently live? (Table) 
 
Please enter your Prolific.com id. (THIS IS NEEDED FOR PAYMENT) 
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Chapter 5  
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Conclusions and implications for policy and further research  
Summary of Findings 
This thesis examined how academics handle multiple demands in the UK higher 
education sector. It addressed the questions of why some academics progress faster through 
their careers than others and what regularities may help sustain gender imbalances in career 
success in academia. The value of considering these questions lies in the economic 
importance of, and the increasing demands placed on, the UK higher education sector.   
An argument made in this thesis is that academics have some degree of discretion in 
their time allocation decisions between research, teaching and administration/ service with 
consequences for career outcomes. The marketization of UK public sector higher education 
has reduced academic autonomy by establishing principal-agent line management chains 
leading to control through workload accountability (Canaan & Shumar, 2008; J. Kenny & 
Fluck, 2014; J. Kenny, 2017; Olssen & Peters, 2005; Olssen, 2016; Vardi, 2009). With 
universities largely funded on a per student basis, both high quality teaching and prestige-
enhancing research are desirable for universities. However, for academics, teaching, research 
and administration/ service may be viewed as substitutes (Gautier & Wauthy, 2007; Hattie & 
Marsh, 1996; Marsh & Hattie, 2002). Indeed, research and teaching may have been 
differentiated by an increasing focus on teaching for employability, associated with 
neoliberalism in higher education (Canaan & Shumar, 2008). Neoliberalism has also, 
arguably, increased the incentive to devote time to research as a portable asset in an 
increasingly globalised job market (Gautier & Wauthy, 2007; Murphy & Sage, 2014). So, the 
incentives facing academics, including their intrinsic motivations for each role, may influence 
choices between research and teaching, subject to institutional constraints on choices, 
producing very different allocations of time to research, teaching and administration/ service 
(Allgood & Walstad, 2013; Boyd & Smith, 2016; Gautier & Wauthy, 2007; Kossi et al., 
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2015; Wilkin & Tavernier, 2002). On this basis, chapters two and three considered how 
individual preferences, and responsiveness to student expectations and engagement, affect 
discretionary time allocations to research, teaching and service. Chapter four moved on to the 
assessment of outputs, considering differences in the evaluation of teaching by gender. 
A common theme across the three chapters is differences in effects by gender. 
Gendered differences in academic career outcomes have been attributed to systemic cultural 
sexism in a male-centered system, especially in respect of working mothers (Heijstra et al., 
2015; O'Hagan, 2018; Savigny, 2014; Savigny, 2017). Certainly female academics face 
different societal expectations for care giving which may lead to gendered differences in time 
usage and power over time (Beddoes, 2015; Heijstra et al., 2015; Rafnsdóttir & Heijstra, 
2013). Further, gender differences in volunteering for non-promotable administration/service 
tasks and gender differences in recognizing contributions may influence time allocations 
(Babcock et al., 2017; Sarsons, 2017; Vesterlund et al., 2014). Conceptually, whilst 
controlling for domestic responsibilities (number of children, young children, job mobility), I 
assume that both male and female academics have some power over their allocation of time. 
On this basis, I find gender differences working in favour of male academics in terms of 
allowing for greater emphasis on research in chapter two (due to preferences for research) 
and chapter four (due to more favourable evaluations of teaching) but not in chapter three 
where male and female academics were equally responsive to student expectations and 
engagement.    
I contribute to existing literature in each chapter. Chapter two’s focus on academic’s 
preferences for research and teaching has received limited attention and my work represents a 
step in exploring the link between research, teaching and time preferences and career 
outcomes (Callaghan & Coldwell, 2014; Matthews et al., 2014). I shed light on the 
relationship between the roles of research and teaching, by finding a conflict between 
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research and teaching preferences and that greater preferences for research predict more time 
allocated to research (Hattie & Marsh, 1996; Marsh & Hattie, 2002). I also find a mediating 
role of a preference for research in devoting time to research activities based on gender. Thus 
I contribute to the study of gender differences in role preferences (Gino et al., 2015).  
In chapter three I find that high student expectations of support and student 
engagement give rise to extra-curricular teaching effort. I test whether guilt aversion could be 
a possible mechanism leading to extra-curricular teaching efforts but obtain conflicting 
findings. In particular, guilt-proneness is found to be positively associated with extra-
curricular teaching effort. However, guilt aversion might not be the reason why academics 
respond to greater student expectations and engagement. I thus contribute to the literature on 
social exchange theory (Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1976) and to the study of guilt aversion 
(Battigalli & Dufwenberg, 2007; Charness & Dufwenberg, 2006). 
The subject of chapter four is teaching evaluation bias. I find a bias in favour of male 
academics at junior levels, and I explore the role of warmth and competence perceptions 
about academics as driving the academic’s overall evaluation, which is a novel approach in 
this setting (MacNell et al., 2015; Ottoboni et al., 2016). In addition, very few studies have 
considered what may help eliminate the gender bias in teaching evaluations. I examined the 
role of academic seniority (Mengel et al., 2017) and bias awareness (Boring & Arnaud, 
2017). I thus extend current work on the teaching evaluations bias, and derive new insights, 
in a controlled experimental setting.   
The following sections consider the policy implications arising from the thesis, the 
external (ecological) validity of the research instruments used in each chapter, and promising 
directions for future research.    
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Policy Implications 
A number of policy implications arise from this thesis. I discuss below these 
implications referencing each of the chapters in turn.  
Chapter two has generated preliminary evidence that research preferences may drive 
allocations of time to research, which, as shown in the literature (Barbezat, 2006; Hattie & 
Marsh, 1996; Rey, 2001), contributes to greater research productivity and career success. It 
was also found that research preferences are not aligned to teaching preferences but rather 
greater research preferences are typically associated with lower teaching preferences. One 
policy implication therefore is the importance of encouraging research-based teaching so that 
academics do not regard teaching and research as conflicting activities but find ways of 
leveraging the time devoted to one of these for making progress on the other front. Recent 
studies that find that greater research productivity is associated with better teaching (Healey 
et al., 2010; Shin, 2011; Zhang & Shin, 2015) suggest that this is possible. Practices such as 
the analysis of data from classroom simulations and assessments, and hands-on projects 
whereby the students are asked to reach out to specific target populations for data, may help 
in making better teachers become more research-productive, further strengthening the 
relationship between research and teaching. I also find a gender difference in preferences for 
research which helps explain why female academics may be devoting less time to research. 
Such a difference could be predicted from a previously hypothesised stronger social 
orientation of women (Croson & Gneezy, 2009) which may apply to female academics. In 
this sense, policies that celebrate female role models that devote themselves to research and 
showcase forms of research that benefit others and the broader society may help women 
develop stronger preferences for research, and help, therefore, the career success of female 
academics. 
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In chapter three, I showed that both male and female academics are more likely to 
exert extra-curricular teaching effort in response to greater student expectations of support 
and greater student engagement. It is important to note, therefore, that when current policies 
in higher education raise student expectations, this may have repercussions for how much 
academics work in addition to what their reward systems compensate them for. Whereas the 
bulk of regulatory concerns centre around student experience and value for money 
(Department for Business Innovation and Skills, 2016; Kandiko & Mawer, 2013), they 
should attend to the experiences of academics as well, and allow for greater flexibility in the 
reward systems so that academics do not begin to regard the system as unfair and 
demotivating. As my work shows, the risk of devoting more time to teaching away from 
research time, which is highly valuable to the careers of academics, in response to high 
student expectations and high engagement is faced by both male and female academics. 
Again, teaching that is more research-based and where the interactions with students would 
centre more around research-relevant assignments may be valuable in addressing this 
problem as well.  
 Finally, the policy implications from chapter four have to do with the experiences of 
those academics whose evaluations of teaching are likely to distort the effort invested into 
this activity. I have seen that the delivery of equal teaching content was assessed more 
negatively (as reflected in lower recommendations to hire the academic for a university 
position) for women, and junior women, in particular. Some authors found evidence of a 
similar phenomenon in field studies of teaching evaluations (Mengel et al., 2017; Ottoboni et 
al., 2016). Collectively, what these findings suggest is that a policy of shielding academics 
from the impact that teaching evaluations would normally have on their careers for a period 
of time would be useful. The period of time needs to be chosen closer to the beginning of the 
academic career. In this time, teaching evaluations may be collected for their role of 
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informational feedback. The policy may be terminated once both male and female academics 
have had the time to experiment and learn, as well as grow in their careers to a level at which 
their credentials may protect them from biases in teaching evaluations. Chapter four also 
contributes to the debate on the importance of bias awareness for bias reduction.  In 
particular, I showed that those more aware of gender bias in teaching evaluations did not 
correct their evaluations to compensate for the bias. Hence, mere awareness might not be the 
most effective tool for overcoming biases in teaching evaluations, a finding clarified by a 
recent field study (Boring & Arnaud, 2017).      
 
External Validity of the Research Instruments 
I will consider the external (ecological) validity of the research instruments used in 
each chapter. In chapter two, my findings for time preferences are subject to the question of 
whether academics consider the extrinsic rewards from research outputs as a motivation to 
engage in research in the real world. I argued that monetary rates of time preferences may act 
as a mediator of time allocated to research given that the monetary benefits of research, in 
terms of career advancement, may be deferred far into the future. However, some activities 
have been argued to provide their own intrinsic reward (Deci, 1971; Kahneman & Thaler, 
2006), so an academic may allocate time to research because they enjoy it without regard to 
the longer term career benefit. Indeed, I did not find a significant relationship between rates 
of time preference and time allocated to research in my study.  
In chapter three, the vignettes used to determine extra-curricular teaching effort in 
response to the manipulations of student expectations and engagement were designed to 
mirror a real world conflict. Further, unlike student population samples, the target audience 
faced similar research and teaching responsibilities in the real world. The online format 
avoided cues from an invigilator in a laboratory setting. However, to guard against possible 
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experimenter demand effects, prompted by cues about what constitutes acceptable behaviour, 
I embedded the experiment in a lengthy set of survey questions (Zizzo, 2010). The ordering 
of vignettes was also randomized to avoid spillover effects (Transue, Lee, & Aldrich, 2009). 
In chapter four, I have highlighted that the methodology used eliciting judgements of 
other participant’s bias may be problematic as research has shown that people in general have 
a bias blind spot, tending to think of others as more prone to bias than themselves (Page, 
2009; Pronin et al., 2002; Scopelliti et al., 2015). A recent field study (Boring & Arnaud, 
2017) clarified my experimental finding that mere awareness of bias is insufficient to debias 
teaching evaluations. Also in chapter four, the external (ecological) validity of the assessment 
of warmth for participants reading, rather than being physically present and observing, a 
lecture can be questioned. Further, the sample population was drawn from Prolific.com and 
so, unlike in a field experiment, was not directly invested in the teaching that they were 
evaluating (MacNell et al., 2015; Ottoboni et al., 2016). However, unlike in a field 
experiment, in the controlled experimental setting I use, “teaching quality and style can 
literally be held constant by deceiving students about the instructor’s true gender identity” 
(Mengel et al., 2017, p. 4). So, experiments can provide vital insights into real-world 
behaviours and complement field experiments.   
The internal validity of the analytic methods employed is strong. The use of 
randomized economic experiments in chapters three and four, represent a benchmark, in 
terms of their empirical credibility, against which non-experimental studies can be evaluated 
(Angrist & Pischke, 2010). Further, the analysis of mediating variables used in chapters two 
and four is an established tool in the psychology literature to understand the mechanism 
through which the causal variable affects the outcome (D. Kenny, 2016).  
In summary, whilst concerns can be raised about the external validity of specific 
results they do not necessarily undermine the main findings of this thesis. However, the 
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concerns raised provide a basis for adopting better methodology to further explore my 
findings as detailed in the next section. 
 
 
Future Directions 
An assumption made in this thesis is that academics, of both genders, have at least 
some discretion over their allocation of time. Capturing additional data, comparing actual 
against contractual allocation of time and exploring restrictions on the allocation of time, 
could enhance the strength of this argument. Further, all the findings in this thesis open 
promising avenues for future research both in terms of methodological improvement, and in 
terms of testing novel theoretical insights.  
Better Methodology. Chapter two, on the importance of the academic’s preferences 
for time dedicated to research and subsequent career growth through higher research 
productivity, would be best addressed using a longitudinal study of preferences, time 
allocation and career outcomes. This would entail careful consideration of incentives for 
study participants to minimize rates of attrition, and a choice of the appropriate data-analytic 
strategy (Diggle et al., 2002). 
Chapter three was a 3x3 experiment on the role of student expectations and 
engagement. Additionally, I was interested to test for the gender effects in the sensitivity of 
academics to the manipulated levels of expectations and engagement. Perhaps the design 
could be simplified (e.g. only engagement being manipulated) and gender differences could 
be tested not across all academic disciplines but with the consideration of the specificities of 
work within different academic disciplines. So, a possible design could be 3 (engagement) x 
2 (gender) x 2 (hard sciences versus not), and this could provide for a more thorough 
investigation of the context in which the effects of engagement arise. 
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In chapter four, I examined the bias in teaching evaluations by means of a controlled 
experiment. In respect of the perceptions of bias awareness, the approach adopted in a recent 
field study on interventions to debias student evaluations (Boring & Arnaud, 2017), should be 
adopted to avoid the issue of participants tending to think of others as more prone to bias than 
themselves (Page, 2009; Pronin et al., 2002; Scopelliti et al., 2015). In respect of the main 
results, the people evaluating a given teaching content were not actual students (although I 
sampled only respondents who were aged between 18 and 30) and not particularly invested in 
my chosen domain of study (astronomy). I could improve on this study by better tailoring the 
context of teaching evaluations to the actual experience of the respondents, and run similar 
studies in different disciplines of study with actual students in that discipline. Such a design 
would produce additional insight into the differences in bias between various study 
disciplines.  
Theoretical insight. Importantly, everything I learned in the thesis may be equally 
relevant to the study of public services other than academia. First my findings in chapter two 
open an interesting agenda for exploring the effect of role preferences in shaping career 
progress in a range of occupations in public services as many occupations may require 
choices concerning the time to be devoted to more technical versus more social aspects of the 
job. Just as academics may have a stronger preference for research versus teaching, 
healthcare professionals may have a stronger preference for surgery versus primary care, and 
experience dramatically different career outcomes as a result. As in education, it would be 
important to test then whether such impactful differences in preferences align with gender 
differences, and whether it is in the interest of the broader society to sustain these differences 
culturally and by means of job design. 
As for the focus of my investigation in chapter three, in primary care the General 
Practioners (GPs) face real conflicts between engaging in extra time with a particular patient 
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and fulfilling local authority data requirements. This is the setting I examined in chapter three 
where academics were shown to respond with extra-curricular teaching effort to their 
students’ high expectations and high engagement. The design of the study reported in chapter 
three may be employed to test whether patient expectations matter for how GPs handle 10 
minute consultations with their patients, and what the repercussions are for the quality of 
patient outcomes.  
In chapter four, I note that education is an example of a credence service whereby 
students lack the knowledge necessary to confidently judge the academic, especially 
concerning competence (Darby & Karni, 1973; Kasnakoglu, 2016). Similarly healthcare is a 
credence service, whereby patients lack the knowledge necessary to confidently judge the 
competence of the doctor. This suggests that the “bedside manner” of the doctor may have 
similar effects to those of teaching style in the studies reported in chapter four. It would be 
interesting to examine to what extent the effect I find in teaching style (a warm teaching style 
improves perceptions of the female academic’s warmth at the expense of somewhat 
diminishing her competence perceptions) generalizes beyond credence settings such as 
education and healthcare, and what are the factors (e.g. a teacher’s or a doctor’s visible 
competence credentials) that may protect the person delivering the service from the perverse 
effects of approaching their job in a gender-stereotypical manner.   
I would like to conclude by noting that the theoretical insights in this thesis lead the 
way to further research into productivity within the higher education sector specifically, and 
potentially other areas of the public sector. The economic importance of the UK higher 
education sector, and the effects of the demands currently being placed on academics by 
government and institutional policies, suggest that the questions raised here merit further 
research attention.      
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